

Varieties of Political Regimes (Va-PoReg)



Country Reports N-Si

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Overview

The following country reports are part of the Va-PoReg supplementary materials. We provide these materials to transparently trace how we have classified political regimes between 1900 and the present. For details on regime classification, please consult the codebook. The countries and territories covered by the dataset are listed in alphabetical order in the country report documents. In each case, the history of political regimes in the named territory from 1900 to the most recent cut-off date (currently 07/01/2024, whereby the dates follow the format MM/DD/YYYY) is listed. The description begins in each case with an entry starting 01/01/1900. This is followed in each case by the regime type at that time. The time at which this regime began is indicated in square brackets behind it. All following entries indicate the end of a regime and the start of a new regime. The entries conclude with a note indicating which regime was continued at the last cut-off date, specifically 07/01/2024. Please note that regime periods which begin after 07/01 of year x and end before 07/01 of the following year appear in the following country reports but not in the country-year dataset. If the regime type is mentioned in brackets after protectorate, this always refers to the country that is a protectorate. If after colony a regime type is mentioned in brackets, this refers to the colonizing country if it is mentioned first.

Acronyms for datasets

AF	Anckar and Fredriksson (2020, Political Regimes of the World Dataset, v.2.0) Regimes of the World Dataset, v.2.0
BMR	Boix, Miller, and Rosato
BR	Bjørnskov and Rode (2019)
CEI	Clean Elections Index (V-Dem)
CGV	Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland
EF&FI	Elections Free and Fair Index (V-Dem)
FH	Freedom House
GWF	Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018)
LDI	Liberal Democracy Index of V-Dem
LIED	Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy, dataset v6.4 (2022)
MCM	Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013, Autocracies of the world)

PCLI	Political and Civil Liberties Index (V-Dem)
REIGN	Rulers, Elections and Irregular Governance Dataset
RoW	Regimes of the World
V-Dem	Varieties of Democracy

Other abbreviations

EU	European Union
LoN	League of Nations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America

Namibia

[Formerly known as: South West Africa]

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 08/07/1884]: While German Southwest Africa was named a protectorate („Schutzgebiet” Deutsch Südwestafrika) it fulfills our coding rules of a colony. In 1883, Adolf Lüderitz landed in what is known today as Namibia. He bought the land around today's Lüderitz in hopes of finding mineral resources there. On 04/24/1884, Bismarck instructed the German consul at Cape Town via cable to officially declare that Lüderitz and his establishment were under German protection. Consequently, in response to this development, the Cape Colony annexed Walvis Bay. On 07/24/1884, the Cape Colonial Parliament passed the Walfish Bay and St. John's River Annexation Act (No. 35 of 1884), and on 08/07/1884, the governor issued a formal Proclamation of Annexation (No. 184). The annexed territory stretched from the north bank of the Orange River to the twenty-sixth degree of south latitude, extending twenty miles inland, and encompassing all islands belonging to it under international law. On 08/16/1884, Schering issued a proclamation declaring the establishment of a German protectorate over Namaland and Damaraland. With the proclamation of the protectorate, known as the South West Africa Protectorate, the demarcation of the boundaries of what would become Namibia was finalized. On 07/01/1890, Britain and Germany reached an agreement concerning Africa and Heligoland that acknowledged British control over Walvis Bay and German sovereignty over the South West Africa Protectorate (Berat 1993). Under German administration, the treatment was notably severe, leading to particularly devastating outcomes for the Nama/Orlam and the Herero communities (Berat 1993). Within the colony itself, there was no local parliament or representative assembly that included the indigenous population or even the settlers. The colony was administered directly by German officials appointed by the colonial government in Berlin. The administration was characterized by a highly centralized and autocratic form of governance, with little to no input from the local population. LIED confirms that there were no multiparty executive and legislative elections during this period. Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as absent. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

07/09/1915 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by South Africa, Electoral Oligarchy]: In 1915, troops from the Union of South Africa, which had incorporated the Cape Colony in 1910, entered German

South West Africa during World War I, siding with the Allied and Associated Powers. Following the war, the Union administered the former German protectorate on behalf of Britain as a League of Nations C mandate. This included the integration of South West Africa and the Walvis Bay territory into a unified legislative framework. South Africa later treated the mandate as a covert annexation and implemented a severe system of governance (Berat 1993). According to LIED, no elections were held during this period. For the given timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

12/17/1920 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by South Africa, Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy]/Start (de facto) Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate of South Africa, Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy]: The conclusion of the First World War marked the official demise of the German colonial empire. As per the Treaty of Versailles, all colonies were transferred to the newly established League of Nations as mandated territories, including German Southwest Africa. In 1921, the League of Nations transferred the mandate over Namibia to South Africa, which governed Namibia as a fifth province. This included the implementation of homeland policies, allocating specific territories to different population groups, and the enforcement of strict passport and labor regulations.¹ Although this transfer of power ended German sovereignty over the area, it did not mean that sovereignty was vested in the League of Nations. Instead, the League had supervisory power over mandates. Sovereignty over South West Africa also did not vest in South Africa despite the expressed intention of South Africa to the contrary. From the start, South Africa treated the mandate as a veiled annexation. It continually took actions that asserted South African sovereignty over the territory (Berat 1993). In 1925 an all-white parliament Assembly and an executive committee were created by the South West Africa Constitution Act. From 1920-1925, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1926, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. From 1927 to 1966, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-

¹ <https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/hintergrund-aktuell/203118/namibia-feiert-seine-unabhaengigkeit/>

Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In 1949 the South West Africa Affairs Amendment guaranteed a direct representation of South West Africa in South Africa's parliament but the South West African parliament Assembly was still present.² According to LIED legislative and multiparty elections were present since 1926 but only accessible for white settlers as South Africa imposed its Apartheid system in Namibia during this time. During the 1950s, South Africa implemented the apartheid system across its provinces. Concurrently, anti-colonial opposition to South Africa began to emerge in Namibia, leading to the establishment of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) movement in 1960. Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as absent.

10/27/1966 Continuation as (de facto) Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of South Africa, Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy]: On this date, the UN, as the successor to the League of Nations, revoked South Africa's mandate over Namibia, effectively ending the International Mandate of South Africa on Namibia, but the South African government ignored this, creating a de jure Colony of Namibia under South African administration. As a result, SWAPO took up the military struggle.³ On 10/27/1966 the United Nations General Assembly put South West Africa under direct UN responsibility; South Africa did not recognize this and continued to exercise de facto authority.⁴ In 1967, the UN established a Council for South West Africa/Namibia, responding to a different administrative vacuum through the International Trusteeship Agreement (ITA). The council's mandate involved overseeing Namibia's governance, stepping in to address the vacuum created not by immediate threats to the existing government, but by the expected withdrawal of South Africa subsequent to the termination of its mandate and the General Assembly's assumption of direct responsibility for the territory. Nevertheless, South Africa barred the council from entering Namibia. Despite this, the council exercised its de jure administrative authority, among other things, to issue travel documents and enact a Decree on Natural Resources. In December 1973, the UN recognized the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) as the authentic representative of the Namibian people, referring concurrently to the international Territory of Namibia. SWAPO was granted observer status in the General Assembly in 1976. South Africa eventually engaged in negotiations with SWAPO, facilitated by a contact group comprising five Western states. From 1966 to 1978, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the

² <https://web.archive.org/web/20150402110638/http://www.lac.org.na/namlex/Intro.pdf>

³ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/untagS.htm>

⁴ <https://www.rulers.org/ruln1.html#namibia>

executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In 04/1978, the Contact Group presented a Settlement Proposal (Crawford 2006). For 1979, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In 1988, when South Africa ultimately consented to Namibian independence, the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) had a restricted administrative role focused on overseeing and managing the elections (Wilde 2001). In this regime period there was no legitimate local parliament that represented the indigenous Namibian population. The political system was structured to exclude the majority of Namibians, particularly the black population, from any meaningful participation in governance. LIED confirms that multiparty legislative elections were still present until 1983. From 1980 to 1982, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1983 and 1984, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1985, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1984 onward, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held. Universal suffrage was introduced in 1990 (LIED). Per FH, from 1972 to 1974, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. FH doesn't provide information on the rest of the regime period. According to LIED political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as absent until 1979 and as not really present from 1980 onward.

04/01/1989 End (de facto) Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of South Africa, Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy]/Start Democratizing Regime [as International Mandate of the UN]: On this date, the General Assembly designated the United Nations Council for Namibia as the 'legitimate Administering Authority' for Namibia until its independence. Independence for Namibia was facilitated by the Tripartite Accords, an agreement between South Africa, Angola, and Cuba.⁵ Pre-independence parliamentary elections were conducted under UN supervision from 11/7 to 11/11/1989. On 02/09/1990, the Constituent Assembly approved a constitution. SWAPO, led by Nujoma, the primary party in the armed struggle for independence, emerged

⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Namibian_parliamentary_election

victorious in the elections.⁶ Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For this year, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. From 1986-1989, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

03/21/1990 End Democratizing Regime [as International Mandate of the UN]/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, the country became independent, declaring itself the Republic of Namibia and introducing universal suffrage.⁷ The Constituent Assembly became the National Assembly of Namibia. As a result of SWAPO's election victory Sam Nujoma was unanimously declared by parliament as President of Namibia and was sworn in by UN Secretary-General.⁸ On 04/23/1990 Namibia was admitted to the United Nations.⁹ For 1990, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1991 to 2018, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. SWAPO has won all subsequent elections and maintained more than two thirds of the seats in the legislature from 1994 until 2019.¹⁰ Although elections have generally been considered fair, the ruling party has monopolized the use of state resources to influence outcomes, harassed the media, and controlled the electoral tribunal, disadvantaging the opposition. The opposition has faced intimidation and harassment (Bauer 2001: 43-51, Africa Confidential 2007). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1990 the country's elections score a constant competitiveness according to LIED. However, V-Dem's CEI indicates ambiguous cleanliness for the first five years of independence. Since 1995 the elections are considered as somewhat clean. Furthermore, the overall election conditions were ambiguous until 1993. Between 1994 and 2013 they increased to somewhat free and fair elections. From 2014 to 2018 the country scored free and fair elections. Since 2019, the overall conditions turned back to somewhat free

⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Namibian_parliamentary_election

⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Namibian_parliamentary_election

⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_652

¹⁰ <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/NAM>

and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). For 2019, 2021 and 2022 and 2023, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 2020 and 2023, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. As per FH's classification for this regime period, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 4 to 5, which we also interpret as free or rather free in our framework. Furthermore, regarding the political liberties, LIED states their presence since 1990. In addition, V-Dem's PCLI also indicates the existence of political liberties for the entire time. According to Polity5 during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. By GWF Namibia is coded as an autocracy which we view as a misclassification. Post-independence, Namibia has adhered to the formal rule of law and democracy, but power remained concentrated in the hands of Nujoma and his inner circle even after his retirement. Challenges to the government from dissatisfied regions in the 1990s were met with human rights violations and government repression (Bauer 2001: 40-44, 53, Africa Confidential 2007). Opposition parties are allowed but were widely considered to have no real chance of gaining power.¹¹ However, the pattern changed in the 2019 parliamentary elections. SWAPO lost its two-third majority in parliament and their presidential candidate Hage Geingob gained only 56% of the votes – the lowest share of votes in party history.¹² The general election was supposed to be held on 11/27/2024, which was preceded by rising youth dissatisfaction over high unemployment and increasing scrutiny of the long-ruling SWAPO party. Voting itself was plagued by widespread technical and logistical problems, including malfunctioning equipment and ballot shortages, which led the Electoral Commission to illegally extend voting hours over several days. This extension was vehemently opposed by opposition parties, who accused the ECN of voter suppression and fraud, and subsequently boycotted the official result declaration. Ultimately, the ruling SWAPO party retained power, though with its weakest electoral performance since independence, securing a bare parliamentary majority. Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, the SWAPO candidate, was declared Namibia's first female president, despite the opposition leader, Panduleni Itula, immediately vowing to challenge the election results in court due to the "multitude of irregularities."¹³

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

¹¹

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Namibia#:~:text=Namibia%20is%20a%20democratic%20but,real%20chance%20of%20gaining%20power.

¹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Namibian_general_election

¹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Namibian_general_election

Additional Sources (Emminghaus 2002, Krennerich 1999, McDougall 1986)

Natal

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 10/12/1838]: On 10/12/1838 Natal became a republic. However, by 1839, the Boers, led by Pretorius, had overcome the Zulu and established a republic in Natal. This move led to renewed conflict with the British government, which opposed the presence of a competing European state on the Indian Ocean coast. The British also feared the impact of Boer expansion into Natal on the surrounded Nguni communities in the eastern Cape. Consequently, Britain annexed Natal in 1845. Disheartened by this turn of events, most of the Natal Boers returned to the highveld, where other groups of settlers had already displaced the Ndebele beyond the Limpopo River. The British government hesitantly followed the Boers north of the Orange River, yet in 1852 and 1854, it acknowledged the independence of the Boer republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, respectively. Thus, in the mid-nineteenth century, South Africa comprised two British colonies, the Cape and Natal, alongside two Boer republics and numerous independent African kingdoms and chiefdoms, with the Basuto and Zulu kingdoms being the most prominent among them (Oliver/Anthony 2005). From 01/07/1856 on, Natal was a separate British colony. The Imperial Government reluctantly consented to the annexation of Natal. It was not warmly received as an addition to the British Empire; however, the Secretary of State, Lord Stanley, believed that Natal might pose less of a burden to Britain if it were integrated into the Cape Colony rather than being administered as a separate entity. This arrangement remained until 1856, but the challenges of governing the new territory from Cape Town were considerable. Consequently, in 1848, a distinct Legislative Council was established in Pietermaritzburg, and Martin West became the first Lieutenant-Governor, effectively governing Natal as a separate colony (Lambert 1975). On 05/01/1893 Natal received self-government. Following his communication with the Imperial Government, Robinson, upon his return to Natal, strongly advocated for responsible government. This led to the commencement of a significant constitutional discussion in the colony in 1888. Due to disagreements regarding the degree of control the colonists would have over native policy, the debate prolonged for more than four years. However, in 1893, the colony ultimately achieved full self-government (Lambert 1975). In May, the small white settler community commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of Natal's annexation by the British Crown as a district

of the Cape Colony. This status persisted until 1856 when Natal became a distinct colony with its own 'representative government'. During the same month of May in 1893, Natal's Legislative Council passed a 'responsible government' bill with a narrow majority, receiving royal assent in July of that year. The year 1893 was significant for another reason, marked by the elections held in September for the new Legislative Assembly under Natal's 'responsible government' constitution. This assembly was elected by a predominantly male and white electorate, reflecting the Colony's non-racial franchise, which, due to property qualifications enforced by local officials, effectively excluded most people of color. Natal's achievement of 'responsible government' status was part of a larger imperial process. Each of the white settlement colonies in Canada and Australia gained representative institutions, albeit at varying rates within the British Empire, depending on local circumstances. Closer to home, Natal neighbored politically independent Boer republics in the interior, as well as the Cape Colony, which had obtained 'representative government' in 1853 and 'responsible government' in 1872. It's noteworthy that Natal was one of the last British colonies with a white settler population to achieve this constitutional milestone. The Imperial Government had to balance settler demands with the interests of indigenous populations across its overseas territories, particularly in Natal, where settlers constituted a small minority of the population (Guest 1993/94). On 05/31/1910 Natal became part of the Union of South Africa (see Cape Colony, Orange Free State and Transvaal). Based on our observations, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period, which contradicts the observations of LIED. Before the affiliation to South Africa the country held elections which were not competitive between 1900 and 1910, according to LIED. Furthermore, political liberties were absent (LIED). V-Dem does not register Natal in its dataset.

05/31/1910 End Natal [Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy]: On this date Natal became part of the Union of South Africa.

For time after 05/31/1910, see **South Africa**.

Nauru

01/01/1900 (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 10/02/1888]: In 1886, Germany was granted control over the island of Nauru through the Anglo-German Declaration. On 10/02/1888, Nauru was forcefully integrated into the German Protectorate of the Marshall Islands, ostensibly to quell a civil war.¹⁴ Then, in April

¹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Nauru

1906, the Marshall Islands Protectorate was incorporated into German New Guinea, leading to Nauru's transition from a protectorate to an official colony by 1907 (Reilly/Gratschew 2001, Storr 2020). Nauru, as part of the German colonial system, did not have a local parliament or any form of representative assembly. The island was administered by officials appointed by the German government, who reported to the colonial authorities in German New Guinea and, ultimately, to the German Imperial government. The governance of Nauru was centralized, with the German colonial administration making decisions regarding the island's affairs. The local population had no political power or formal means of participation in governance. LIED confirms that legislative multiparty elections were absent. LIED classifies political liberties as absent.

09/14/1914 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Australia, Defective Democracy]: On this date, the Acting Governor of German New Guinea surrendered to Australian troops. From that point until 1919, Britain held control of the island. The Australian occupation was declared successful on 11/06/1914 (Storr 2020). No elections were held during this period (LIED). For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent.

10/28/1919 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Australia, Defective Democracy]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy]: In 1920, Nauru was formally designated as a British League of Nations mandate, although the practical implementation of administrative authority on the island was dictated by the 1919 Nauru Island Agreement", adopted on 10/28/1919. This agreement established an Australian-appointed administrator and formed the British Phosphate Commission (BPC) to control phosphate mining (Storr 2020: 161, Lansford 2021). During this period, Nauru did not have a local parliament or representative body. The island was administered by an Australian-appointed administrator who acted on behalf of the three mandatory powers (the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand). The political authority on the island was concentrated in the hands of the Australian administrator, who was responsible for implementing the policies of the mandatory powers. The local population had no formal political representation or say in the governance of the island. The British Phosphate Commission (BPC) was established to manage the lucrative phosphate mining operations on Nauru. This body, controlled by the mandatory powers, further underscored the economic exploitation of Nauru without the involvement or consent of the indigenous Nauruans. LIED still considers multiparty executive and legislative elections as absent. Political liberties were absent according to LIED.

08/26/1942 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as International Mandate]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]: During the Second World War, Nauru was occupied by Japanese forces who deported around 1200 Nauruan people to the Truk Islands (now Chuuk State within the Federated States of Micronesia) (Morris 2022, Lansford 2021). The Japanese also took control of the phosphate operations on the island. In 1945, the United States of America bombarded the Japanese military base in Nauru and Truk but focused on occupying Truk and the rest of the Pacific Islands Mandate, leaving Nauru under Japanese control (Storr 2020). No elections were held during this period (LIED). In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent.

09/13/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy, later Australia]: On this date, Japanese troops surrendered to Australian forces. On 01/01/1946, the Nauruan people who survived Japanese captivity on Truk Islands were repatriated to Nauru and the BPC maintained its operations (Storr 2020).¹⁵ On 11/01/1947, Nauru was designated a UN Trust Territory, jointly administered by the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, with Australia once again acting as the de facto administering authority (Lansford 2021: 1160).¹⁶ Universal suffrage was introduced in 1951. According to LIED multiparty and legislative elections were held since 1951. According to our observations, this is a false coding. Nauru's electoral laws originated in 1965 when an electoral ordinance based on Australian legislation was implemented (Reilly/Gratschew 2001). According to LIED political liberties were absent.

01/22/1966 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime/Start (de facto) Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate of Australia]: Formally, already on 01/01/1966 Nauru became a self-governing territory. On 01/22/1966 elections were held for members of a Legislative Council, that held jurisdiction over all matters except defense, external affairs, and the phosphate industry (Lansford 2021: 1160). The newly formed body consisted of fifteen members, including nine elected members, one ex officio member (the Administrator), and five „official members“ appointed by the Governor-General of Australia upon the nomination of the Administrator. Since six members of the assembly were de facto not elected, the period cannot be called a democratic period.¹⁷ There were no parties, all candidates ran as independent

¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_occupation_of_Nauru

¹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Nauru

¹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Administrators_of_Nauru

contestants. DeRoburt insisted that ‘self-government’ meant being recognized as a sovereign state on the international stage. However, the Australian government was only willing to grant them the status of a municipal council within Queensland (Storr 2020). A Constitutional Convention was elected in 1967. It produced a new constitution in preparation for independence, which provided for an 18-member Legislative Assembly with a three-year term. The assembly would then appoint a five-member Council of State to exercise executive power.¹⁸ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this time the elections were competitive following LIED. According to LIED political liberties were present.

01/31/1968 End (de facto) Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate of Australia]/Start Liberal Democracy: Following the adoption of the Nauru Independence Act on 11/10/1967 in the Australian federal parliament, Australian authorities drafted a new constitution for Nauru, providing for a Westminster-style parliamentary system. On 01/26/1968, elections were held for the 18-member new legislative assembly, with two positions for each of the nine constituencies. On 01/29/1968, the constitution was unanimously adopted, and Nauru became a sovereign state on 01/31/1968 (Storr 2020). On 05/18/1968 Hammer DeRoburt, who had served as head chief of Nauru since 1956, was appointed as the first president of the new republic through legislative designation (Lansford 2021: 1160). On 12/18/1976, Bernard Dowiyogo was elected president, challenging DeRoburt’s leadership. The parliamentary elections of 1976 saw the emergence of the Nauru Party, which won most seats, but the party disappeared after DeRoburt’s re-election as president. Although Nauru does not have political parties, they are permitted, but candidates generally run as independents. Alliances in the parliament are loose and mainly based on personal and family relationships. Throughout the years, the government has witnessed numerous changes due to successful votes of no confidence, resulting in 16 government changes between 1968 and 2000. Nauru operates under a unicameral parliamentary system with a president who serves as head of government and head of state. Suffrage is granted to Nauruan citizens over 20 (Reilly/Gratschew 2001). The parliamentary elections on 08/24/2019 were monitored by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Incumbent President Baron Waqa had previously been accused of electoral fraud by granting citizenship to foreigners. However, the elections were generally considered free and fair, Waqa lost re-election, and Lionel Aingimea was chosen president. Despite universal suffrage, only three women have been elected to Nauru’s legislative assembly since independence. Based on

¹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967_Nauruan_Constitutional_Convention_election

our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED affirms that the elections were constantly competitive ever since the country's independence. According to FH, from 1972 to 2018, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. From 2019 onward, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. Besides, the country guaranteed political liberties ever since its independence in 1968 (LIED). Moreover, the Australian government yields considerable political influence in Nauru due to an immigration detention center for asylum seekers on the island. On 09/24/2021, Nauru signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Australian government to maintain the operation of the immigration detention center indefinitely.¹⁹ V-Dem does not list the country in its data.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Nepal

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 09/25/1768]: Nepal first reached its sovereignty on 09/25/1768. The Kingdom of Nepal has been ruled by the Shah dynasty since it was founded in 1768.²⁰ The circumstances altered significantly when Nepal succumbed to British control and was compelled to sign the Sugauli Treaty in 1816, effectively placing Nepal under British protection and reducing its territorial extent. Similarly, the Betrawati Treaty signed with Tibet resulted in a reduction of Nepal's northern borders. Nonetheless, Great Britain officially acknowledged Nepal as an independent and sovereign state through the 1923 treaty (Bhatta 2022). On 09/15/1846 Jung Bahadur (later Rana) and his brothers killed about 40 members of the palace court including the prime minister Fathe Jung Shah and rendered King Rajendra Bikram Shah powerless.²¹ Bahadur became prime minister, exiled the king, and began the concentration of power in his own hands that resulted in the marginalization of the royal family and the establishment of Jung Bahadur's family as hereditary prime ministers and de facto rulers of Nepal. They controlled all executive, legislative, and judicial power. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making

¹⁹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nauru/freedom-world/2022>

²⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_heads_of_state_of_Nepal

²¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jung_Bahadur_Rana

power. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

12/21/1923 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as independent country]: On this date, the Nepal-Britain treaty was signed with immediate effect, changing Nepal's status from a British protectorate to a sovereign state with the authority to conduct its foreign policy. The treaty was officially recorded in the League of Nations in 1925.²² The departure of the British from India in 1947 left the Ranas without a crucial external source of support and subjected the regime to fresh risks.²³ Nonetheless, by 1950 the Rana family owned three fourths of the arable land in the country and consumed about half of the state's income (Levi 1952: 185-88, Hayes 1975: 620, Heitzman 1993, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 81). For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1923 to 1949, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1950, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

02/18/1951 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Autocratic Monarchy: On this date another revolt by the Nepali Congress forced the Rana family into political exile. The popular king Tribhuvan returned to the throne with promises of creating a democracy. After the triumph of the Indian Independence Movement, in which Nepalese activists participated with India's backing and the cooperation of King Tribhuvan, the Nepali Congress succeeded in overthrowing the Rana regime and establishing a parliamentary democracy.²⁴ The Rana family, which had assumed decision-making authority as hereditary prime ministers since the nineteenth century, was compelled to restore the hereditary monarch due to an insurgency, protests, and pressure from India (Levi 1952: 185-91, Heitzman 1993). King Tribhuvan arrived back in Kathmandu on 02/15 and announced a modification in the governing regulations of the country on 02/18 (Levi 1952: 191, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 81). This revolution resulted in the establishment of a

²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nepal%E2%80%93Britain_Treaty_of_1923

²³ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nepal/History>

²⁴ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nepal>

new dynasty; however, it marked not at all the formation of the first democratic government in Nepal.²⁵ In 1951 universal suffrage was introduced.²⁶ Following the downfall of the Rana government, the Nepali Congress assumed leadership in three out of the five administrations established before the elections. Matrika Prasad Koirala, the first commoner to hold the position of Prime Minister, governed from 1951 to 1952 and from 1953 to 1955, while Subarna Shamsher Rana led the government from 1958 to 1959. The long-delayed elections took place in February 1959, resulting in Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala becoming Nepal's first democratically elected Prime Minister after the Nepali Congress secured 74 out of 109 parliamentary seats.²⁷ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period, with the exception of the year 1959, in which only multiparty legislative elections were held. For the period under consideration, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. From 1951 to 1956, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. From 1951 to 1958, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In 1959, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For the same year, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. In 1960, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. Regarding our criteria the regime does not fulfill the criteria of a constitutional monarchy. For 1960, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. A parliament existed only on a brief period 1959 to 1960. However, Nepal's monarchy held supreme authority during this period, exemplified by King Mahendra's dissolution of parliament in December 1960. There was in this brief period no separation of powers: the elected parliament lacked institutional safeguards to counterbalance royal authority, enabling unchecked executive dominance. On 12/15/1960, King Mahendra, seeking to restore order in the political system and declaring that democracy had failed, suspended the constitution, dissolved the legislature and assumed again direct executive rule in an auto-coup. Nepal was further governed by a

²⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nepali_Congress

²⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

²⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nepali_Congress

Panchayat system that heavily restrained political parties. The Panchayat System centralized power under King Mahendra's rule. It consisted of four levels of governance, from village, town, district to national level.²⁸ During the Panchayat regime of Nepal, the Panchayat served as the official legislative body, operating effectively from 1961 to 1990.²⁹ Each village panchayat nominated a representative to serve on one of the 75 district panchayats, representing between 40 to 70 villages; the urban panchayat selected one-third of the members for these assemblies. Members of the district panchayats then elected delegates to fourteen zone assemblies, which acted as electoral bodies for the National Panchayat. Furthermore, there were various class organizations at the village, district, and zonal levels representing peasants, youth, women, elders, laborers, and ex-soldiers, with their representatives elected to the respective assemblies.³⁰ The system was heavily criticized by members of the opposition because of its lack of democratic representation. The National Panchayat, consisting of approximately 90 members, was prohibited from scrutinizing the royal government, deliberating on the tenets of party-less democracy, proposing budgetary bills without royal consent, or passing bills without the king's endorsement.³¹ Inspired by the international support and the democratic movements occurring throughout the world after the disintegration of the USSR in 1989, the Nepali Congress and the United Left Front launched a mass movement on 02/18/1990 to end the Panchayat regime and the installation of an democratic interim government represented by various parties and people.³² For 1961, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 1962, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1963-1970 and 1972-1979, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. In 1971, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED, legislative and executive multiparty elections were present since 1963. In this period LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent since 1962. In

²⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panchayat_\(Nepal\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panchayat_(Nepal))

²⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rastriya_Panchayat

³⁰ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panchayat_\(Nepal\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panchayat_(Nepal))

³¹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panchayat_\(Nepal\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panchayat_(Nepal))

³² [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panchayat_\(Nepal\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panchayat_(Nepal))

1961, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. From 1962 to 1980, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. Since 1981, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. Per FH, from 1972 to 1978, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In 1979 the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. In 1980 the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. FH doesn't provide information for 1981. From 1982 to 1988 the country scores again between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. In 1989 the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In 1990 the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. For the span of 1980-1989, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1990 and 1991, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. Again, V-Dem's JCE and LCE seem not be very reliable indicators, while Polity5 is in line with our interpretation of the research literature on Nepal.

05/12/1991 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Constitutional Monarchy: On this date, general elections took place. King Birendra had lifted the ban on political parties in 1990 and allowed for an interim government headed by a coalition of opposition leaders. A Constitution Recommendation Commission (CRC) drafted a new basic law, setting the stage for parliamentary elections in May 1991 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 45). The transition to a constitutional monarchy was signaled by multiparty elections, which were won by a pro-democracy party (Rahim 1993). In 1990, the king consented to constitutional amendments that introduced multi-partyism and imposed constraints on the monarchy. However, given that the king appointed the interim government and had the potential to backtrack on the agreements, we refrain from categorizing the regime as concluded until the first election ushered in parliamentary governance (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 81) The general elections in May 1991 resulted in a narrow majority for the Nepali Congress (110 of 205 seats) and a strong opposition of the Communist Party of Nepal (69 seats). The 'Pancha Partys' associated with the old system won four out of 205 seats. The outcomes were seen as a robust approval of the political changes in 1990, leading to G.P. Koirala being nominated by the NC and appointed by the king to lead

the newly elected government.³³ On 02/13/1996 a civil war broke out between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Kingdom of Nepal when members of the Communist Party tried to replace the royal parliamentary system with a people's republic.³⁴ On 06/01/2001, Birendras potential successor Dipendra killed King Birendra and his entire family.³⁵ Dipendra was crowned while in a coma, through his self-inflicted wounds, but died shortly after.³⁶ The new king, Birendra's brother Gyanendra, took an active role in defending the monarchy.³⁷ Throughout the conflict, the government maintained control over the main cities and towns, while the Maoists dominated the rural areas.³⁸ According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are present until 2000 and are somewhat present afterwards. Different from LIED we code executive elections as absent, since we argue that the king was the center of executive power, and he was not elected. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 1992 to 1999, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For the year 2000, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2001, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. As per FH's classification in 1991 and 1992, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. From 1993 onward a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free.

10/04/2002 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start Autocratic Monarchy: King Gyanendra dismissed the prime minister and imposed his direct rule on the nation after Bahdur refused to call elections: King Gyanendra removed the Prime Minister from office, assumed executive authority, and canceled the scheduled parliamentary elections, thereby bringing an end to the preceding era of constitutional monarchy (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 81).³⁹ On 02/01/2005 King Gyanendra dissolved the government again and ruled directly for several years in order to try to end ongoing political instability and an insurgency with Maoists. Based on Polity5's

³³ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nepal/Constitutional-monarchy>

³⁴ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nepal>

³⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nepalese_Civil_War

³⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nepalese_Civil_War

³⁷ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nepal/Fall-of-the-monarchy>

³⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nepalese_Civil_War

³⁹ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5283.html>

assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. According to FH, in 2002, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. In 2003 and 2004 the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In 2005 the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. For the relevant period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present. For the years 2002-2006, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

04/24/2006 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Constitutional Monarchy: Extensive protests compelled the king to restore the previously elected parliament on 04/24. Subsequently, in June 2006, Parliament significantly curtailed the king's authority, effectively restoring the country to a constitutional monarchy (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 81).⁴⁰ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category.

11/21/2006 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: The comprehensive peace accord was signed, urging the king to give up all his political rights, also his property was nationalized under public trust.⁴¹ The assembly elections, initially planned for June 2007, faced multiple postponements, particularly after the Maoists withdrew from the government, insisting on the immediate abolition of the monarchy. It wasn't until December 2007 that an agreement was reached to abolish the monarchy, with elections scheduled for April 2008.⁴² According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present. As per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. For 2007, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free.

⁴⁰ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5283.html>; <http://tinyurl.com/3jo7mu4>

⁴¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comprehensive_Peace_Accord

⁴² <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nepal/Fall-of-the-monarchy>

04/10/2008 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, parliamentary elections took place.⁴³ On 05/28/2008, more than two centuries of royal rule came to an end as the new assembly voted to declare Nepal a democratic republic.⁴⁴ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since the transition towards an electoral regime the elections are classified as competitive, following LIED. Political demonstrations occasionally continue to be tainted by acts of violence, while corruption persists as a pervasive issue across politics, government, and the judicial system. According to FH until 2013 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. In addition to that LIED considers that political liberties were absent for this period, whereas V-Dem's PCLI scores full political liberties since 2008. In our view V-Dem's PCLI seems unreliable in this case. For the years 2008, 2011, 2012 V-Dem's JCE and LCE are interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

11/19/2013 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Defective Democracy: The election on this date marked a decisive turning point in the country's post-conflict democratic trajectory after years of institutional paralysis and political deadlock following the failure of the first Constituent Assembly (2008–2012). Although the electoral and institutional environment prior to 2013 was characterized by volatility, weak constraints on the executive, and unclear electoral integrity, the 2013 election re-established a functioning legislature and initiated a renewed process of democratic consolidation. International observers assessed the election as broadly competitive and peaceful, despite some localized incidents. The resumption of multiparty parliamentary activity and the subsequent formation of a government based on the electoral outcome represented a restoration of meaningful electoral and legislative processes. The data corroborate this interpretation. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI point to a gradual improvement beginning in 2014, following the 2013 vote. Legislative and judicial constraints on the executive, while uneven, began to consolidate around this period. FH raised the political rights rating from a score of 8 in 2013 to 7 in 2014, suggesting a shift toward greater political openness and competitiveness. While the constitutional framework remained in flux until 2015, the November 2013 election re-established electoral legitimacy and enabled the institutional processes necessary for the eventual promulgation of the constitution. Challenges in Nepal include gender-based violence, underage marriage, and bonded labor. Transitional justice bodies have encountered difficulties

⁴³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Nepalese_Constituent_Assembly_election

⁴⁴ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nepal/Fall-of-the-monarchy>

in fulfilling their mandates.⁴⁵ In addition, V-Dem's CEI indicates an ambiguous state regarding the cleanliness of elections from 2009 to 2011 and for the following two years no cleanliness. Since 2014 the country gained back a somewhat electoral cleanliness. Furthermore, V-Dem's EF&FI indicates ambiguous overall election conditions until 2012, while the following four years underlined free and fair election conditions. Since 2017 the quality of elections according to V-Dem's EF&FI can be interpreted as somewhat free and fair. As per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. General elections took place on 11/20/2022 to elect the 275 members of the House of Representatives. Following failed power-sharing negotiations among the Democratic Left Alliance on 12/25/2022, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, chairman of the CPN (Maoist Centre), assumed the role of prime minister. His eight-member cabinet comprised MPs from his party, CPN (UML), Rastriya Swatantra Party, and Janamat Party, with support from RPP, JSP, NUP, and three independents.⁴⁶ For the years 2008, 2011, 2012 and 2015-2018, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. For 2009-2010, 2013-2014 and 2019-2022, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 2023, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. The freedom of Nepalese citizens to exercise their political rights is sometimes restricted by intermittent instances of political violence, along with crackdowns on political demonstrations by security forces. There have also been reports of vote buying in recent elections.⁴⁷

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Baral 1994, Krämer 2001, Elklit 1994, Savada 1993)

[The] Netherlands

01/01/1900 Constitutional Monarchy [Start: 11/03/1848]: On 07/26/1581 the Plakkaat van Verlatinghe was signed declaring independence from Spain. Since 03/16/1815 the Kingdom of the Netherlands is an independent monarchy.⁴⁸ In 1848, the Constitution of the Netherlands was

⁴⁵ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nepal>

⁴⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Nepalese_general_election

⁴⁷ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nepal/freedom-world/2022>

⁴⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monarchy_of_the_Netherlands

amended to make ministers responsible to the States General and no longer responsible to the king, who acted as the leader of cabinet. The new Constitution was proclaimed on 11/03/1848.⁴⁹ In the parliamentary elections from 1848 only a small minority of the population had the right to vote. The part grew from 1.8 per cent in 1848 to 16.5 per cent in 1917 (Andeweg/Ridder/Irwin 2010: 1396f.). According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as present except during World War I, and V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For this regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

07/03/1918 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start (Monarchical) (Male) Defective Democracy: On this date, the first parliamentary elections after a series of reforms that introduced universal male suffrage and pure proportional representation took place.⁵⁰ From 1917 on full suffrage for men aged 23 and above was granted. In 1917, women were given a limited form of suffrage known as „passive“ voting rights, which allowed them to stand for political office and be elected but did not grant them the right to vote in elections.⁵¹ From 1919 on suffrage was extended to women. Ruijs de Beerenbrouck was prime minister during this regime period and headed a right-wing government consisting of the Christian parties in parliament and some liberal independent representatives.⁵² Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Following LIED competitiveness for the elections was scored. Moreover, V-Dem's CEI reflects cleanliness of elections in this period. The overall election conditions are stated as free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. For the relevant period, LIED identifies political liberties as present, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For this regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

⁴⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutional_Reform_of_1848

⁵⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1918_Dutch_general_election

⁵¹ <https://stacker.com/world/when-women-got-right-vote-50-countries>

⁵² <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Netherlands_V: 1

07/05/1922 End (Male) (Monarchical) Defective Democracy/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: On this date the first parliamentary elections under universal suffrage took place.⁵³ De Beerenbrouck remained in office until August 1925 when he lost elections to Hendrik Colijn, who headed another right-wing government, but only until March 1926, when he resigned. After Colijn, Dirk Jan de Geer formed yet another government of Christian parties (the Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary Party and the Christian Historical Union) and liberal independents. De Geer stepped down from office in 1929 and was replaced by earlier prime minister de Beerenbrouck, who continued the same coalition composition. In May 1933 de Beerenbrouck was again replaced as prime minister by Colijn who served until 1939 and was, again, replaced by de Geer. De Geer's coalition included the Social Democratic Worker's Party among the Christian parties. When Nazi-Germany invaded the Netherlands in May 1940, de Geer and his government fled to London.⁵⁴ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For the entire time the elections were competitive per LIED. Moreover, electoral cleanliness is scored according to V-Dem's CEI. Freedom and fairness during the elections are given (V-Dem EF&FI). For this period, LIED identifies political liberties as present until 1932 and as absent afterwards. V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are present. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the years 1922-1939, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

05/15/1940 End (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: On this date, the Dutch armed forces surrendered to the German forces, after the Netherlands were invaded by German forces, in spite of the country's neutrality policy, and without a formal declaration of war on 05/10/1940. The German troops also advanced into Belgium and Luxembourg simultaneously. The objective of this move was to distract Allied forces away from the Ardennes, as well as entice British and French forces into Belgium. Additionally, it was done to prevent a prospective British invasion in North Holland.⁵⁵ According to LIED, no elections were held during this period. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present. For 1940-1945, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as

⁵³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

⁵⁴ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, Netherlands_R: 1-2, Netherlands_V: 1-2

⁵⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netherlands_in_World_War_II#German_invasion

indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

05/05/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: From this date on the Netherlands were free from Nazi occupation due to the surrender. The first parliamentary elections after World War II were held on 05/17/1946. Following the elections, the Catholic People's Party formed a grand coalition government with the Labour Party.⁵⁶ The Netherlands has a parliamentary system of government with a bicameral parliament, consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The monarch continued to take on a mainly ceremonial role. The political landscape is characterized by freely operating parties competing with each other. Competitiveness is underscored by regularly changing coalitions of usually three to four parties.⁵⁷ Equal political rights are granted to all citizens by the constitution. According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. LIED and V-Dem's PCLI score full political liberties ever since the end of German occupation. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. For 1946, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1947 onward, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. The judiciary operates independently in both theory and practice. From 1971 on men and women aged 18 and older could vote in national elections.⁵⁸ On 11/22/2023 general snap elections were held, with the right-wing Party for Freedom emerging as the largest party and subsequently forming a coalition government. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since the end of the German occupation constant competitiveness for the is achieved (LIED). V-Dem's CEI scores constantly a cleanliness of elections and thus the absence of irregularities in the election process. Moreover, ever since 1946 the elections were free and fair following V-Dem's EF&FI.

(Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

⁵⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946_Dutch_general_election

⁵⁷ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Netherlands_R: 2-4, Netherlands_V: 2-3

⁵⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

[The] Netherlands Antilles

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 01/01/1845]: The territory, which would later become known as the Netherlands Antilles, was administered under the name "Colony of Curaçao and Dependencies. This administrative unit grouped together the six Dutch island territories in the Caribbean, the "Leeward Islands" (Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao) off the coast of Venezuela and the "Windward Islands" (Saba, Sint Eustatius, and the southern part of Sint Maarten).⁵⁹ Curaçao, the largest island, was originally inhabited by Arawak people before being settled by the Spanish in 1499 and subsequently seized by the Dutch West India Company in 1634.⁶⁰ Aruba followed a similar trajectory, with Spanish colonization in 1499 and Dutch control established in 1636.⁶¹ Sint Maarten was divided between France and the Netherlands via the Treaty of Concordia in 1648.⁶² Governance was centralized in Willemstad, Curaçao, under a Dutch governor with comprehensive executive authority.⁶³ Until 1936 the colonial structure allowed for no genuine representation of the indigenous population with the Colonial Council only as a purely advisory body appointed by the colonial authorities. In 1936, a new constitution was enacted, reorganizing the colonial administration. This reform replaced the Colonial Council with a representative body known as the Estates of Curaçao, which convened for the first time in April 1938. The first elections for this body were held on 20 December 1937. However, the parliament consisted of only 15 members, of whom 5 were appointed by the Governor and 10 were elected. Suffrage was extremely restricted based on income and education (census suffrage), allowing only about 5% of the male population to vote. Despite the existence of this parliament, the Governor retained dominant executive power and legislative vetoes, maintaining the character of direct colonial rule during this period.⁶⁴ On 05/21/1948 a new constitution for the territory entered into force. Crucially, this revision introduced universal suffrage for men and women and formally renamed the territory "Netherlands Antilles".⁶⁵

⁵⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colony_of_Cura%C3%A7ao_and_Dependencies

⁶⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Cura%C3%A7ao

⁶¹ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aruba#History>

⁶² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sint_Maarten#History

⁶³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netherlands_Antilles,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governor_of_the_Netherlands_Antilles

⁶⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_the_Netherlands_Antilles

⁶⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netherlands_Antilles

03/17/1949 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, following the new legal foundation from May 1948, the first general elections for the Estates of the Netherlands Antilles took place.⁶⁶ The newly elected parliament possessed genuine legislative authority, marking a substantial transfer of power to a locally elected body.⁶⁷ Furthermore, on 03/03/1951, the "Islands Regulation of the Netherlands Antilles" was enacted by royal decree. This regulation granted substantial autonomy to the individual island territories (Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao, and the Windward Islands), establishing Island Councils and decentralizing significant administrative powers.⁶⁸

12/15/1954 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, Liberal Democracy] [Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, Liberal Democracy]]/Start Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of Netherlands, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands was signed, ending the colonial status of the islands. The Netherlands Antilles became an autonomous country within the Kingdom, equal to the Netherlands and Suriname. The Charter granted the Netherlands Antilles full autonomy over internal affairs, with a parliamentary democratic system, while the Kingdom retained responsibility for defense, foreign affairs, and the Supreme Court.⁶⁹ Growing dissatisfaction with Curaçao's perceived subservient position in its relationship with the Netherlands, persistent racial discrimination, and an increase in joblessness due to layoffs in the oil sector, culminated in a series of riots in 1969.⁷⁰ On 01/01/1986 Aruba seceded from the Netherlands Antilles to become a separate constituent country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This secession was the culmination of a long-standing political struggle driven by Aruban dissatisfaction with the administrative dominance of Curaçao within the Antillean federation. Under the leadership of Betico Croes and his Movimiento Electoral di Pueblo (MEP), the call for a "Status Aparte" gained momentum in the 1970s.⁷¹ This mandate was formally secured in the referendum on 03/25/1977, where an overwhelming majority voted in favor of complete independence, forcing the Kingdom to open negotiations. In March 1983, Aruba secured a formal arrangement with the Kingdom for its eventual independence, with a progression of steps granting greater autonomy as approved by the Crown. In August 1985, Aruba formulated a constitution that received unanimous approval.

⁶⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1949_Netherlands_Antilles_general_election

⁶⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_the_Netherlands_Antilles

⁶⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islands_Regulation_of_the_Netherlands_Antilles

⁶⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charter_for_the_Kingdom_of_the_Netherlands

⁷⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cura%C3%A7ao#Dutch_colonial_rule

⁷¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1977_Aruban_independence_referendum

Aruba conducted general elections on 11/22/1985 to choose the members of the Island Council. These elections took place shortly before Aruba's separation from the Netherlands Antilles and its establishment as a 'land' (country) within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Therefore, based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were present during this period. The Netherlands Antilles continued to exist as a political entity comprising the remaining five islands (Curaçao, Bonaire, Sint Maarten, Sint Eustatius, and Saba).⁷² In 1989, the political leadership of Sint Maarten expressed their intention to attain complete independence at the earliest opportunity. However, ultimately, Sint Maarten opted to maintain its association with the Netherlands, granting it a higher level of self-governance. Following the results of referendums held on each island between 2000 and 2005, the constitutional structure of the Dutch Caribbean was reorganized.⁷³ In 2006, the people of Sint Maarten, in conjunction with the other islands and the Dutch government, reached an agreement to dissolve the Netherlands Antilles.⁷⁴

10/10/2010 End Netherlands Antilles [Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the Netherlands Antilles were dissolved as a political entity. Curaçao and Sint Maarten became autonomous constituent countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands (comparable to the status Aruba achieved in 1986). The smaller islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba (collectively known as the BES islands or Caribbean Netherlands) became special municipalities of the Netherlands proper, thereby integrating directly into the Dutch political system.⁷⁵

For the time after 01/01/1986 (Aruba) and 10/10/2010 (Curaçao, Sint Maarten), see the respective Country Reports.

New Caledonia

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 09/24/1853]: In 1853, France assumed control over much of what is now New Caledonia during ceremonies at Balade and the Île des Pins, with the initial intention of potentially using the region as a location for a penal Colonial Regime.⁷⁶ Throughout the period of colonial settlement and persisting until as late as 1917, there were frequent uprisings by the Melanesian population,

⁷² <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aruba#History>

⁷³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dissolution_of_the_Netherlands_Antilles

⁷⁴ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Saint-Martin-island-West-Indies>

⁷⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_Caribbean

⁷⁶ <https://www.newcaledonia.travel/en/history-economy>

which were a source of ongoing concern for both the settlers and the authorities. By 1860, French control had been established over the southern portion of the mainland. Over the following decade, the French implemented policies related to the allocation of indigenous land, the reorganization of tribes, and the appointment of a system of tribal chiefs to represent the colonial administration. As the 19th century approached its end, substantial portions of Melanesian land had been taken over, and the residents were confined to designated reserves.⁷⁷ LIED does not list New Caledonia during its colonial era.

10/27/1946 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy]/Start Part of Other Country [of France, Defective Democracy] : In 1946, New Caledonia attained the status of an overseas territory. By 1953, French citizenship was extended to all residents of New Caledonia, irrespective of their ethnic background.

11/08/1998 End Part of Other Country [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy [as protectorate-type of France, Liberal Democracy]: Within the framework of the Nouméa Accord, New Caledonia's status changed from an overseas territory to a sui generis overseas collectivity.⁷⁸ Through this Accord, New Caledonia was granted extensive autonomy rights. However, the region exercises this autonomy under the sovereignty of France. New Caledonia gained the right to vote for both legislative and executive powers and is represented in the French Senate and Assembly. However, a representative of the French state oversees these institutions and has the authority to intervene.⁷⁹ Following the Nouméa Accord's timeline, which mandated a vote by the end of 2018, preparations for a referendum on full independence from France began. The vote took place on 11/04/2018, resulting in the rejection of independence. Another referendum occurred in October 2020, where voters once again opted to remain part of France. In the 2018 referendum, 56.7% of voters chose to remain, and in the 2020 referendum, 53.4% made the same choice. A third referendum took place on 12/12/2021. Pro-independence groups boycotted the referendum, citing concerns about the COVID-19 pandemic and requesting a postponement, which the French government declined. As a result, 96% of voters chose to maintain their association with France.⁸⁰ In May 2024, weeks of civil unrest erupted following the enactment of a law granting French residents of the islands the right to vote in provincial elections, provided they have lived there for at least ten years. Thousands of protesters took to the streets in deadly riots, prompting the declaration of a state of emergency and the deployment of army personnel to the islands. The riots are believed to

⁷⁷ <https://www.britannica.com/place/New-Caledonia-French-unique-collectivity-Pacific-Ocean/History>

⁷⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noum%C3%A9a_Accord

⁷⁹ <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000393606/>

⁸⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Caledonia#History

stem from the frustration of pro-independence parties, who had boycotted the 2021 referendum.⁸¹ The autonomy rights, representation in the French Parliament, and limited sovereignty make it difficult to categorize the regime. New Caledonia, like the other overseas collectivities, represents a special borderline case. However, it distinguishes itself from the others through its particularly strong independence movement and the resulting unique status. Nevertheless, this special position is not significant enough for New Caledonia to be regarded as independent. Due to its higher degree of autonomy compared to other French administrative zones, such as the départements et régions d'outre-mer, the region cannot be classified as an Indirect Rule Colonial Regime. Instead, it can be categorized as a Defective Democracy with the additional designation of a protectorate-type. It is considered defective because, due to France's position, these territories do not possess full sovereignty. FH, LIED and V-Dem do not list New Caledonia in their database. Since 1986, New Caledonia has again been listed by the United Nations as a Non-Self-Governing Territory caused by an ongoing debate about the independence of the region.⁸²

Defective Democracy [as protectorate-type of France, Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Newfoundland

01/01/1900 Defective Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 08/xx/1610]: English colonists began establishing settlements in Newfoundland in August 1610, guided by proprietary governors as part of England's efforts to gain a foothold in North America.⁸³ The competition between England and France in Europe extended to conflicts in North America, particularly in Newfoundland, where English settlements were near French claims in Southern Newfoundland. In 1825, it officially became a Crown colony, with Thomas John Cochrane appointed as its first governor. Representative government was established in 1832, with a colonial assembly sharing power with an appointed Legislative Council.⁸⁴ Newfoundland achieved responsible government in 1854, gaining self-governing status. Philip Francis Little served as the first Premier from 1855 to 1858. Despite considerations from 1864 to 1869, the colony rejected confederation with Canada.⁸⁵ Newfoundland retained its status as a colony until the 1907 Imperial Conference, which decided to grant dominion status to all self-

⁸¹ <https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/whats-behind-the-deadly-riots-in-new-caledonia/>

⁸² <https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsqt>

⁸³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newfoundland_Colony; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuper%27s_Cove

⁸⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Newfoundland_and_Labrador#Colonization

⁸⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newfoundland_Colony

governing colonies in attendance.⁸⁶ In April 1925, women aged 25 and above were given the right to vote. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

06/02/1928 End Defective Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy]/Start Liberal Democracy [as (de facto) Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy]: On this date, for the first time women took part in the parliamentary elections. 90 percent of eligible women exercised their voting privilege.⁸⁷ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. FH, LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Newfoundland.

02/16/1934 End Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: Newfoundland's self-governing status was revoked by the Dominion, leading to the assumption of control by the Commission of Government in response to the economic collapse during the Great Depression. Despite retaining the title of a dominion, Newfoundland effectively functioned in name only. During this period, a governor oversaw Newfoundland, reporting to the Colonial Secretary in London, and the legislature was suspended (Overton 1990).⁸⁸

12/11/1945 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date it was announced by the British Government that a national convention should be elected by the local population to decide for Newfoundland's future. The election took place on 06/21/1946 and on 09/11/1946 the new National Convention started its work.⁸⁹ The British government included confederation as an option in a referendum held on 06/03/1948, which yielded inconclusive results. A subsequent referendum on 07/22/1948 saw a majority of 52.3 percent in favor of confederation.⁹⁰

03/31/1949 End Newfoundland [Indirect Rule Colonial Regime]: On this date, Newfoundland became part of Canada, as the province of Newfoundland.⁹¹ With the end date, Newfoundland is no longer in Va-PoReg, since the decision to join Canada was completely free and the return

⁸⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominion_of_Newfoundland#Political_origins

⁸⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1928_Newfoundland_general_election

⁸⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominion_of_Newfoundland#End_of_responsible_government

⁸⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newfoundland_National_Convention

⁹⁰ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Newfoundland-and-Labrador/British-fishery-to-colony>

⁹¹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newfoundland_\(island\)#Union_with_Canada](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newfoundland_(island)#Union_with_Canada)

to an independent status is extremely unlikely. V-Dem do not list Newfoundland in their database.

For the time after 03/31/1949, see **Canada**.

New Zealand

01/01/1900 Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 02/06/1840]: On 02/06/1840, New Zealand became a British colony by the Treaty of Waitangi.⁹² When the British Parliament passed the New Zealand Constitution Act in 1852, New Zealand embarked on a journey of independence from Britain in exercising sovereignty – legislative, judicial, and executive authority – over its domestic affairs. However, ‘imperial interests’, (including foreign relations, external trade, the constitution and ‘native affairs’), were beyond the powers of the New Zealand Parliament. New Zealand did not obtain ‘Dominion status’ until 1907, yet this did not signify absolute sovereign independence, as the position of the dominions in international affairs may not necessarily align with dominion status.⁹³ From 01/17/1853 it was de facto self-governing. With the extension of voting rights to women in 1893, the self-governing British colony became one of the first permanently constituted jurisdictions in the world to grant universal adult suffrage, suffrage previously having been universal for Māori men over 21 from 1867, and for white men from 1879. Plural voting (impacting men) was abolished in 1889. Some prison inmates were denied the right to vote.⁹⁴ According to our observations and LIED, during this time multiparty legislative and executive elections were held and universal suffrage was guaranteed. Both LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI classify political liberties as present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination.

09/26/1907 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: On this date, New Zealand was granted nominal independence by becoming a dominion. However, it did not achieve full independence, meaning complete autonomy and sovereign authority over its own constitutional matters and foreign affairs, until 11/25/1947. On 11/25/1947, the Statute of Westminster was adopted, and

⁹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Waitangi

⁹³ https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/research-papers/document/00PLLawRP07041/new-zealand-sovereignty-1857-1907-1947-or-1987#footnote_3

⁹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

Britain lost the power to legislate for New Zealand.⁹⁵ As of 2023 New Zealand is still formally a monarchy with King Charles III. as Sovereign. However, the King acts entirely on the advice of New Zealand Government Ministers. The monarch is represented in New Zealand by a governor-general.⁹⁶ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For over one hundred years as an independent country, the elections were always competitive following LIED. In addition, constant cleanliness was scored (V-Dem CEI). The overall election conditions were continuously free and fair, except between 1951 and 1953 when somewhat freedom and fairness is scored (V-Dem EF&FI). According to all classifications of political regimes New Zealand is a democracy. In RoW which distinguishes between electoral and liberal democracies it is classified as a liberal democracy since 1913 and by LIED as a polyarchy (largely equivalent to the meaning of liberal democracy). Regarding FH the country achieved, for instance in 2022, a value of 99 from 100, including a perfect score on the political rights scale, as one of the freest countries in the world.⁹⁷ According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Therefore, for over one hundred years New Zealand achieved full political liberties (LIED, V-Dem PCLI). Since 1908, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the years 1900 to 2023, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

(Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Bassett 1982, Brooking 2004, Lipson 1948, Roberts 2004, Kaiser 2002)

Nicaragua

01/01/1900 Electoral Autocracy [Start: 12/10/1893]: On 09/15/1821, Nicaragua became part of the Federal Republic of Central America, which declared independence from Spain. On 11/05/1838, Nicaragua declared independence from the Federal Republic of Central America. Thirty years of Conservative dominance in Nicaragua ended in 1893, when President Roberto Sacasa was forced to resign, and a bipartisan provisional government was established. A month

⁹⁵ https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/research-papers/document/00PLLawRP07041/new-zealand-sovereignty-1857-1907-1947-or-1987#footnote_3

⁹⁶ <https://www.parliament.nz/mi/get-involved/features/the-sovereign-s-role-in-new-zealand/>

⁹⁷ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/new-zealand/freedom-world/2022>

later, a coup led by the Liberals and supported by the military ousted the provisional government and installed a rival provisional government headed by José Santos Zelaya. On 08/10/1893, the junta established the regulations for the selection of members of the constituent assembly. This assembly's responsibility was not only to draft a new constitution but also to formulate a new electoral code (Cruz 2002:133). The constituent assembly was composed of deputies elected in Nicaragua's electoral districts and departments. On 09/20/1893, the junta resigned and transferred its executive powers to the Constituent Assembly (Cruz 2002). On 09/16/1893, the Constituent Assembly elected Zelaya provisional president and president for the first new constitutional term (La Botz 2016). On 12/10/1893, the Assembly adopted a new constitution, constructing a new, liberal, national state and introducing male suffrage (Kellam 2013).⁹⁸ On 07/20/1886, Zelaya called a constitutional referendum, which allowed for universal suffrage, but no presidential elections were held throughout his 17-year regime. In 1905, Zelaya aimed to overhaul the Constitution once again, intending to enable the president to have unlimited succession (Cruz 2002:143). Zelaya evolved into an authoritarian president, employing repressive legislation and police actions to sustain his regime. He orchestrated multiple re-elections through the national Assembly and frequently declared a 'state of siege' to maintain order (La Botz 2016:40). Weakened and influenced by both internal and external factors, Zelaya stepped down on 12/17/1909. Following his resignation, José Madriz, his minister of foreign affairs, was appointed president by the Nicaraguan Congress. Holding liberal beliefs, Madriz struggled to establish stability amidst ongoing pressure from conservative factions and the intervention of the United States. Eventually, he resigned on 08/20/1910. Following Madriz's departure, Conservative leader Estrada, who governed Nicaragua's easternmost region, assumed control. The United States pledged support to Estrada under the condition that a Constituent Assembly be elected to draft a new constitution. With this condition accepted, a coalition government comprising conservatives and liberals, led by Estrada, was officially recognized by the United States on 01/01/1911.⁹⁹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this time, parliamentary and presidential elections with male suffrage were held but were not competitive according to LIED. V-Dem's CEI affirms no electoral cleanliness. According to V-Dem's EF&FI, no freedom and fairness for the elections is stated. Since 1902 no elections were conducted, except in 1905 when the overall conditions were not free and fair. Moreover, LIED scores absent political liberties and V-Dem's

⁹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#Dates_by_country

⁹⁹ <https://countrystudies.us/nicaragua/10.htm>

PCLI not really political liberties for the entire time. From 1900 to 1908, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. From 1909 to 1912, Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

08/04/1912 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by USA Defective Democracy]: The occupation was a component of the Banana Wars, during which the U.S. military invaded several Latin American countries between 1898 and 1934.¹⁰⁰ Until 1933, with a nine-month exception in 1925, US Marines were stationed in Nicaragua to maintain control over the construction of a Nicaraguan Canal.¹⁰¹ In 1913, the United States reduced its military presence in Nicaragua to just 100 troops, signaling its readiness to use force and support conservative regimes. National elections were held under U.S. oversight, but liberals declined to take part, leading to Adolfo Díaz's reelection. Violence and political unrest led to a decline in foreign investment. Although a treaty granting U.S. intervention rights was never ratified, a revised version, excluding the intervention clause, was approved in 1916. This collaboration with the U.S. enabled conservatives to hold power until 1925. Despite liberal participation in the 1920 elections, U.S. support and election fraud ensured Emiliano Chamorro's uncle, Diego Manuel Chamorro, secured victory.¹⁰² According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held until 1919, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Thereafter, multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted until 1925. In 1926 and 1927, only legislative elections were conducted but they were not categorized as multiparty. In 1928 legislative elections were classified as multiparty. No executive elections were present during this year. From 1929 onward, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. During this period, LIED lists male suffrage as present. From 1912 to 1925, and from 1928 to 1933, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present.

¹⁰⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_occupation_of_Nicaragua

¹⁰¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Nicaragua

¹⁰² <https://countrystudies.us/nicaragua/10.htm>

01/02/1933 End Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Defective Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy: Under U.S. supervision, elections took place in November 1932, leading to the triumph of Liberal Party candidate Juan Bautista Sacasa, who had been involved in the 1926 coup prior to the second U.S. intervention. U.S. military forces withdrew entirely from Nicaragua on 01/02/1933, just one day after Sacasa assumed office (Bulmer-Thomas 1990: 320-23, 329, Gobat 2005: 205, Puig 2013: 152-53, Casey et al. 2020: 12). President Sacasa saw a decline in his popularity due to his ineffective governance and allegations of electoral fraud during the 1934 congressional elections. Taking advantage of Sacasa's waning influence, Somoza García strategically unified the National Guard and the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal-PL), positioning himself for success in the 1936 presidential elections.¹⁰³ Quantitative indicators show mixed results regarding the integrity of the elections. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED indicates the presence of competitive elections until 1935, whereas according to V-Dem's CEI and EF&FI the elections were neither clean nor free and fair. In this case our qualitative observations are in line with V-Dem. In addition to that, no political liberties were present for this time, according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

06/09/1936 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Personalist (Electoral) Autocracy: Leveraging control of the National Guard, Anastasio Somoza García overthrew President Juan Bautista Sacasa and replaced him with his own candidate for Acting President, Carlos Brenes Jarquín (Booth 1998a: 132, Casey et al. 2020: 12). Somoza was nominated for the presidency a week later at a Liberal Party convention on 06/16/1936 and was inaugurated on 01/01/1937 (Crawley 1984: 94-95, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 81-82). The Somoza family (Spanish: Familia Somoza) was a family dictatorship which ruled Nicaragua for forty-three years from 1936 to 1979. The dictatorship started by Anastasio Somoza García was continued by his two sons Luis Somoza Debayle and Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Anastasio Somoza García was the President of Nicaragua from 1937 until 1956. In 1944, Anastasio Somoza García responded to increasing criticism by establishing a puppet government to preserve his authority. He opted not to seek

¹⁰³ <https://countrystudies.us/nicaragua/10.htm>

reelection and instead had the PLN nominate the elderly Leonardo Argüello, under the belief that he could manipulate Argüello from behind the scenes. However, Argüello had no inclination to serve as a puppet. In under a month, as Argüello's actions started to encroach on Somoza García's authority, the National Guard chief orchestrated a coup and installed a family associate, Benjamín Lacayo Sacasa, as the president.¹⁰⁴ Anastasio Somoza was succeeded by his eldest son, Luis Somoza, who held the presidency from 1957 to 1963. The youngest Somoza son, Anastasio Somoza, held two presidential terms: 1967-1972 and 1974-1979. Although the Somozas did not hold the presidency for the full forty-three years, they continued to rule through puppet presidents and their control of the National Guard.¹⁰⁵ In 1955 female suffrage had been introduced. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held in 1936, but they were not categorized as multiparty. In 1937 and 1938 multiparty executive and legislative elections were held but from 1939 onward, multiparty elections remain absent. LIED indicates that multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted once more between 1947 and 1970. In 1971, only executive elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty and no legislative elections were held. From 1972 onward, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held once again. For the given timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. Per FH in 1972 the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. From 1973 the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free.

07/17/1979 End Personalist (Electoral) Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Anastasio Somoza stepped down after his forces were defeated by the Sandinista insurgency, and shortly thereafter, a government led by insurgent leaders was established (Booth 1998b: 148, Crawley 1984: 173, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 82). At the institutional level, political authority was centralized within a Provisional Junta of National Reconstruction, while a newly established State Council was granted certain legislative capabilities (Krennerich 2005). The five-member junta reaffirmed its commitment to promoting political pluralism, implementing a mixed

¹⁰⁴ <https://countrystudies.us/nicaragua/11.htm>

¹⁰⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somoza_family

economic system, and pursuing a nonaligned foreign policy.¹⁰⁶ Somoza Debayle was assassinated in September 1980.¹⁰⁷ The Sandinistas aimed to change the oppressive and brutal practices of the previous government. Most individuals accused of crimes during the Somoza regime were given fair trials, and the Ministry of Interior prohibited mistreatment of prisoners. Within their initial two years in power, Amnesty International and other human rights organizations noted significant improvements in Nicaragua's human rights situation. To enhance representation, the new government established a consultative assembly called the Council of State on 05/04/1980. This assembly could approve laws proposed by the junta or create its own legislation. However, the junta retained veto power over laws initiated by the council and controlled much of the budget. Despite its limited authority, the council had autonomy and often modified legislation proposed by the junta. The council's composition, consisting of thirty-three members, was determined through negotiations among revolutionary factions in 1979. These members were appointed rather than elected by various political groups.¹⁰⁸ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties, indicating an intermediate state between present and absent. In 1979 and 1980, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power. From 1981 to 1983, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. In 1984, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. In 1979, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1980-1984, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to FH in 1979 and 1980 a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. FH doesn't provide information for 1981. From 1982 onward the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free.

11/04/1984 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, general elections were held at the initiative of the incumbent authoritarian Sandinista government in 1984, amidst

¹⁰⁶ <https://countrystudies.us/nicaragua/14.htm>

¹⁰⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somoza_family

¹⁰⁸ <https://countrystudies.us/nicaragua/15.htm>

a temporary easing of the state of emergency (which was later reinstated from 1985 to 1988). The roles and responsibilities of these institutions were officially outlined in the 1987 Constitution. This constitution instituted a presidential system featuring a unicameral congress and a president possessing extensive powers (Krennerich 2005). The main opposition figure, Arturo Cruz, opted out of running in the election, citing restrictions imposed by the regime. However, the majority of external observers deemed the election to be free and fair (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 46). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. On the contrary, LIED classifies the elections during his period as not competitive. Between 1985 and 1989 and from 1999 to 2011 V-Dem's CEI indicates ambiguous cleanliness levels. For the remaining years, the election were what we interpret as somewhat free and fair. However, the elections are characterized as somewhat free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. In addition, according to LIED political liberties were absent at this time. V-Dem's PCLI scores an ambiguous presence of civil liberties until 1988. In 1989 and since 2007 somewhat political liberties were present. Between 1990 and 2006 V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. Daniel Ortega assumed his six-year presidential term on 01/10/1985. Following the United States Congress's refusal to continue funding the Contras in April 1985, the Reagan administration implemented a complete trade embargo against Nicaragua the next month. They accused the Sandinista government of posing a threat to U.S. security in the region. In response, the FSLN government suspended civil liberties and targeted both the media and the Roman Catholic bishops, alleging that they were destabilizing the political system. The church's publications and the conservative newspaper *La Prensa* faced censorship or closure at various times due to their critical stance on the military draft and the government's handling of the civil war (Krennerich 2005).¹⁰⁹ Although the extent of autocratic manipulation of the elections is disputed. Until 1989 according to our classification the regime was a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime. On 02/25/1990 the government of the dominant Sandinista Party held presidential elections in 1990, with intense international monitoring. The election was won by an opposition coalition led by Violeta Chomorro (Close 1999: 37, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 82, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 46).¹¹⁰ A historic and peaceful transfer of power ensued thereafter. The early phase of this period was characterized by efforts towards national

¹⁰⁹ <https://countrystudies.us/nicaragua/18.htm>

¹¹⁰ <https://tinyurl.com/8rdzdsq>

reconciliation, state reform and pacification.¹¹¹ In 1995, constitutional reforms came into force which transferred part of the presidential power to the National Assembly (Staff 1995: 1). On 10/20/1996 general elections were held. Arnaldo Aleman led the Liberal Alliance against Daniel Ortega's Sandinistas, despite international observers noting irregularities, the results were accepted (Krennerich 2005: 482).¹¹² Per FH's evaluation in 1984 and 1985, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In 1986 the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. From 1987 to 1989 the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. From 1990 to 1992 the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. In 1993 and 1994 the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. In 1995 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. In 1996 and 1997 the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. In 1998 the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. From 1999 to 2008 the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. In 2009 and 2010 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. From 1990 to 1994, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. Since 1995, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. For the period of 1985-1989, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the years 1990-1995, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1996-2005, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. In 2006, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2007-2011, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

¹¹¹ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nicaragua/Nicaragua-from-1990-to-2006>

¹¹² <https://tinyurl.com/8rdzdsq>

09/06/2011 End Defective Democracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: The incumbent President Daniel Ortega, won a third term in the 2011 Nicaraguan elections. At the same time, parliamentary elections were held in which monitors from the OAS reported many irregularities (Lansford, 2021: 1207). The re-election of Ortega was made possible by rule of the Supreme Court of Justice, which consisted of six judges with connections to the Sandinista party.¹¹³ We therefore code this regime change event as a strategic autocratic restructuring. On 11/06/2016 national elections for the presidency and the assembly were held. Ortega was re-elected with 72.4 % of the vote. The polling was described by observers as corrupt and fraudulent especially after antiregime candidates were barred from campaigning and foreign election observers were banned (Lansford 2021: 1208). During an anti-government protest in 2018, state forces used harsh repression against protesters. The latest presidential elections in November 2021 were described as not free nor fair due to the prior crackdown on Ortega's challengers.¹¹⁴ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED elections were competitive until 2015, and not competitive afterwards. V-Dem scores elections as not really clean since 2012 (CEI). The overall election conditions were ambiguous from 2011 to 2020. Since 2021, the election are stated as not really free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI. As classified by FH in 2011 and 2012, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. From 2013 to 2015 a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. In 2016 and 2017 the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. From 2018 to 2024 the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. However, LIED indicates the absence of political liberties for the entire time. V-Dem's PCLI scores an ambiguous presence of political liberties until 2017 and no presence since 2018. From 2012 to 2015, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. In 2016, 2017 and 2018, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. For 2012-2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

¹¹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Nicaraguan_general_election#Controversy

¹¹⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nicaragua/freedom-world/2022>

Niger

01/01/1900 No Central Authority [Start: 08/05/1890]: Niger was an object of centuries-old contention among different African peoples. On 08/05/1890, the Franco-British agreement was signed, dividing the territory between the two colonial powers.¹¹⁵ Starting from there, the French conquered the territory step by step in military campaigns against the indigenous people (Fuglestad 1983).

07/23/1900 End No Central Authority/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, (Male) Defective Democracy]: A formal Zinder Military Territory was formed on 07/23/1900. This military territory only governed what is modern southern Niger, with only nominal rule east of Zinder or north of Tanout.¹¹⁶ LIED and V-Dem do not treat Niger for this time. For 1900-1921, V-Dem do not list Niger in their database.

10/13/1922 Continuation Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, (Male) Defective Democracy]: In 1922, Niger officially became a French colony. Political evolution began under a constitution granted by France in 1946, with Niger becoming a self-governing republic within the French Community in 1958 and attaining full independence in August 1960. In 1948 universal suffrage had been introduced. According to LIED, universal suffrage was introduced in 1957. While Niger was officially only a colony from 1922 onwards, de facto it was already ruled as a colony before. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1945. In the period between 1946 and 1947, multiparty legislative elections were held. From 1948 onward, multiparty executive and legislative elections remain absent. Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as absent. In this timeframe, from 1922 to 1955, V-Dem's JCE is classified as robust, indicating strong and regular judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

07/23/1956 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date the French National Assembly voted the Loi-Cadre, a reform act which should transform France's colonial powers towards an elected territorial government. As a result, elections were held in most of French

¹¹⁵ https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Franz%C3%B6sisches_Abkommen_von_1890

¹¹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colony_of_Niger

African colonies also in Niger. Niger turned to an autonomous state in the French Community.¹¹⁷ LIED confirms the presence of legislative and multiparty elections since 1957. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

08/03/1960 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start One-Party Autocracy: The independence of Niger came into effect on this day.¹¹⁸ The prohibition of the Marxist-oriented Sawaba (Freedom) Party in 1959 transformed Niger into a one-party state under the Niger Progressive Party (Parti Progressiste Nigérien, PPN), led by President Hamani Diori, who belonged to the Djerma tribe (Lansford 2021: 1214). The PPN won the December 1958 pre-independence election with help from the French. Prior to independence, the most popular rival party was outlawed, and its leaders jailed. Power was centralized under Diori, who controlled ministerial appointments without parliamentary scrutiny, could appoint and dismiss civil servants and military officers, and could decree and veto laws (Higgott/Fuglestad 1975: 385, Collier 1982: 109, Ibrahim 1994: 21-24). According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during the period between 1961 and 1964. From 1965 onward, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. In this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. During this regime period, from 1960-1973, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free.

04/15/1974 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: Diori was accused of consolidating power to himself and to his family while diverting food and other resources. He was overthrown through a military coup by army chief of staff Kountche who established himself as president of a military junta (Conseil Militaire Supreme) (Higgott/Fuglestad 1975: 385) (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 82). Within a year of the coup, the majority of CMS members had been either killed or imprisoned as Kountche solidified his

¹¹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loi-cadre_Defferre; [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niger#Colonial_\(1900–1958\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niger#Colonial_(1900–1958))

¹¹⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niger#Colonial_\(1900%E2%80%931958\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niger#Colonial_(1900%E2%80%931958))

personal power (Higgott/Fuglestad 1975: 385, 397, Robinson 1992: 155, Ibrahim 1994: 25, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 82). In 1981 Kountche began to increase civilian representation in the CMS, and in 1982 preparations were undertaken for a constitutional form of government. A civilian prime minister, Mamane Oumarou, was appointed on 01/24/1983. In January 1984, he established a commission to draft a pre-constitutional document, termed a 'national charter'.¹¹⁹ The charters main points were the establishment of non-elective, consultative institutions at both national and local levels. On 06/16/1987 the „national charter” referendum took place and was approved by 96.8% of voters with a 99.58% turnout.¹²⁰ After Kountche's death Ali Saibou secured his nomination by the Supreme Military Council as Kountche's successor, subsequently sending military rivals overseas with diplomatic tasks. Saibou took over the office of president on 11/14/1987.¹²¹ On 09/24/1989 Saibou had a new constitution approved. It would render Niger as a one-party state with the 'National Movement for the Development of Society' (MNDS) as sole legal party. The government would have a presidential system, as well as the continued involvement of the Armed Forces, which had ruled the country since the military coup in 1974. It was approved by 99.3% of voters with a 94.9% turnout. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent until 1988 and were not really present afterwards. From 1974 to 1986, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For 1974, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1975 to 1988, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Between 1987 and 1989, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category.

12/12/1989 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: On this date the first general elections under the new constitution were held. Saibou was elected as president

¹¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seyni_Kountch%C3%A9

¹²⁰ https://africanelections.tripod.com/ne.html#1989_Presidential_Election

¹²¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Saibou

unopposed under the sole legal party MNDS.¹²² Saibou permitted in response to widespread demonstrations and strikes, the convening of a National Conference in July 1990. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For 1989, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1990, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present.

07/29/1991 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, the National Conference that stripped Saibou of all but ceremonial powers opened (Gervais 1997: 92). Without delay, it declared its decisions to hold sovereign authority, superseding existing institutions. The dissolution of the government followed, with ministries instructed to directly report to this authority, and the removal of the army commander. The National Conference then selected a transitional government, led by a technocrat and a professor without ties to the previous regime, to guide the transition to democracy. The National Conference formulated a new constitution adopted on 12/26/1992, aiming to institute a multiparty political system, and set elections for March 1993. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. For this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present. As classified by FH in 1991, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. In 1992, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. For 1991 and 1992, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

03/27/1993 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, fair multiparty elections took place, and the victors were granted the right to assume power,

¹²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Nigerien_constitutional_referendum

concluding the successful transition to democracy (Ibrahim 1994: 29-38, Gervais 1997: 96, Ibrahim/Souley 1998: 148-50, Lansford 2012, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 82-83). Mahamane Ousmane emerged as the winner, leading a coalition led by the Democratic and Social Convention (CDS) (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 47).¹²³ BTI characterized those elections as „relatively free and fair”¹²⁴, nonetheless deficits continued. During this transition, LIED confirms that competitive elections were present. V-Dem’s CEI indicates somewhat cleanliness outcomes from 1993 to 1994 and an ambiguous state in 1995. In addition, V-Dem’s EF&FI scores free and fair elections. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 in 1993 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. In 1994 and 1995 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. However, LIED indicates the absence of political liberties for this period. In addition, V-Dem’s PCLI declares somewhat political liberties are given. Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, 1993-1995, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

01/27/1996 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date the army, led by Colonel Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara overthrew incumbent president Mahamane Ousmane, who had been elected in 1993.¹²⁵ Mainassara subsequently claimed victory in a rigged election in July 1996 that barred all of the main opposition candidates from competing and seated himself as chairman of the National Salvation Council. He remained in power until his assassination in 1999 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 83, Ibrahim/Souley 1998: 164).¹²⁶ According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. For that timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties were somewhat present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the year 1996, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1997 to 1999, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints

¹²³ <https://africanelections.tripod.com/ne.html>

¹²⁴ <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/NER>

¹²⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Nigerien_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat;

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibrahim_Bar%C3%A9_Ma%C3%AFnassara" \o "Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara

¹²⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Nigerien_presidential_election

on the executive were absent. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free.

04/09/1999 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: In 1999 authoritarian ruler Colonel Ibrahim Mainassara Bare was killed by his own presidential guard. Following the coup within the army, Major Daouda Mallam Wanke declared a 9-month transition plan to take place under a military Council of National Reconciliation and seated himself as chairman. An extensive debate about the nature of institutional arrangements both within appointed Technical and Consultative Committees and in the press followed. The military imposed a solution, which was validated in a referendum in 1999. The junta promised a return to democracy within the year.¹²⁷ As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time.

11/24/1999 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Defective Democracy: Presidential and legislative elections took place in October and November 1999, and the new administration assumed office under the designation of the Fifth Republic in 2000 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 48, Lansford 2012, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 83).¹²⁸ The presidential and legislative elections were hailed as free and fair by international observers. Mamadou Tandja, a former army officer, won the presidency in a second round of polling with about 60% of the vote.¹²⁹ Tandja was re-elected for a second round of presidency in 2004. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Between 1999 and 2008 the elections were competitive (LIED). From 1999 to 2008 V-Dem's CEI indicates ambiguous cleanliness scores. Moreover, V-Dem's EF&FI states the elections as somewhat free and fair until 2003. From 2004 to 2008 the elections were free and fair. According to FH, from 2000 to 2003, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. From 2004 to 2008 the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. LIED view political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI declares the full presence of political liberties. Until 2008, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For the timeframe 2000-2008, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. In 2009 a constitutional crisis occurred due to a political conflict between Tandja and judicial and legislative bodies regarding the constitutional referendum that opponents claimed was an

¹²⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mamadou_Tandja

¹²⁸ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad6c94.html>

¹²⁹ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5278c70112.htm>

attempt to extend his mandate beyond the constitutional maximum of two terms. The Constitutional Court of Niger ruled on 06/12/2009 that the proposed referendum was unconstitutional. Although the judiciary was nominally independent, it was prone to corruption due to the low wages of judges. Defamation lawsuits were regularly used by political authorities to deter journalists. Further, an estimated 43.000 to 870.000 people were living in de facto slavery in 2002 (Freedom House, 2010: 453).¹³⁰

06/26/2009 End Defective Democracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the president dissolved the courts and announced he was assuming emergency powers. The referendum was eventually held on 08/04/2009, despite major criticism from international groups. The crisis led to a coup d'état by military leaders.¹³¹ In 2009, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For 2009, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Per FH's evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In 2009, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were present.

02/18/2010 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Lieutenant General Salou Djibo led a military coup against President Mamadou Tandja. Djibo, as the leader of the Council for the Restoration of Democracy (Conseil Suprême pour la Restauration de la Démocratie—CSR), suspended the constitution and dissolved parliament the next day. Former President Tandja and several of his ministers were placed under house arrest (Lansford 2021: 1217).¹³² The junta progressed towards civilian governance by facilitating multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections on 01/31/2011, despite objections from opposition party leaders. They argued that issues with the voter rolls warranted a postponement (Lansford 2021: 1217). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For 2010, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Especially V-Dem's LCE seems misleading again since there was no parliament in this regime period. According to FH, for the regime period under consideration, a score between 9 and 10

¹³⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery_in_Niger#Modern_slavery

¹³¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009%E2%80%932010_Nigerien_constitutional_crisis

¹³² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Nigerien_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. In 2010, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were present.

01/31/2011 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: The presidential election on this date resulted in a victory for Mahamadou Issoufou of the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS), who defeated Seyni Oumarou of the National Movement for the Development of Society (MNDS). In the National Assembly elections, the PNDS emerged as the largest party.¹³³ Santiago Fisas, the chief of EU monitoring, praised the election as a triumph for the people of Niger, stating, 'It serves as an exemplary model for the peaceful restoration of democracy.'¹³⁴ On 02/21/2016, President Mahamadou Issoufou secured his re-election for a second five-year term. The electoral atmosphere was marked by political tension, as the primary challenger for the presidency, opposition leader Hama Amadou, remained in custody throughout the electoral process, facing accusations related to a baby-trafficking scandal. The opposition chose to boycott the second round of the presidential poll, which Issoufou ultimately won with an overwhelming 92 percent of the vote.¹³⁵ The opposition parties refused to accept the partial election results provided by the electoral commission, alleging disparities between the announced results and their own counts. Amadou Cissé, the candidate from the Union for Democracy and the Republic, contested the results and accused the government of establishing „thousands of polling stations“ to manipulate the outcome.¹³⁶ On 12/27/2020, general elections were held in Niger to elect the President and National Assembly. On 02/21/2021 a second round was held. Mohamed Bazoum was declared the winner in the second round with 55.67% of the vote.¹³⁷ The vote marked what was expected to be the first peaceful transfer of power in Niger.¹³⁸ The presidential polls were marked by isolated reports of attempted vote buying, but were largely peaceful while for the national assembly, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) observers called the elections relatively free and fair, and lauded the participation of young and female voters.¹³⁹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED between 2011 and 2015 the elections were competitive and not

¹³³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Nigerien_general_election

¹³⁴ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12724965>;

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Nigerien_general_election

¹³⁵ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/niger/freedom-world/2017>

¹³⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Nigerien_general_election

¹³⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020%E2%80%9321_Nigerien_general_election

¹³⁸ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/niger/freedom-world/2021>

¹³⁹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/niger/freedom-world/2021>

competitive since 2016. From 2012 to 2015 the elections are classified as somewhat clean, and since 2016 as ambiguous. Until 2019 V-Dem's EF&FI indicates the overall election conditions as ambiguous. Since 2020 the elections are somewhat free and fair. Per FH, from 2011 to 2015, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. From 2016 onward the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. While LIED views political liberties as absent, V-Dem's PCLI considers them as fully present until 2023. From 2011 to 2018, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For 2011, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 2012 to 2020, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 2021 and 2022, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. On 31/03/2021 a coup attempt took place, that was staged by elements within the military. The alleged leader of the plot was Captain Sani Saley Gourouza. The coup was unsuccessful.¹⁴⁰

06/26/2023 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: After a successful coup d'état led by the Presidential Guard Commander General Abdourahamane Tchiani on 06/26/2023, Nigers President Mohamed Bazoum was detained and removed from office, ending the already unstable constitutional order. Shortly thereafter General Abdourahamane publicly declared himself the leader of a newly formed military junta.¹⁴¹ The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) demanded the release and reinstatement of President Bazoum and the regional bloc gave the military a one-week ultimatum, threatening measures that could include the use of force should it not comply with its demands. After the deadline passed without effect, sanctions were imposed and relations and borders closed with Niger, Nigeria cutting it off from its energy supply, on which Niger depends on for 70% of its power.¹⁴² Surrounding countries such as Burkina Faso and Mali, similarly led by coup-leaders, have pledged support for General Abdourahamane and threatened a forceful response should ECOWAS decide to intervene militarily, further increasing regional tensions.¹⁴³ On 07/27, supporters of the coup incited civil unrest after setting fire to the headquarters of the former

¹⁴⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Nigerien_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat_attempt

¹⁴¹ <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/8/20/timeline-what-has-happened-in-niger-since-the-coup>

¹⁴² <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/8/20/timeline-what-has-happened-in-niger-since-the-coup>

¹⁴³ <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2024/mounting-damage-flawed-elections-and-armed-conflict>

governing party in Niamey.¹⁴⁴ For 2023, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. In 2023, the country's FH score was 10, which FH classified as partly free and which our framework interprets as rather not free. In 2024, the score worsened to 13, a level that both FH and our framework classify as not free.

Military Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Decalo 1990, Basedau 1999)

Nigeria

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 02/26/1885]: The United Kingdom's dominance over Nigerian territory had been recognized by other European powers at the Berlin Conference that ended on 02/26/1885. From 1886 until 1899 the territory was ruled mainly by the Royal Niger Company. In 1900, both the Southern and the Northern Nigeria Protectorate passed on to the Crown. The protectorates were governed by the colonial office at Whitehall.¹⁴⁵ LIED provides data from 1914 onward and does not record any multiparty executive or legislative elections that took place during the specified period. LIED and V-Dem do not treat Nigeria before 1914. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI. For 1900-1913, V-Dem do not list Nigeria in their database. From 1914 to 1953, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

10/01/1954 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Autocracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date, Nigeria became the self-governing Federation of Nigeria. Nevertheless, full independence had not yet been granted. General elections were held between October and December 1954.¹⁴⁶ The elections were held using different systems in the different provinces. Direct elections were held in Lagos and the Eastern and Western regions, whilst electoral colleges were used in Southern Cameroons and Northern Region.¹⁴⁷ In these elections male suffrage was introduced (LIED) and in 1958 female suffrage was

¹⁴⁴ <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/8/20/timeline-what-has-happened-in-niger-since-the-coup>

¹⁴⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonial_Nigeria

¹⁴⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1954_Nigerian_general_election

¹⁴⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1954_Nigerian_general_election

introduced.¹⁴⁸ On 12/12/1959 parliamentary elections were held that resulted in the victory for the Northern People's Congress, which won 134 of the 312 seats.¹⁴⁹ Based on our observations, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which contradicts the observations of LIED. However, LIED classifies the elections as not competitive until 1960. Moreover, no cleanliness is achieved according to V-Dem's CEI. The 1959 elections were not really free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). For this period political liberties were absent (LIED). Whereas V-Dem's PCLI points out ambiguous political liberties are present. In this period, the British monarch remained the symbolic head of state, represented by a colonial governor, while local elections were being held to establish domestic governance. For 1954 to 1958, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1959, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

10/01/1960 Continuation (Monarchical) Electoral Autocracy [as independent country]: On 10/01/1960, Nigeria reached independence within the Commonwealth under its first prime minister, Abubaker Tafawa Balewa (Lansford 2021: 1227). The British monarch continued to be the symbolic head of state. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

10/01/1963 Continuation Electoral Autocracy [as republic]: On this date, Nigeria adopted a new constitution in 1963 which abolished the monarchy and the office of governor-general, with Nigeria becoming a parliamentary republic within the Commonwealth with Nnamdi Azikiwe of the Ibo tribe as President of Nigeria (Lansford 2021: 1227). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since the independence, electoral competitiveness is given (LIED). In addition, the elections are stated as not really clean (V-Dem CEI). The overall election conditions were not really free and fair as well (V-Dem EF&FI). According to LIED no political liberties were present. V-Dem's PCLI scores somewhat political liberties. However, since 1960, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. From 1963 to 1966, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive

¹⁴⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

¹⁴⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1959_Nigerian_general_election

were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

01/15/1966 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: The government could not control the ongoing ethnic violence in the country and thus the military initiated a coup designed to eradicate the civilian elements.¹⁵⁰ Eventually, General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi took the reins of a new military government with the goal of restoring order (Luckham 1971: 43-49, 55-66, 76-79).¹⁵¹ There were around 22 casualties. The acting president, Nwafor Orizu, announced a „voluntary” transfer of power to the armed forces. Shortly after, General Ironsi established a Military Council which suspended the constitution. The coup was seen as an Igbo conspiracy to gain power and fueled the Nigerian Civil War which broke out soon after.¹⁵² According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power.

07/29/1966 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup led by Hausa-Fulani junior officers and NCOs ousted the government of Ibo Major General Ironsi. The military regime that commenced in July 1966 was distinct from the previous military administration due to differences in ethnic composition and the seniority of the officers participating in the two governments (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 83). This coup is regarded as the „counter-coup” to the military coup on 01/15/1966.¹⁵³ Several pogroms against Igbo people and southern Nigerians took place starting in May 1966 and culminating after 09/29/1966. An estimated 8.000 to 30.000 Igbos and eastern Nigerians were killed and an additional one million Igbos fled the Northern Region. In response, northern Nigerians were massacred in Port Harcourt in the East. The killings contributed to the secession of Biafra and the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War.¹⁵⁴ On 07/06/1967 the Nigerian Civil War, also known as the Biafran War, began, when Nigerian troops advanced into Biafra.¹⁵⁵ It was a war fought between and the Republic of Biafra, a secessionist state which had declared its independence from Nigeria in 1967. Biafra was led by Igbo nationalists who no longer felt represented by the federal government which they felt was being dominated by Muslim Hausa-Fulanis. On 01/07/1970, the Nigerian Army launched their last operation named „Tail-Wind”.¹⁵⁶ On 01/14/1970 the surrender paper of Biafra was signed in Lagos. The secession was renounced

¹⁵⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_Nigerian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

¹⁵¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johnson_Aguiyi-Ironsi

¹⁵² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_Nigerian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

¹⁵³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Civil_War#Background

¹⁵⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_anti-Igbo_pogrom

¹⁵⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Civil_War#War

¹⁵⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Civil_War

and General Gowon, who had led Nigeria during the civil war, returned to power.¹⁵⁷ The Nigerian Civil War is documented as one of the deadliest conflicts in modern history, with accusations against Gowon for crimes against humanity and genocide.¹⁵⁸ In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1967 to 1974, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. As classified by FH from 1972 onward, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free.

07/29/1975 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a number of scandals including a massive cement contract mistake combined with Gowon's declaration to stay in power led to a bloodless coup while Gowon was attending the 12th summit of the Organization for African Unity in Kampala. Brigadier Murtala Mohammed was appointed leader of the military government by the coup plotters.¹⁵⁹ In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1975 to 1978, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Per FH, in 1975, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In 1976 and 1977, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. In 1978 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. For this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as pointing out that political liberties are ambiguous until 1977 and are somewhat present afterwards.

08/11/1979 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, competitive presidential elections were overseen by the outgoing military regime as a means of choosing a civilian leadership (Panter-Brick 1979: 317-35, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 83).¹⁶⁰ The

¹⁵⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Civil_War#

¹⁵⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yakubu_Gowon

¹⁵⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1975_Nigerian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

¹⁶⁰ <http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng.html>

elections were won by Shehu Shagari from the National Party of Nigeria.¹⁶¹ PRC classifies the regime as a semidemocracy, RoW as an electoral autocracy, BR, BMR, GWF, HTW, LIED, MCM and REIGN as a democracy. The main reason for our classification as an electoral hybrid regime is the low quality of the elections which is mainly due to the oversight of the military over the elections. This also has to be seen against the background that this regime was preceded and succeeded by a military autocracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. However, LIED scores the elections as competitive. Whereas V-Dem's CEI indicates no clean elections. The overall election conditions are considered as ambiguous by V-Dem's EF&FI. Per FH's scoring for this regime period, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. Moreover, LIED's score still underlines the absence of political liberties. Following V-Dem's PCLI somewhat political liberties are present for this time. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. During this regime period, from 1979 to 1983 V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Given all our observations Nigeria is a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

12/31/1983 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, religious and political violence coupled with economic decline prompted a military coup by Major-General Muhammadu Buhari against the government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari. Buhari rationalized the military's seizure of power by castigating the civilian government as hopelessly corrupt and promptly suspended the constitution.¹⁶² Buhari established himself as the chairman of the Supreme Military Council (Lovejoy 1992, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 83, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 84).¹⁶³ In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is categorized by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties, indicating an intermediate state between present and absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1984 and 1985, V-Dem's JCE is

¹⁶¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shehu_Shagari

¹⁶² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammadu_Buhari

¹⁶³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammadu_Buhari

classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free.

08/27/1985 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Major-General Ibrahim Babangida, overthrew the government of Major General Muhammadu Buhari.¹⁶⁴ Babangida formed a new junta, called the Armed Forces Ruling Council. On 06/12/1993, the first presidential elections since the 1983 military coup were held. The unofficial result indicated a victory for Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), who defeated Bashir Tofa of the National Republican Convention (NRC). However, the winner of the election was never declared as the elections were annulled by Babangida.¹⁶⁵ Hence, no regime change is coded for 06/12/1993. In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1986 to 1991, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1992, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Per FH, from 1985 to 1987, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In 1988, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. In 1989 the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. In 1990 to 1992, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

08/26/1993 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Non-Party) Regime: The annulment of the election led to political violence and severe strikes. On this date, the military government under Babangida was forced to resign and appoint an unelected civilian government after annulling the results of what should have been a transitional election (Lewis 1999: 144). For 1993, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints

¹⁶⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1985_Nigerian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

¹⁶⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Nigerian_presidential_election

on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

11/17/1993 End Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Non-Party) Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, in a situation of political and economic stalemate General Sani Abacha, defense minister, overthrew Interim President Chief Ernest Shonekan and canceled the budding civilian government.¹⁶⁶ Due to the shifts in the identity of those holding key leadership positions and influencing policy decisions, the era following August 1993 is perceived as distinct from the Buhari/Babangida regime.(Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 83-84). Abacha dissolved the legislature, as well as the state and local governments, and replaced the elected civilian state governors with military and police officers. He also banned all political activities and established two governing institutions - the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) and Federal Executive Council.¹⁶⁷ In the span of a month, Abacha dismissed and compelled the retirement of a significant number of high-ranking officers. He narrowed the circle of influence and high office to his close military allies and individuals from his home region. Additionally, he excluded civilians who had collaborated with the previous regime from positions of influence .¹⁶⁸ GWF misclassifies the period from 02/27/1997 on as democratic based on the statement that there has been „competitive presidential elections overseen by the military as part of a transition to democracy” (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 84) on this date. However, they have been wrongly dated and only occurred on 02/27/1997. Hence, the period until the elections is coded as a military autocracy. In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1994 to 1998, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Per FH, until 1997, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In 1998, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free.

02/20/1999 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, parliamentary elections were held, following the annulling of the 1998 elections.¹⁶⁹ The Carter Center and

¹⁶⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Nigerian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

¹⁶⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Nigerian_presidential_election

¹⁶⁸ <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-09-26-mn-39134-story.html>

¹⁶⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Nigerian_parliamentary_election

NDI observers reported serious irregularities nationwide: Instances of electoral process abuses, such as ballot stuffing, result inflation, and voter intimidation, were pervasive enough to raise concerns about the outcome of the elections in specific electoral districts (The Carter Center 1999). On 02/27/1999 presidential elections were held. The result was a victory for Olusegun Obasanjo of the People's Democratic Party.¹⁷⁰ Presidential elections were held regularly in 2003, 2007 and 2011. According to international observers like the EU EOM the presidential elections of 2003 were marred by irregularities and fraud, such as ballot stuffing and forgery of results. In addition, the media coverage was biased (van den Berg 2003). Furthermore, most observers deemed the Nigerian elections of 2007 to significantly deviate from the benchmarks of credible, free, and fair elections, marking them as the poorest in Nigeria's post-independence electoral timeline. Up to this point, elections primarily favored the interests of the influential elite, with minimal, if any, tangible contribution to enhancing representative democracy. Reports from both domestic and international observers corroborate that all aspects of the elections were fundamentally flawed (Department for International Development 2010). The general elections of 2011 were characterized by both domestic and international observers as transparent, free, and fair, which is particularly noteworthy considering the fraudulent elections of 2007. However, despite being well-managed, the aftermath saw post-election violence in northern Nigeria, resulting in 800 casualties over three days and displacing 65,000 individuals, making it the most violent election in Nigeria's history (Okolo/Onunkwo 2011, Bekoe 2011). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Besides, between 1999 and 2002 the elections score competitiveness. Until 2010 no competitive elections were held. Since 2011, electoral competitiveness is stated again, following LIED. However, V-Dem's CEI views the elections as not really clean from 1999 to 2003 and for the following seven years as not clean at all. Since 2011, the election were classified as not really clean again. V-Dem's EF&FI considers the overall elections conditions as ambiguous until 2002. Between 2003 and 2010, not real freedom and fairness is achieved. Since 2011, the elections are classified as somewhat free and fair. Per FH, in 1999, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. In 2000 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. In 2001 and 2002 the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. From 2003 to 2007 the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. In 2008 and 2009 a score between 9

¹⁷⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Nigerian_presidential_election

and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. From 2010 to 2013 the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. In 2014 the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Whereas LIED points out the absence of political liberties, V-Dem's PCLI indicates full political liberties. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For 1999-2009, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2010 and 2011, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2013 to 2015, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. Regarding the fundamental problems with electoral integrity the period is classified as an electoral autocracy in our dataset. 03/28[&29]/2015 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: General elections were held in Nigeria on these dates. The AUEOM concluded that the elections were conducted in a „peaceful atmosphere“ and met the „continental and regional principles of democratic elections“. ECOWAS EOM said that it met the „criteria of being free and transparent“ despite „pockets of incidents and logistical challenges.“ The Commonwealth EOM described the conduct as „generally peaceful and transparent”.¹⁷¹ Constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech, expression, and the press were limited by laws on sedition, defamation, and false news. While the right to peaceful assembly was protected, authorities frequently banned public events seen as national security threats, and the military faced criticism for abuses of rights, including extrajudicial killings and torture. Both Boko Haram and a civilian vigilante group were reported to forcibly recruit child soldiers.¹⁷² According to FH, in 2015, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. From 2016 to 2018 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. According to LIED Nigeria did not guarantee political rights for this time. On the other hand, V-Dem's PCLI still states the full presence of political liberties except in 2021 political liberties are classified

¹⁷¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Nigerian_general_election

¹⁷² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2020>

by us as somewhat present. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In addition, between 2015 and 2018 the country's elections were competitive according to LIED. Furthermore, elections are not competitive since 2019 per LIED. V-Dem's CEI indicates ambiguous cleanliness outcomes until 2018, and not real electoral cleanliness ever since 2019. V-Dem's EF&FI underlines somewhat free and fair election conditions since 2015. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. On 02/23/2019 general elections were held to elect the president, vice president and both chambers of the parliament. Observers documented irregularities, including violence, voter and official intimidation, and vote-buying. There were also instances where party officials instructed voters on how to cast their ballots at polling stations. Additionally, INEC refused to certify the winning candidates in two races due to reports that local returning officers were operating under duress.¹⁷³ Generally the 1999 constitution provides for a bicameral legislative branch (National Assembly), consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Members are elected for four-year terms. Executive power is vested in a president, generally elected for four-year terms.¹⁷⁴ However, due to the deep challenges to Nigeria's democratic integrity it is coded an electoral autocracy: widespread corruption, high levels of violence by both state- and non-state actors, and discrimination that impede the civil liberties of groups such as LGBT+ and women,¹⁷⁵ and media is restricted by so-called defamation laws that allow the government to punish critical journalism likely cause self-censorship. Moreover, high violence during election cycles has led to disillusionment and falling voter-turnout rates.¹⁷⁶ The 2023 Nigerian presidential election took place on 02/25/2023, to choose the president and Vice President of Nigeria. Bola Tinubu, the former Governor of Lagos State and nominee of the All Progressives Congress, emerged as the winner with 36.61% of the vote, totaling about 8,794,726 votes. The election initially had a high projected turnout but was marked by reports of irregularities such as vote buying, voter intimidation, attacks on polling units, and delays in electoral procedures. Additionally, there were accusations of fraud, and the Independent National Electoral Commission failed to upload polling unit results to the INEC result viewing portal as promised on election day, further eroding trust in the electoral process.¹⁷⁷ Based on our observations,

¹⁷³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2022>

¹⁷⁴ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Government-and-society>

¹⁷⁵ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2023>

¹⁷⁶ <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/06/democracy-nigeria>

¹⁷⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Nigerian_presidential_election

multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For 2016 to 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. From 2019 onward, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. According to FH, for the regime period under consideration, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Bendel 1999a, Bienen 1978, Diamond 1988, Kura 2005, Metz 1991, Zage 2010)

Niue

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [Start: 06/30/1898]: The last King of Niue to be appointed by the populace, before the island was colonized, was Togia-Pulu-Toaki, who was anointed on 06/30/1898. His reign ended with the arrival of the British colonizers (Smith 1903).

10/19/1900 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]: In a document dated 10/19/1900, the people of Niue – apparently – consented to „Queen Victoria taking possession of this island”, marking the official end of the self-government of the people of Niue.¹⁷⁸ LIED does not treat Niue's short colonial time.

06/11/1901 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]/Start Part of Other Country [United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy, as Part of Colony of New Zealand]: In 1901, through an Order in Council under the United Kingdom's Colonial Boundaries Act of 1895, the islands were incorporated into the Colony of New Zealand. This boundary adjustment took effect on 06/11/1901.¹⁷⁹

09/26/1907 Continuation Part of Other Country [New Zealand, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date, New Zealand was granted nominal independence shifting into a dominion status (Yates 2014). After Autonomy had been proposed to Niue in 1965 (a proposal

¹⁷⁸ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niue#History>

¹⁷⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Cook_Islands#British_protectorate

accepted by the Cook Islands), Niue had requested a postponement of its autonomy for an additional decade.¹⁸⁰

10/19/1974 End Part of Other Country [New Zealand, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of New Zealand, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: The 1974 Niue Constitution Act, enacted by the New Zealand Parliament, reinstated self-government in Niue. This followed the 1974 Niuean constitutional referendum, where Niueans could choose among three options: independence, self-government, or remaining a New Zealand territory. The majority opted for self-government, and Niue's written constitution was established as the supreme law.¹⁸¹ The executive authority under the Niue Constitution Act of 1974 is entrusted to His Majesty the King in Right of New Zealand and the Governor-General of New Zealand. The constitution outlines that the day-to-day exercise of sovereignty is carried out by the cabinet, consisting of the Premier and three other ministers. These officials, including the Premier, are members of the parliament.¹⁸² The judiciary works independently from legislature and executive.¹⁸³ Niue traditionally does not have political parties, instead the election pool consists of independents. In the most recent of its three-year-term cycle in March 2023, voter turnout was high with 74% and all 20 Assembly seats were elected along with the premier. Dalton Tagelagi, the incumbent premier, was re-elected for another three terms.¹⁸⁴ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. FH, LIED and V-Dem do not register Niue in their data. Based on the limited data on observations it is hard to decide if Niue fulfills all criteria for a liberal democracy. However, we found no facts contradicting this classification.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

North Macedonia

[Until 02/12/2019 known as Macedonia]

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 01/19/1392]: On 01/19/1392, Skopje fell under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, bringing the whole of Macedonia under Ottoman rule.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Niue#Autonomy

¹⁸¹ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niue#History>

¹⁸² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niue#Government_and_politics

¹⁸³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Niue#Executive_branch

¹⁸⁴ <https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/4124/>

¹⁸⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Macedonia

08/10/1913 End Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Part of Other Country [Serbia, Constitutional Monarchy]: With the end of the second Balkan War, the territory of North Macedonia, called „Vardar Macedonia”, was given to Serbia in the Treaty of Bucharest. After World War I, the people in this region were regarded as southern Serbs.¹⁸⁶

12/01/1918 End Part of Other Country [Serbia, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Constitutional Monarchy]: On this date, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Sloves, later Kingdom of Yugoslavia was founded. And North Macedonia, as part of the Kingdom of Serbia became part of it.¹⁸⁷

04/08/1941 End Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Bulgaria, Constitutional Monarchy, Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy, Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: From 1941-1944 the territory of today's North Macedonia was occupied by Germany, Bulgaria and Italy.¹⁸⁸ Despite the occupation, the first meeting of the Macedonian Communists 'Anti-fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia' (ASNOM) was held on 08/02/1944. On the same day, the Yugoslav Socialist Republic of Macedonia was founded.¹⁸⁹ From August 1944 to the end of World War II. ASNOM was the supreme legislative and executive people's representative body of the communist Macedonian state. Italy signed its capitulation on 09/08/1943 and on 10/02/1944 Bulgaria ordered its troops to withdraw. By 09/1944, the Soviet Army was approaching North Macedonia. To create a buffer against the Red Army, Germany attempted to establish a Macedonian puppet state, the „Independent State of Macedonia,“ under Ivan Mihailov in the territory of Yugoslavia, which had been occupied by Bulgaria. This plan failed, leading to a German withdrawal order on 10/06/1944. On 10/08/1944, right-wing nationalists declared independence and took control of the puppet state. The „Independent State of Macedonia“ existed from 10/08/1944 to 11/13/1944, overlapping briefly with the Socialist Republic during this period.¹⁹⁰

11/19/1944 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: By this date, the Germans were completely dislodged from Macedonia, and organs of „People's Authority” were established. The body was set up by the Macedonian Partisans ASNOM during the final stages of the World

¹⁸⁶ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Bucharest_\(1913\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Bucharest_(1913))

¹⁸⁷ <https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Macedonia.htm>

¹⁸⁸ <https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Macedonia.htm>

¹⁸⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-fascist_Assembly_for_the_National_Liberation_of_Macedonia;
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nordmazedonien#Vom_Balkankrieg_bis_zum_Ende_des_Kalten_Krieges

¹⁹⁰ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_Macedonia_\(1944\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_Macedonia_(1944))

War II in Yugoslav Macedonia.¹⁹¹ The Manifesto of ASNOM eventually became a compromise between the powers in favor of the creation of an independent United Macedonian state with loose ties to Yugoslavia, and the proponents of the creation of a Macedonian state within the Yugoslavian federation. The unification of the Macedonian people was discussed and propagandized but the decision was ultimately reached that Vardar Macedonia (today's North Macedonia) would become part of the new communist Yugoslavia.¹⁹²

03/07/1945 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date, and during the retreat of the German forces, a government dominated by Tito and the communists was established (Petrovich 1947: 508-9, Van Dyke 1947: 375). On 11/29/1945, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, led by Josip Broz Tito was officially proclaimed. In 1946, Macedonia became autonomous as Peoples Republic of Macedonia, later Socialist Republic of Macedonia, within the SFRY.¹⁹³ After Tito's death in 1980, the Yugoslav Communist Party adopted a collective leadership model, with the occupant of the top position rotating annually, and strengthened the federal structure that gave more authority to Yugoslavia's constituent republics. During the 1980s, however, attempts to implement IMF-sponsored adjustments to contain economic decline exacerbated tensions between liberal elites within the federal government and the regional elites, and among the regional elites themselves (Lansford 2021: 1242). On 11/11/1990 the first parliamentary universal elections in the country's history took already place before independence. Both LIED and V-Dem do not treat North Macedonia before 1991.

11/20/1991 End Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this day the Macedonian Independence Referendum took place. One should not be confused by the fact that North Macedonia celebrates 09/08/1991 as its Independence Day. From the mid-1980s, the Slovenian government initiated the practice of withholding tax contributions from the federal government and resisting attempts to increase federal control over the monetary system. These actions set a precedent that resonated in Croatia. The tensions within the federal system were further heightened by ethnic conflicts within Serbia, particularly between Serbs and Albanians. Slobodan Milosevic, the president of the Communist League of Serbia, exploited these intra-Serbian conflicts, utilizing Serbian nationalist appeals that alarmed elites in other regions. The growing discord among the regional branches of the Communist Party culminated in the effective dissolution of the Communist League of Yugoslavia during

¹⁹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_in_Yugoslav_Macedonia

¹⁹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_in_Yugoslav_Macedonia

¹⁹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_North_Macedonia#Balkan_Wars_and_World_War_I

its 14th Congress in January 1990, giving rise to separate parties for each republic. The disbandment of the federal party paved the way for reformist communists across regions to organize multiparty elections in 1990. In Macedonia, despite the nationalist party securing a plurality, the ex-communist party (SDSM) under Kiro Gligorov managed to form a majority coalition in parliament. Gligorov was elected president in 1991 and, following Slovenia and Croatia's lead, spearheaded the government's declaration of „sovereignty“ later that year. Like Croatia, strong nationalist sentiments prevailed, yet widespread mobilization did not play a decisive role in the collapse of the Yugoslav regime or the decision to conduct regional elections. Additionally, thanks in part to UN peacekeepers, Macedonia remained relatively uninvolved in the Balkan wars (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 39-40). On 06/05/2011 elections took place that were judged generally free, fair, and without incident (Lansford 2021: 1242). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since the country's independence the elections are competitive (LIED). From 1991 to 1994 no cleanliness is scored. The electoral cleanliness was ambiguous from 1995 to 1998, 2002 and 2007 to 2008. In 1999, from 2003 to 2007 and since 2018 the elections were somewhat clean. They were not really clean between 2000 and 2001 (V-Dem CEI). Between 1994 and 1997 the overall election conditions are considered as ambiguous. In 1998, free and fair elections were held. But the following three years the overall conditions score ambiguous outcomes. For two years, from 2002 to 2003 freedom and fairness were achieved. Since 2004, the overall conditions are classified as somewhat free and fair. North Macedonia struggles with corruption and clientelism. Despite active involvement in robust public discourse by the media and civil society, journalists and activists continue to experience pressure and intimidation.¹⁹⁴ Per FH, until 2000, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. In 2001 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. From 2002 the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. Besides, LIED scores a constant absence of political liberties. V-Dem's PCLI considers the political liberties as somewhat present from 1991 to 2002, 2008 to 2017 and since 2022. The remaining years full political liberties were achieved. From 1992 to 2001, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. Since 2002, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making

¹⁹⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/north-macedonia/freedom-world/2022>

authority. For 1991 to 2007, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. From 2008 to 2011, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 2012 to 2015, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. In 2016, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 2017 onward, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. According to FH North Macedonia is classified as partly free for the whole period, fluctuating between 6-8. In our framework, the country is therefore considered to be rather not free in 2001 and rather free from the remaining years of the considered time period. North Macedonia is over most of the period according to our observations a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Kasapović 2010a)

Northern Mariana Islands

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy as Part of German New Guinea] [Start: 02/12/1899]: The Jesuit priest Diego Luis de Sanvitores initiated the permanent colonization of the islands in 1668. Spanish reinforcements, led by José Quiroga, arrived in 1680, marking the beginning of European colonial rivalries in the Marianas by the 19th century. German and British soldiers encroached on Spanish claims in Micronesia, leading to potential conflict in 1886. Pope Leo XIII mediated, preventing war between Germany and Spain. However, Spain's weakening empire faced war with the United States in 1898. After the U.S. defeated the Spanish fleet in the Philippines and took Guam, Spain decided to withdraw from the Pacific in 1899. It sold its possessions, including all of the Marianas except Guam, which remained under American control, to Germany.¹⁹⁵ The German-Spanish Treaty was

¹⁹⁵ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Northern-Mariana-Islands/History>

signed on 02/12/1899.¹⁹⁶ The islands were under German administration as a component of the German New Guinea colony.¹⁹⁷

09/21/1914 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy as Part of German New Guinea]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as League of Nation Mandate of Japan, Autocratic Monarchy]: At the onset of World War I, Japan declared war on Germany and occupied the Northern Marianas. Following the war's conclusion in 1919, the League of Nations (LoN) granted Japan a mandate over all of Germany's Pacific islands situated north of the Equator, which encompassed the Northern Marianas. Consequently, Japan administered the Northern Marianas as part of the South Seas Mandate under this mandate.¹⁹⁸ On 12/08/1941, shortly after the assault on Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces from the Marianas initiated an invasion of Guam. Chamorros from the Northern Marianas, under Japanese rule for over two decades, were transported to Guam to support the Japanese administration.¹⁹⁹

06/15/1944 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as League of Nation Mandate of Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]: On this date, the United States military initiated the invasion of the Mariana Islands, commencing the Battle of Saipan, which concluded on 07/09.²⁰⁰ After Japan's defeat in World War II, the Northern Marianas were placed under U.S. administration as part of the United Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

09/28/1964 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]: On this day the Congress of Micronesia, as the legislature of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, was created and was composed by a Senate and a House of Representatives with 21 members. The Mariana Islands voted 3 of the members. Elections were held every two years until 1976.²⁰¹ Moreover, four referendums, held in 1958, 1961, 1963, and 1969, indicated majority support for integration with Guam, but Guam rejected this in 1969. In the 1975 referendum, nearly 80% voted for the Commonwealth of the United States, and in 1977, over 93% approved the CNMI constitution. Opting not for independence, the Northern Mariana Islands pursued closer ties with the U.S. Commonwealth negotiations began in 1972, leading to the approval of a covenant for political union in a 1975 referendum.²⁰² LIED does not treat the colonial time in its data.

¹⁹⁶ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German%E2%80%93Spanish_Treaty_\(1899\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German%E2%80%93Spanish_Treaty_(1899))

¹⁹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Mariana_Islands#German_possession_and_Japanese_mandate

¹⁹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Mariana_Islands#German_possession_and_Japanese_mandate

¹⁹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Mariana_Islands#World_War_II

²⁰⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Mariana_Islands#World_War_II

²⁰¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_of_the_Trust_Territory_of_the_Pacific_Islands

²⁰² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Mariana_Islands#History

01/09/1978 End (de facto) Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Liberal Democracy]/Start Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of USA, Liberal Democracy]: On this date the constitution became effective after it was drafted in 1976 and ratified by Northern Mariana Islands voters on 03/06/1977.²⁰³ The Northern Mariana Islands came under U.S. sovereignty on 11/04/1986, and the residents gained U.S. citizenship.²⁰⁴ As per the 1978 constitution, the U.S. president serves as the head of state in the Northern Mariana Islands. The head of government is the governor, elected by residents to a four-year term, along with a lieutenant governor. The bicameral legislature comprises a nine-member Senate and an 18-member House of Representatives. Additionally, the commonwealth elects one representative to the U.S. House of Representatives.²⁰⁵ The judiciary operates independently, and regular elections facilitate frequent changes in government.²⁰⁶ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. FH, LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Northern Mariana Islands.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Norway

01/01/1900 Constitutional Monarchy [Start: 05/17/1814]: Despite being recognized as an independent kingdom, Norway had been linked with Denmark under a shared monarchy since the 16th century, with the government of the united state centered in Copenhagen. Denmark, having aligned with France during the Napoleonic Wars, was obliged to relinquish Norway to Sweden by signing the Treaty of Kiel in January 1814, which established the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway.²⁰⁷ In 1814, the Kingdom of Norway made a short-lived and unsuccessful effort to reclaim its sovereignty. On 05/17/1814, the Norwegian Constitution was signed by the Eidsvoll assembly, which changed Norway's political regime from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy.²⁰⁸ The United Kingdoms, also known as Sweden and Norway or Sweden-Norway, was a personal union between the independent kingdoms of Sweden and Norway, which shared a single monarch and foreign policy from 1814 to 1905 when it ended

²⁰³ <https://cnmilaw.org/cons.php#gsc.tab=0>

²⁰⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Mariana_Islands#History

²⁰⁵ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Northern-Mariana-Islands/Economy#ref54015>

²⁰⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_Northern_Mariana_Islands#;

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_the_Northern_Mariana_Islands

²⁰⁷ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Norway_\(1814\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Norway_(1814))

²⁰⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Norway

peacefully.²⁰⁹ Women's suffrage was introduced in 1913.²¹⁰ The Union between Norway and Sweden was dissolved on 06/07/1905.²¹¹ From 1906 to 1918, elections were governed by a two-round run-off system. In the first round, a candidate could win if they received an absolute majority of the votes. If no majority was achieved, a second round was held a few weeks later. In this second round, the candidate with the most votes won, and there were no restrictions on the number of candidates or entry requirements. This system was not mechanically driven by electoral rules but rather controlled by the elites (Fiva/Smith 2017: 4-5). On 10/17/1927, Norway conducted parliamentary elections. The Labour Party secured the position of the largest party, securing 59 out of 150 seats in the Storting. Nevertheless, the subsequent government was led by Ivar Lykke of the Conservative Party.²¹² In accordance with LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. For the relevant period, LIED identifies political liberties as present except during World War I, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

01/28/1928 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: An important incident in the early years of the new monarchy occurred in 1928 when the King appointed the first Labour government. The Norwegian Labour Party was then relatively radical, even advocating for the abolition of the monarchy in their program. Traditionally, the King would consult the previous prime minister for advice on appointing the new prime minister. In this instance, the previous conservative prime minister opposed granting power to the social democrats. Nevertheless, the King upheld the established practice of parliamentarism and selected Christopher Hornsrud as the inaugural Labour Prime Minister.²¹³ Nevertheless, the cabinet had a weak parliamentary basis and was only in office for three weeks from January to February. While the 1814 constitution confers significant executive powers to the King, these powers are nearly always exercised by the Council of State on behalf of the King.²¹⁴ The monarch has not had any influence in the government formation process since 1928 (Anckar 2021: 26). The next elections were held on 10/20/1930. The Labour Party won the most seats

²⁰⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_between_Sweden_and_Norway

²¹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

²¹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dissolution_of_the_union_between_Norway_and_Sweden

²¹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1927_Norwegian_parliamentary_election

²¹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monarchy_of_Norway

²¹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monarchy_of_Norway

(47 of 150 seats) in the Storting and Johann Ludwig Mowinckel of the Liberal Party became the prime minister.²¹⁵ This period was marked by multiple changes in government (Anckar 2021: 26).²¹⁶ The next elections were held on 10/20/1930. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1928 the elections scored fully competitiveness according to LIED. V-Dem's CEI indicates constant cleanliness, and the overall elections conditions are acknowledged as free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. Additionally, LIED and V-Dem's PCLI confirm that political liberties were achieved since 1928. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For 1928-1939, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

04/09/1940 End (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: On this date German troops invaded the country and quickly occupied Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik.²¹⁷ Vidkun Quisling, party leader of the Nasjonal Samling, a fascist party that did not have a single seat in the Storting, declared himself Prime Minister via radio broadcast on the same day. Lacking any significant popular support, however, the Nazi occupiers ignored Quisling and Reichskommissar Josef Terboven appointed a government accountable only to himself. The government was itself mostly made up of officials from Nasjonal Samling. Quisling was not granted a formal position until 02/01/1942 when he became Prime Minister of the puppet government.²¹⁸ However, the real power rested with Reichskommissar Josef Terboven, who oversaw the collaborating government. We, therefore, do classify Norway in this period as a direct rule occupation regime. During this occupation period, Norway's traditional democratic institutions were suspended, civil liberties were severely restricted, and political repression intensified, especially targeting resistance movements and those opposed to the occupation. The occupation regime aligned with Nazi ideology, which represented a stark departure from Norway's pre-war democratic system. No elections were held during this period (LIED). LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present in this timeframe. For 1940 and 1941, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

²¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1930_Norwegian_parliamentary_election

²¹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johan_Ludwig_Mowinckel

²¹⁷ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Norway/World-War-I-and-the-interwar-years>

²¹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nasjonal_Samling

From 1942 to 1944, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

05/08/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Democratizing Regime: On this date Germany surrendered and Norway regained its independence. The Quisling regime surrendered one day later.²¹⁹ After the occupation regime collapsed, Norway entered a transitional period under the leadership of a broad-based coalition government, which was non-electoral in nature but multiparty, representing various political factions committed to restoring democracy. The transitional government was led by Johan Nygaardsvold's pre-war cabinet, which had operated in exile in London during the occupation.²²⁰ In 1945, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. For 1945, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

10/08/1945 End Democratizing Regime/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: On this date parliamentary elections were held. The result was a victory for the Labour Party, which won 76 of the 150 seats in the Storting.²²¹ From then on Norway remained a stable democracy. The Labor Party ruled almost uninterruptedly between 1945 and 1965.²²² On 09/12/1965 and on 09/13/1965 parliamentary elections were held. Although the Labor Party became the largest party, the four non-socialist parties were able to form a coalition and Per Borten became Prime Minister.²²³ Norway is a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral system. The prime minister is formally appointed by the monarch. The monarch is officially designated as the head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces; however, his responsibilities are predominantly ceremonial.²²⁴ Political parties in Norway operate freely and are competitively. Elections are generally deemed free and fair. Civil liberties and political rights are generally upheld. As per FH's classification for this regime period, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Therefore, according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI, political liberties were constantly present ever since

²¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quisling_regime#Dissolution

²²⁰ <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/the-government/previous-governments/regjeringer-siden-1814/historiske-regjeringer/norways-governments-1940-1945/johan-nygaardsvolds-government/id438691/>

²²¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945_Norwegian_parliamentary_election

²²² <https://www.britannica.com/place/Norway/World-War-II>

²²³ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Norway/World-War-II>;

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965_Norwegian_parliamentary_election

²²⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/norway/freedom-world/2023>

1946. On 11/13/2021 parliamentary elections were held, with the result of the Labour Party winning the largest share of votes. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Ever since the end of the German occupation, the elections held were competitive following LIED. Electoral cleanliness is scored for the entire time (V-Dem CEI). In addition, V-Dem's EF&FI affirms free and fair overall election conditions. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. From 1946 onward, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Cadoret 2010, Derry 1973, Derry 1979, Eriksen 1988, Groß/Rothholz 2009, Larsen 1974)

Oman

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as (de facto) Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 12/31/1741]: Oman became sovereign on 01/26/1650. The start of the Al Said dynasty is dated to 12/31/1741. With the previous dynasty weakened by civil war over the succession and poor leadership, in 1741 Ahmed bin Said al Busaidi, governor of Sohar on the coast of what is now of Oman, led the city's defense against a Persian invasion. Although he did not become the formal leader of Oman until 1744 (probably-date of formal election is disputed) when he was named imam, Ahmed bin Said seems to have been the most powerful leader during a very chaotic time. The Al Said have remained in power as traditional sultans since then (Smyth 1994, Plekhanov 2004: 50-53). The information on whether Oman became an official protectorate of the United Kingdom are contested. However, it seems that Oman kept its legal independence, whereas Zanzibar became a British Protectorate after its separation from Oman.²²⁵ Oman and Great Britain were bound by a series of treaties, economically and politically. Moreover, the British aided the Sultanate on many occasions. Therefore, Oman is coded as an informal protectorate, as it was so tightly tied to the Empire.²²⁶ Oman is a hereditary monarchy where authority is centralized with the sultan, resulting in significant limitations on political rights and civil liberties. In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or

²²⁵ <https://www.qdl.qa/en/close-relationship-britain-and-oman-1750>

²²⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muscat_and_Oman

legislative elections were held during the specified period. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant period, 1900-1951 V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

12/23/1951 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as independent country]: The legal framework established under the guise of a British protectorate started to erode in 1939 when the 1891 treaty underwent renegotiation. This process accelerated, particularly in 1951, with the signing of the contemporary Anglo-Omani treaty, allowing Oman to reclaim formal control over its foreign relations. The complete dissolution occurred between 1958 - when the mutual termination of the territorial non-alienation declaration of 1891 took place - and 1967, marking the expiration of Britain's extraterritorial rights in Oman.²²⁷ On 07/23/1970 Qabas bin Said, the king's son suffered greatly under his father's paranoid rule and eventually overthrew him, taking the throne for himself.²²⁸ In 1994, women were granted the right to vote, although this right was limited until 2002. Universal suffrage has been unrestricted for all citizens since 2002.²²⁹ While, technically, elections take place in Oman, this is only to elect a consultative assembly with no power. Hence, Oman is still classified as an autocratic monarchy. The regime imposes criminal consequences for any form of criticism and dissent. After the death of bin Said in 2020, his cousin Haitham bin Tariq became the new monarch. Sultan Haitham distributed some of the duties that his predecessor previously kept for himself among his cabinet ministers. This included the appointment of a foreign minister, while Haitham retained his position as prime minister. In 2021, a new basic law was issued, establishing the role of crown prince. The title was bestowed upon Sultan Haitham's eldest son, Dhi Yazan bin Haitham. In 1996, a bicameral body was established consisting of an appointed Council of State and the entirely elected Consultative Council. The citizens elect members to the Consultative Council for four-year terms. However, this chamber lacks legislative authority and is limited to suggesting modifications to proposed legislation. The electoral system permits all citizens aged 21 and

²²⁷ <https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/anglo-omani-treaties>

²²⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970_Omani_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

²²⁹

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oman#:~:text=Oman%2C%20officially%20the%20Sultanate%20of,borders%20with%20Iran%20and%20Pakistan.>

above to vote, except those in the military or security forces. Nonetheless, the framework applies only to the Consultative Council and municipal councils, which serve largely as advisory bodies. The sultan holds a monopoly on political power, and the constitutional system is structured in a way that prevents any change in government through elections. Political parties are prohibited, and authorities show no tolerance for any form of organized political opposition. About 46 percent of the population comprises non-citizens, who have no political rights or electoral opportunities. While Omani women are legally permitted to vote and run for office, they face few practical opportunities to autonomously organize and further their interests within the political system. The judiciary is not independent and remains under the authority of the sultan, who has the power to appoint and dismiss senior judges. Legal restrictions on freedom of expression, including a ban on criticizing the sultan, constrain the media.²³⁰ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1993. From 1994 onward legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No executive elections were present. Until 1990, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Since 1991, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. From 1952 to 1976, V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1977 and 1978, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1979 to 1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. From 1992 to 1999, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 2000 to 2010, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 2011 onward, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For

²³⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/oman/freedom-world/2023>

that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free.

Autocratic Monarchy as of 01/07/2024 continued.

Additional Sources (Alhaj 2001, Metz 1993, Richter 2014)

Orange Free State

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [Start: 04/10/1854]: The Orange Free State was established by Boers who left the Cape Colony in the late 1830s. It is located across the Orange River from the Cape Colony and shares borders with British Basutoland, Natal, Transvaal, and Griqualand West. The republic declared its independence on 02/23/1854, and adopted a constitution on 04/10/1854 (Keltie 1898, Meredith/Shaw 2007). From 03/29/1854 until 05/31/1902 it was called the Republic of Orange Free State. From 1899 until 1902 Orange Free State (and the Transvaal) was occupied in the Second Anglo-Boer-War. In the Boer War, Britain invested heavily in resources and personnel, ultimately gaining the upper hand by June 1900 (Evans et al. 2003, Meredith/Shaw 2007). The British government declared the official annexation of the full territory of the Orange Free State on 10/06/1900, even though they had not yet occupied the full territory, nor defeated the Free State forces.²³¹ In the elections only the minority of white male settlers were allowed to vote (Skovsholm 1999: 237-238).²³² Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For this time competitive elections are scored (LIED). LIED identifies political liberties as absent in this timeframe. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority.

05/31/1902 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]: On this date the Treaty of Vereeniging was signed, which was the result of the peace talks in April 1902. Alfred Milner was eager to end the war for Britain. However, a major issue was the lack of political rights for Africans in the new British colonies of Transvaal and Orange River Colony. The Boer leaders refused to include a Black franchise in the peace deal. To achieve peace, Milner abandoned African political rights. The Treaty of

²³¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orange_River_Colony

²³² <https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01646/05lv01703.htm>

Vereeniging stated in Article 8 that the decision on granting franchise to natives would be deferred until after self-government was established (Evans et al. 2003). LIED indicates that during the colonial time there were no legislative elections. LIED identifies political liberties as absent.

11/27/1907 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]: The British government decided to grant self-government to their Boer colonies in 1907, hoping to resolve their differences and merge into a single South African nation. The two colonies were governed by defeated Boer generals who had signed the terms of surrender five years prior (Meredith/Shaw 2007). Again, in the elections only the small minority of white male settlers were allowed to vote (Skovsholm 1999: 237-238).²³³ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. Since 1907 LIED no longer lists the country. LIED does not treat Orange Free State in its data after 1907.

05/31/1910 End Orange Free State [Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy]: On this date the Orange Free State became part of the Union of South Africa, which was an independent, white-ruled state within the British Empire. Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner and administrator of the former Boer republics, played a significant role in the British political control of South Africa during the early 1900 (Guelke 2005). FH and V-Dem do not register Orange Free State in its data.

For the time after 05/31/1910, see **South Africa**.

Qualitative Sources: (Tylden 1939)

Ottoman Empire

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [Start: 02/14/1878]: The sultan of the Ottoman Empire from 1876 until 1909 was Abdul Hamid II. Under him, the Ottoman Empire got its first constitution, which introduced a bicameral parliament, the General Assembly.²³⁴ Male suffrage was introduced in 1876.²³⁵ However, this first era of Constitutionalism was short lived and only

²³³ <https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01646/05lv01703.htm>

²³⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Ottoman_Empire

²³⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

lasted from 1876 until 02/14/1878²³⁶, before Abdul Hamid II reinstated his absolute power.²³⁷ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. However, in 1908, multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted. For that period LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent. For 1900-1906, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1907, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1908, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Starting in July 1908, the Young Turk Revolution catalyzed the reinstatement of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, leading to the revival of the previously suspended Ottoman parliament.²³⁸ This era witnessed the conduct of elections, marking the first instance of multiple political parties vying for parliamentary seats. The general elections were held in November and December 1908, with the parliament convening on 12/17/1908.²³⁹ On 04/27/1909, Sultan Abdul Hamid II was removed from power through a unanimous parliamentary vote, paving the way for Mehmed V to assume the throne.²⁴⁰ The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) seized control in a coup d'état on 01/23/1913, establishing the dominance of the „Three Pashas,“ although the Empire remained a monarchy under Sultan Mehmed V. As documented by LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted between the years 1909 and 1911. Subsequently, no further multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1913. Between 1914 and 1917, both executive and legislative elections were conducted, but they were not categorized as multiparty. In 1918, multiparty executive and legislative elections were again absent, and from 1921 onwards, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. While the Young Turk Revolution changed the design of the regime, we still classify it as an autocratic monarchy because of the lack of political rights. Until 1907, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority

²³⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Constitutional_Era#cite_note-2

²³⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul_Hamid_II

²³⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Young_Turk_Revolution;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1908_Ottoman_general_election

²³⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Constitutional_Era

²⁴⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mehmed_V

with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. In 1908, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. From 1909 to 1917, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For 1909, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. During 1910-1912, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1913 to 1918, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1919 to 1922, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In this regime period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous in 1909 and as not really present from 1910 to 1912 and from 1919 to 1922 regarding the status of political liberties. For the remaining years, V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent.

10/29/1923 End Ottoman Empire [Autocratic Monarchy]: The establishment of the Republic of Turkey formally concluded the Ottoman monarchy. For the year 1923, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

For time after 10/29/1923, see **Turkey**.

Pakistan

For time before 08/14/1947, see **India**

08/14/1947 (Monarchical) Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: In 1947, Pakistan consisted of West Pakistan (today's Pakistan) and East Pakistan (today's Bangladesh). Upon achieving independence, authority transitioned to a government headed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Jinnah had been elected shortly prior to independence by a Constituent Assembly, which itself was formed through a combination of appointments by the rulers of princely states and selections from provincial legislatures, either elected through restricted franchise elections or comprising delegates from the Indian Central Assembly who opted for Pakistan (Feit 1973: 70, Gauhar

1996: 16, Zingel 2001). The Constituent Assembly, which had 69 members, served as the legislature, remained in office for seven years without producing the constitution that would set the rules through which future legislatures would be elected. During that time the executive, the Governor General, continued to function under the rules of the colonial administration, which allowed him to choose and dismiss prime ministers without consulting the legislature and to dismiss elected provincial governments (Shehab 1995: 201, Gauhar 1996: 25-29). He dismissed a bill from the Constituent Assembly that required the Governor General to choose prime ministers responsible to parliament (Shehab 1995: 234-38, Gauhar 1996: 23-24). A new Constituent Assembly was chosen in 1954, again mostly by provincial assemblies, some of which had been intervened by the Governor General (Asfar 1991: 54, Feit 1973: 70, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 84-85). In 1948, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. In 1949 and 1950, according to Polity5, the executive's constraints were categorized as Intermediate Category 2, between slight and substantial limitations. Since 1951, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For 1947, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 1948, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1949, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1950 to 1952, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1953-1957, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

03/23/1956 Continuation Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy (as a republic): On this date the Assembly endorsed its inaugural Constitution, setting up an Islamic Republic governed by a parliamentary system, and substituting the Governor-General with a president wielding significant executive authority. The monarchy was thereby abolished. The presidency has consistently remained intact, although the extent of its constitutional authority has fluctuated over time. The president has consistently been chosen through an indirect election process involving an electoral college. In 1956 the first indirect presidential elections by the constituent assembly took place (Zingel 2001). Due to the lack of widespread suffrage and the absence of direct national office elections, this period is characterized as an electoral oligarchy. From 1947

to 1958, Pakistan did not conduct any direct national elections. Even the National Assembly elections of 1962 and 1965 were indirect (Zingel 2001). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED the elections were competitive between 1950 and 1955. For the remaining years no competitiveness was achieved. Whereas V-Dem's EF&FI indicates no elections for the entire time. Therefore, V-Dem's CEI scores no cleanliness. However, provincial elections were sporadically organized. Despite the absence of nationwide elections, certain datasets, for reasons not clearly explained, classify this era as either democratic (for example, MCM, BMR) or semi-democratic. The LIED database identifies Pakistan as an exclusive democracy from 1950 to 1958, whereas the GWF labels it as a party autocracy. Our analysis categorizes the regime during this period as an electoral oligarchy. Vanhanen recorded for the elections 1947 (for the constituent assembly) and 1955 that zero percentage of the population participated (Vanhanen 2019). In 1951, male suffrage was enacted, and by 1956, women also gained the right to vote in national elections. Despite the absence of national elections, the first direct elections within the country post-independence were conducted for the Provincial Assembly of Punjab from 03/10/1951 to 03/20/1951.²⁴¹ On 10/07/1958 President Iskander Mirza dismissed the prime minister, shut down the parliament, suspended the constitution, declared martial law as his political grip on power was challenged by deadlock and challenges internally and externally to his foreign policy. Per LIED political liberties were absent during this time. V-Dem's PCLI indicates an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. In 1956 and 1957, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. In 1958, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations.

10/27/1958 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup led by Commander-in-Chief General Ayub Khan ousted the government of President Iskander Mirza and established military rule (Feit 1973: 68, Mook 1974: 102, Shehab 1995: 248-50, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 85). Mirza appointed General Ayub as chief martial law administrator (CMLA), who then declared martial law.²⁴² In 1960, a referendum was held asking a network of local self-governing bodies, which members were elected by constituencies of 800–1.000 adults: Do you have confidence in Muhammad Ayub Khan? The confirmation

²⁴¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

²⁴² [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayub_Khan_\(President_of_Pakistan\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayub_Khan_(President_of_Pakistan))

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayub_Khan_\(President_of_Pakistan\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayub_Khan_(President_of_Pakistan))

was used to install Ayub Khan as president.²⁴³ The regime is classified by CGW as military and GWF as military-personalist. However, MCM dissent and do classify the case as multiparty. In this classification the criteria for an electoral autocracy are clearly not fulfilled in the case of this regime and it is classified as a military autocracy. To our knowledge the elections to the electoral colleges were based on a non-party base (Hassan et al. 2021). Due to mass protests over prices Ayub Khan was forced to hand over power to General Yahya Khan, the army chief of staff. Yahya Khan reenforced martial law and suspended the constitution. In November 1969 Yahya announced parliamentary elections to return power to elected civilians. On 12/07/1970 the first ever general elections in Pakistan took place. However, they did not mark a regime change since Bhutto and a faction of the military did not allow the assembly to come together. As indicated by LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were not conducted until 1959. In 1960 and 1961, only executive elections were held, and they were not categorized as multiparty. However, between 1962 and 1964, only multiparty executive elections were conducted. Between 1965 and 1968, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. From 1969 onward, only legislative elections were held but they were not categorized as multiparty. No executive elections were held during this period. From 1958 to 1961, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. Between 1963 and 1968, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1958 and 1962, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. During 1959-1961, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1963 to 1968, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1969, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1970, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present and were in an ambiguous state in 1966.

²⁴³ <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohammad-Ayub-Khan#ref129208>
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohammad-Ayub-Khan#ref129208>

On 12/16/1971, Pakistani troops located in East Pakistan signed the Instrument of Surrender, ending the Bangladesh Liberation War, as well as the Indo-Pakistani war. East Pakistan was established as an independent nation on the following day.²⁴⁴ For further information, see Bangladesh.

12/20/1971 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: In December 1971 Yahya resigned in response to demonstrations after the military's defeat by Indian forces in what was to become Bangladesh; and Yahya Khan turned power over to Bhutto, whose party had won a majority in West Pakistan in the December 1970 parliamentary elections. This impasse led to violent demonstrations in East Pakistan, which the army attempted to put down amid great bloodshed. Khan was placed under house arrest afterwards. Bhutto called the previously elected Assembly into session in spring 1972, and civilian government was resumed (Middle East Journal 1972). According to GWF the resignation of Yahya Khan is coded in this data set as the regime change event (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 85). Different from other datasets, Bhutto's regime is coded here as non-democratic from the start since he was not willing to accept the victory of the Awami League in the 1970 elections. On 02/09/1975 The leaders of the primary opposition party were detained, and their party was subsequently prohibited (Middle East Journal 1972, Wheeler 1975: 111, 113-114, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 85). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED the elections score competitiveness between 1973 and 1976. Whereas V-Dem's EF&FI indicates no elections for the entire time, thus V-Dem's CEI states no cleanliness. Regarding the political liberties, they are absent according to LIED. In addition, V-Dem's PCLI points out an ambiguous presence of political liberties. Since 1973, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For 1971, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1972-1976, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. While GWF codes this event as a regime change to a party autocracy, our data set considers it as an event confirming the character of the regime as an electoral autocracy. According to FH, from 1972 to 1974, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not

²⁴⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Bangladesh#Pakistani_capitulation_and_aftermath

free. In 1975 and 1976 the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free.

07/05/1977 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: When the ruling leftist party won elections the rightist alliance declared fraud. Political unrest ensued with help from the United States. On 07/05/1977 General Zia-ul-Huq overthrew Bhutto's government in the name of restoring order and to a lesser degree, defeating the leftist influences in the nation. Martial law was declared, and Zia became the military president (Baxter 1991: 30, Baxter 1995a, Richter 1971: 548, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 85). In May 1988, General Muhammed Zia al-Haq dissolved the national parliament and provincial assemblies, calling new elections for November. But shortly thereafter (August) he died in a mysterious plane crash. Elections were announced by the acting President, Ghulam Ishaque Khan, and the unconstitutionality of the suspension of the elections was upheld by the Supreme Court. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1983. In 1984 only executive elections were conducted, but they were not categorized as multiparty. From 1985 onward, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Until 1984, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. Since 1985, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For 1977, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In 1978 and 1979, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1980-1984, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In 1985 and 1986, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1987, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present and were absent between 1980 and 1981. As classified by FH in 1977 the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. From 1978 to 1984 the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free.

From 1985 to 1987 the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free.

11/16/1988 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, parliamentary elections were held, bringing Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) coalition to power (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 49, Baxter 1995b, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 85).²⁴⁵ During this period, Pakistan held regular elections, but the military continued to play a dominant role in politics. The military intervened in the political process on several occasions, and it also controlled key government institutions, such as the intelligence services and the judiciary. Despite the military's influence, there were some positive developments during this period. The media became more independent, and civil society organizations became more active. There was also some progress on economic reforms. In 1990, Bhutto's government was dismissed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who accused her of corruption and nepotism. Bhutto's PPP won the 1993 parliamentary elections, but her government was again dismissed by President Farooq Leghari in 1996. In 1997, Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) won the parliamentary elections. Sharif's government pursued a number of economic reforms, but it was also accused of corruption and nepotism. Due to the veto power of the military and widespread nepotism and corruption, the period can only be considered an electoral hybrid regime. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED considers the elections as competitive at this time. However, since 1989 V-Dem's CEI indicates not really cleanliness scores. In addition, V-Dem's EF&FI scores ambiguous overall election conditions. LIED scores concerning the political liberties remained absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI indicates their somewhat presence for the entire time. Until 1996, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. In 1997 and 1998, based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. For 1988 to 1998, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 1999, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In this period Pakistan is according to our observations an electoral hybrid regime that mixes democratic and autocratic elements. Per FH, in 1988 and 1989, the country scores

²⁴⁵ <http://tinyurl.com/4yfm861>

between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. According to FH, in 1990, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. As classified by FH from 1991 and 1992, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH's scoring from 1993 to 1995, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. Per FH's evaluation from 1996 to 1998, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free.

10/12/1999 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup, spearheaded by General Pervez Musharraf, ousted the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 84). The reason was that Sharif tried to fire Musharraf for the defeat in the Kargil war. After the coup the seven-man National Security Council, made up of the commanders of the military services, the civilian prime minister and several civilian ministers, was established. However, power laid in the hands of a few generals and heads of military intelligence agencies (Lansford 2012: 1089, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 85). From 1999 to 2001, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. Between 2002 and 2006, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. As documented in LIED, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 2001. In the period between 2002 and 2003, only legislative elections were held but they were not categorized as multiparty. From 2004 onward, multiparty legislative elections were conducted yet no executive elections were held. In 2007, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. For 2000 and 2001, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 2002, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 2003-2004, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. From 2005 to 2007, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties are somewhat present. Per FH, from 1999 to 2007, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free.

02/18/2008 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, multiparty elections for the parliament were held. On 08/18/2008 Musharraf resigned under threat of impeachment (Nelson 2009: 16-27, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 85-86).²⁴⁶ Based on the results of the elections Asif Ali Zardari, widower of Benazir Bhutto, became president on 09/09/2008 of a coalition government (in opposition to Musharraf) (Lansford 2021: 1266). Observations on Pakistan clearly indicate that it cannot be classified as a full democracy. For instance, the extensive deployment of security agents at numerous polling stations in 2018 was construed by observers, including the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, as equivalent to voter intimidation.²⁴⁷ In the typology of this dataset, it is classified as an electoral hybrid regime. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 2008, the elections held are classified as competitive by LIED. V-Dem's CEI still scores not really electoral cleanliness. Anyhow, according to V-Dem's EF&FI the overall conditions were somewhat free and fair during this period. According to FH, for the regime period under consideration, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. According to LIED political liberties are still absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates somewhat political liberties from 2008 to 2016 and since 2021. For the remaining four years ambiguous scores were given. In 2008 and 2009, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks. Since 2010, based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. For 2008, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. From 2009 onward, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Marcinkowska 2008, Afzal 2001, Blood 1994, Cohen 2011, Diamond 2000, Kaushik 1993, Mahmood 2001, Rahman 2009, Wagner 2008)

Palau

²⁴⁶ <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/19/world/asia/19legacy.html?ref=pervezmusharraf&pagewanted=1>

²⁴⁷ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/pakistan/freedom-world/2022>

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 02/12/1899]: On 02/12/1899 Palau became a part of German New Guinea (see under Papua New Guinea) through the German-Spanish Treaty of 1899.²⁴⁸ No data was provided by LIED for the specified period.

08/15/1914 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Part of Other Country [Japan, Autocratic Monarchy]: The Japanese Empire took control of the islands from Germany during World War I and annexed them.²⁴⁹

06/28/1919 End Part of Other Country [Japan, Autocratic Monarchy]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of Japan, Autocratic Monarchy]: On this date, the Treaty of Versailles was signed and the League of Nations assigned the islands to Japanese administration under the South Seas Mandate after World War I.²⁵⁰ During World War II, Japan utilized Palau to aid its successful invasion of the Philippines in 1942.²⁵¹

11/27/1944 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]: In 1944, the United States took control of Palau from Japan after the Battle of Peleliu, which resulted in significant casualties on both sides. Following the war, from 1945 until 1946, the United States regained control of the Philippines and administered Palau from the Philippine capital of Manila.²⁵² LIED does not include data on Palau prior to 1947.

07/18/1947 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of USA, Defective Democracy]: In 1947, Palau was transferred to the United States as part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, which was established under the authority of United Nations Security Council Resolution 21.²⁵³ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. LIED identifies political liberties as absent for that period.

09/28/1964 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]: On this day, the Congress of Micronesia, as the legislature of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, was created and was composed of a Senate and a House of Representatives with 21 members. Palau had two

²⁴⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German%E2%80%93Spanish_Treaty_\(1899\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German%E2%80%93Spanish_Treaty_(1899))

²⁴⁹ <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palau>

²⁵⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Seas_Mandate; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Versailles

²⁵¹ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palau#History>

²⁵² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Peleliu

²⁵³ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palau#History>;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_Territory_of_the_Pacific_Islands

members in the senate and three members in the House of Representatives.²⁵⁴ On 01/19/1965 the first Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands parliamentary elections were held.²⁵⁵ Universal suffrage was introduced in 1979.²⁵⁶ In 1979, four of the Trust Territory districts came together to form the Federated States of Micronesia, but Palau and the Marshall Islands voted against it. Instead, Palau opted for independent status in 1978, which was supported by several countries, including the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan. In line with the Encyclopedia Britannica, we find that Palau with the other trust territories „was administered as a de facto American colony”.²⁵⁷ On 11/04/1980 general elections were held to elect a President, Vice-President, Senate and House of Delegates. However, according to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were absent until 1978. From 1978 onward, only multiparty legislative elections were held. Executive elections were absent as well as universal suffrage. LIED identifies political liberties as absent until 1978 and as present from 1979 onwards.

01/01/1981 End (de facto) Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of USA, Liberal Democracy]/Start Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of USA, Liberal Democracy]: Palau established a new constitution and became the Republic of Palau on this date. In 1982 Palau signed a Compact of Free Association with the United States and ratified it in 1993 after eight referendums and a constitutional amendment.²⁵⁸

10/01/1994 Continuation Liberal Democracy [as independent country]: On this date the Compact of Free Association became effective, officially granting Palau independence, although it had been de facto independent since 05/25/1994 when the trusteeship ended. Palau was one of the founding members of the Nauru Agreement in the same year.²⁵⁹ The judiciary operates independently, and regular competitive elections resulted in multiple peaceful changes in government.²⁶⁰ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. As per FH’s classification for this regime period, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Since its independence the elections are classified as competitive, following LIED and political liberties were achieved (LIED). Palau is not treated by V-Dem’s data.

²⁵⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_of_the_Trust_Territory_of_the_Pacific_Islands

²⁵⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965_Trust_Territory_of_the_Pacific_Islands_parliamentary_election

²⁵⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

²⁵⁷ <https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/trust-territory-pacific>

²⁵⁸ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palau#History>

²⁵⁹ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palau#History>

²⁶⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Palau; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Palau#Elections

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Shuster 2001)

Palestine

[On 05/14/1948 the state of Israel was declared into existence, marking the termination of Palestine and the separation of Palestinian territory into Gaza Strip and West Bank. For the time after 1948 see **Israel, Palestine, Gaza Strip** and **Palestine, West Bank**]

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 12/29/1516]: Under Ottoman rule since 12/29/1516, when Yavuz Sultan Selim entered Jerusalem,²⁶¹ the territory was situated in the Damascus Eyalet of Ottoman Syria.²⁶² From 1882 to 1903 there was a large wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine which brought with it the birth of Zionism. During this time, which was known as the first Aliyah, approximately 35.000 Jews moved to Palestine, most of them originating from the Russian Empire.²⁶³ By 1896, Jews constituted the absolute majority in Jerusalem, however, 88% of the overall population of Palestine was Muslim.²⁶⁴ The „Russian” Jews established the Bilu and Hovevei Zion movements with the aim of Jewish settlement in Palestine. In 1897, the World Zionist Organization was founded declaring as its aim the establishment of a home for Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law. During the second Aliyah between 1904 and 1914, another 40 000 Jews settled in Palestine.²⁶⁵ Two great evacuations of Palestinian territory took place during the First World War. By January 1917, the British had taken Sinai and were marching towards Palestine. Ottoman rulers began to hold suspicions against the local population, alleging that they were in favor of the aggressors. At the start of March 1917, the Ottoman Empire expelled all inhabitants from Gaza. On 03/27/1917, Jaffa including Tel Aviv was evacuated. Many died and the pre-war population of Gaza was not recovered until the 1940s. In 1906, the Ottomans and the British Empire established the international border of the region with Egypt.²⁶⁶ Following the Central Powers' defeat in World War I and the subsequent division of the Ottoman Empire, the British delegated control of the Gaza Strip to Egypt, which declined the responsibility.

²⁶¹ <https://thejudean.com/index.php/history/59-the-ottoman-period-1516-1917>

²⁶² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Israel#Ottoman_period

²⁶³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Israel#Birth_of_Zionism

²⁶⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Israel#Ottoman_period

²⁶⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Israel#Birth_of_Zionism

²⁶⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip#History

10/30/1918 End Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy and France, Defective Democracy]: On this date, the British army ended the so-called Sinai- and Palestine Campaign. They had defeated the Ottoman Empire and started a British occupation of Palestine. The 1918 Anglo-French Modus Vivendi came into action. Accordingly, the British ceded control over certain areas to the French.²⁶⁷ For 1918 and 1919, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. No data was provided by LIED during this specified period.

04/25/1920 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy and France, Defective Democracy]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy]: On this date, the Sanremo Conference took place. During the conference, the Sanremo Resolution was passed which awarded a League of Nations international mandate for the administration of Palestine to the United Kingdom.²⁶⁸ In July 1920, the military administration was replaced by a British civilian administration headed by a high commissioner. During the first years there were persistent violent clashes between Muslim and Christian Arabs and Palestinian Jews. Samuel [the high commissioner] endeavored to institute self-governing entities in Palestine in accordance with the mandate. However, the Arab leadership declined to collaborate with any institution that involved Jewish participation.²⁶⁹ In 1922, a legislative council was established which was to consist of twelve elected and ten appointed members as well as the high commissioner. Elections took place in February and March 1923, but the results were annulled due to an Arab boycott of the elections. Between 1936 and 1939 there was an anti-Zionist and anti-British Arab revolt in Palestine.²⁷⁰ In this timeframe, 1920-1946, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. LIED does not provide data for Palestine for its colonial time. V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were not really present.

11/30/1947 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start No Central Authority [as International Mandate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the civil war in

²⁶⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupied_Enemy_Territory_Administration

²⁶⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/San_Remo_conference

²⁶⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_Palestine

²⁷⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_Palestine

mandatory Palestine broke out after a resolution had been signed one day prior, recommending a partition plan for Palestine. Jewish communities clashed with Arab communities which were supported by the Arab Liberation Army. The British organized their departure and intervened only occasionally.²⁷¹

05/14/1948 End Palestine [No Central Authority]: On 05/14/1948 the British International Mandate over Palestine expired and David Ben Gurion, the executive head of the World Zionist Organization, issued the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq and Syria invaded former mandatory Palestine and attacked the new Israeli forces. This marked the beginning of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.²⁷² For 1947 and 1948 again, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the Israeli-Occupied Territories not free, which we also place in the not free category. Per FH, for 1996-2004, the Palestinian Authority-Administered Territories score between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Per FH's evaluation for 2005 and 2006, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Since 2010 FH uses a geographic division between 'West Bank' and 'Gaza Strip'.

End Palestine [No Central Authority]

For the time after 05/14/1948, see **Palistine, Gaza Strip** and **Palistine, West Bank**

Palestine, Gaza Strip

[For the period between 1900 and 1948, see **Palestine**.]

05/14/1948 No Central Authority: Following the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel by David Ben Gurion, Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq and Syria invaded the former territory of Palestine and attacked the new Israeli forces. This marked the beginning of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.²⁷³ Following this, Egyptian forces swiftly entered Gaza, establishing it as the headquarters for the Egyptian expeditionary force in Palestine. Intense battles in the autumn of 1948 led to a significant reduction in the area under Arab control around Gaza, limiting it to a narrow strip measuring 40 km in length and 6–8 km in width. This territory, delineated in the

²⁷¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1947%E2%80%931948_civil_war_in_Mandatory_Palestine

²⁷² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Arab%E2%80%93Israeli_War#

²⁷³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Arab%E2%80%93Israeli_War#

Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement of 02/24/1949, became known as the Gaza Strip.²⁷⁴ In the course of the 1948 Palestine war, particularly the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees sought refuge in the Gaza Strip. By the war's conclusion, 25% of the Arab population in Mandatory Palestine had relocated to Gaza, despite the region comprising only 1% of the total land area.²⁷⁵

09/22/1948 End No Central Authority/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Egypt, Constitutional Monarchy]: Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the State of Israel extended its control over the territory designated by the UN for the Jewish state and appropriated nearly 60% of the area intended for the Arab state. This included regions like Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle, Upper Galilee, segments of the Negev, and a broad stretch along the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem route. Meanwhile, Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip.²⁷⁶ Established on 09/22/1948, amid the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the All-Palestine Government was formed to administer the Egyptian-controlled territory in Gaza, declared as the All-Palestine Protectorate by Egypt on the same day. Recognized by six out of the seven Arab League members, excluding Transjordan, and endorsed by the Arab League, it asserted authority over the entire former Mandatory Palestine. However, its practical control was confined to the designated All-Palestine Protectorate, eventually known as the Gaza Strip.²⁷⁷ From 1949 to 1956 the Gaza Strip was subjected to Egyptian military governance.²⁷⁸

10/29/1956 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [Egypt, One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [Israel, Defective Democracy]: In the course of the 1956 Suez Crisis, also known as the Second Arab-Israeli war, Israel launched invasions into both Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula. Under international pressure, Israel concluded the occupation in March 1957.²⁷⁹

03/01/1957 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [Israel, Defective Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [Egypt, One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy]: On this date, Israel chose to withdraw its forces from the Gaza Strip, resulting in a return to Egyptian occupation. Following the disbandment of the All-Palestine Government in 1959, citing pan-Arabism as a pretext, Egypt maintained control over Gaza until 1967. Although Egypt did not formally annex the Strip, it treated it as a governed territory and oversaw its administration through a military

²⁷⁴ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Gaza-Strip#ref279792>

²⁷⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip#1948%E2%80%931959:_All-Palestine_government

²⁷⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Arab%E2%80%93Israeli_War

²⁷⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All-Palestine_Government

²⁷⁸ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Gaza-Strip#ref279792>

²⁷⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip#1956%E2%80%931957:_Israeli_occupation

governor.²⁸⁰ For that period, V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent.

06/10/1967 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [Egypt, One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [Israel, Defective Democracy]: Commencing on 06/05/1967, the Six-Day War initiated with Israel launching surprise attacks on Egyptian airfields in response to the mobilization of Egyptian forces along the Israeli border. In a span of six days, Israel achieved a decisive victory in the land war, gaining control of the Gaza Strip. The subsequent territorial expansion prompted the establishment of a military government to oversee the affairs of Arab populations under Israeli military rule.²⁸¹ Consequently, the Israeli Military Governorate was established to oversee the civilian population in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and the western Golan Heights. Operating under the Fourth Geneva Convention's guidelines for military rule in occupied regions, this governance excluded East Jerusalem, which was annexed to Jerusalem's municipal area in 1967, with Israeli law extended to the region in 1980. Throughout this time, the UN and various sources commonly referred to the military-administered areas as Occupied Arab Territories.²⁸² On 03/26/1979, Israel and Egypt signed the Egypt–Israel peace treaty, requiring Israel to withdraw its forces and civilians from the Sinai Peninsula, captured during the Six-Day War. The Sinai was to be demilitarized by Egypt. However, the treaty did not address the final status of the Gaza Strip or other Israeli-Palestinian relations. Egypt renounced territorial claims north of the international border, while the Gaza Strip continued under Israeli military administration, with Israel responsible for civil facilities and services.²⁸³ From 1977 to 1980 FH classifies Westbank and Gaza Strip with a score from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free.

09/17/1978 Continuation (de facto) Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Israel, Defective Democracy]: Incorporated into the Camp David Accords of 1978, the establishment of a civil administration²⁸⁴ for the West Bank and Gaza Strip aimed to replace the military government set up by Israel in 1967. Despite the exclusion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from the talks on territories claimed by Palestinians, the Civil Administration, formed thereafter, did not separate civil affairs from the military. While technically under the control

²⁸⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip#1959%E2%80%931967:_Egyptian_occupation

²⁸¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_Military_Governorate

²⁸² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_Military_Governorate

²⁸³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip#1967:_Israeli_occupation

²⁸⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_Civil_Administration refers to Military Order No. 947, which can be found here:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20140112171005/http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israelmilitaryorders/fulltext/mo0947.htm#>

of the Civil Administration, in practice, it remained subordinate to the military and the Shin Bet.²⁸⁵ During Menachem Begin's administration (1979–83), Israeli settlements more than tripled, and settlers increased over fivefold, raising suspicions of eventual annexation. From December 1987 to around 1993 the First Intifada took place, which was a prolonged series of protests and violent actions by Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories. It stemmed from collective frustration with Israel's twenty-year military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which commenced after the 1967 Arab–Israeli War. The uprising concluded around the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, with the Madrid Conference in 1991 marking a significant point in its timeline.²⁸⁶ As classified by FH for 1981-1988, West Bank and Gaza Strip score between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH, for the rest of this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free.

01/29/1996 End (de facto) Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Israel, Defective Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy: As a consequence of the 1993 Oslo Accords, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) reached an agreement for a five-year transitional period. During this time, the Israeli military progressively withdrew from Gaza and the Jericho area, facilitating the incremental transfer of self-governance responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority (PA).²⁸⁷ In 1996, both presidential and legislative elections took place. According to assessments from international and local observers, the elections were conducted in a manner that adhered to principles of freedom and democracy.²⁸⁸ Fatah Chairman Yasser Arafat emerged victorious in the presidential elections, securing 87% of the votes. Concurrently, Fatah also attained a majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), signifying its dominance in the legislative branch of the Palestinian Authority (PA).²⁸⁹ Even though the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) approved the Basic Law, which aimed to establish a formal system of checks and balances, it was never officially ratified. Coupled with the absence of an independent judiciary, this renders the checks and balances virtually non-existent (Karatnycky 1999). Led by Yasser Arafat, the fledgling Palestinian government faced challenges such as economic stagnation, divided popular support, stalled negotiations with Israel, and the threat of terrorism from groups like Islamic Jihad and Hamas, which opposed

²⁸⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_Civil_Administration

²⁸⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip#1987:_First_Intifada

²⁸⁷ <https://www.britannica.com/place/West-Bank>

²⁸⁸ <https://www.elections.ps/tabid/1118/Default.aspx?q=election+1996#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=election%201996&gsc.page=1>

²⁸⁹ https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/

compromise with Israel.²⁹⁰ Furthermore, the Arafat administration was marked by significant human rights abuses and persistent violent clashes with Israeli forces (Amnesty International 1996). This culminated in the initiation of the Second Intifada after Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount. Following the failed 2000 Camp David summit, intended to resolve Palestinian status issues, the violence escalated, leading to Yasser Arafat's confinement by the IDF until his subsequent death in 2004. In the 2005 presidential elections, Arafat's successor as PLO chairman, Mahmoud Abbas, was elected president. Surprisingly, the 2006 legislative elections were won by the Islamist group Hamas and a Palestinian Authority national unity government was formed, led by Ismail Haniya and comprised of both Hamas and Fatah. However, the resulting Hamas-Fatah coalition disintegrated swiftly, sparking military clashes between the coalition partners. This conflict concluded with Hamas taking sole control of Gaza. During the Battle of Gaza, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip by seizing government institutions and replacing officials from Fatah and other factions.²⁹¹ Consequently, Mahmoud Abbas declared a state of emergency in the remaining Fatah-led territory in the West Bank in June 2007.²⁹²

06/14/2007 End Electoral Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: By 06/14/2007, Hamas had gained full control over the Gaza Strip.²⁹³ In the aftermath of the 2006 legislative elections, in which Hamas secured a majority of seats, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was appointed as prime minister by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). Following the rift between Fatah and Hamas, President Mahmoud Abbas dismissed Haniyeh. However, the dismissal of the elected Hamas government was not recognized by Hamas. Consequently, Hamas continues to exercise executive power to this day. Mahmoud Abbas's decision to formally dissolve the PLC in 2018 was also contested by Hamas. Consequently, the Hamas-led PLC continues its operations, despite the expiration of its electoral mandate in 2010. FH characterizes the Gaza administration as a one-party state, as only a limited number of minor parties, aside from Hamas, are tolerated to varying degrees. The Hamas government governs in an authoritarian manner without an electoral mandate or a functional system of checks and balances. Freedom of religion is significantly restricted, with Islam considered the official religion of Palestine. Despite this, the Basic Law proclaims respect for and sanctity of other religions such as Judaism or Christianity. Moreover, Hamas exercises political control over mosques, enforces Sunni Islamic practices, and deems blasphemy a criminal offense.²⁹⁴ While the judicial system of the Hamas regime is

²⁹⁰ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Gaza-Strip#ref279792>

²⁹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip#Post-2006:_Hamas_takeover

²⁹² <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Palestinian-Authority>

²⁹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip#Post-2006:_Hamas_takeover

²⁹⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/gaza-strip/freedom-world/2024>

partially based on Islamic Sharia Law, it also draws inspiration from Ottoman Laws, the legal code of the British Mandate from 1936, and Israeli Military orders.²⁹⁵ It can be concluded that, although Hamas's ideology is rooted in the radical political Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Hamas regime cannot be definitively classified as an Islamist ideocracy.²⁹⁶ In late June 2008, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan declared Abbas's West Bank-based cabinet as the „sole legitimate Palestinian government.“ Egypt moved its embassy from Gaza to the West Bank. On 01/23/2008, Hamas damaged the Gaza-Egypt wall in Rafah, enabling thousands to cross for supplies. In the 2008 Israel-Gaza conflict, rockets targeted Israeli cities. On 12/27/2008, Israel struck Gaza, leading to a ground invasion on 01/03/2009.²⁹⁷ The 2014 Gaza War, or Operation Protective Edge, began on 07/08/2014, with Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip. Following the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers, Israel initiated Operation Brother's Keeper.²⁹⁸ Hamas responded with increased rocket attacks, resulting in a seven-week conflict. From 2018 to 2019, the Great March of Return protests occurred near the Israel-Gaza barrier, demanding Palestinian refugees' right to return and protesting Israel's blockade and the U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital.²⁹⁹ On 10/07/2023, Hamas attacked southwest Israel, causing casualties and taking hostages. On 10/09/2023, Israel declared war on Hamas and imposed a „total blockade“ of the Gaza Strip.³⁰⁰ From 2007 to 2009, according to FH's classification of 'Palestinian Authority-Administered Territories', a score between 11 and 14 makes the territory not free, which we also place in the not free category. From 2010 onwards, Gaza Strip and the West Bank are classified separately by FH. As classified by FH for the rest of this regime period, the Gaza Strip is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. For that period, V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present from 2007 to 2009, in 2011, between 2013 and 2017 and since 2019, are absent in 2018 and are ambiguous in 2010 and 2012. For 2007-2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 2013 and 2014, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. During 2015-2017, V-

²⁹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip

²⁹⁶ https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/hamas/

²⁹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip#2008%E2%80%932009:_Gaza_War

²⁹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip#2014:_Gaza_War

²⁹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip#2018%E2%80%932019:_Great_March_of_Return

³⁰⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip#2023:_Israel%E2%80%93Hamas_war

Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 2018 and 2020-2022, V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 2019, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 2023, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. LIED does not treat the Gaza Strip in its data.

One-Party Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Palestine, West Bank

[For the period between 1900 and 1948 see **Palestine**.]

05/15/1948 No Central Authority: Following the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel on 05/14/1948, the Arab-Israeli War broke out on 05/15/1948. Jordan occupied and annexed areas in the region.

07/20/1949 End No Central Authority/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Jordan, Constitutional Monarchy]: On this date the Arab-Israeli War ended and Jordan controlled certain areas in the West Bank.

04/24/1950 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Jordan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Part of Other Country [Jordan, Constitutional Monarchy]: From this date Jordan officially administered the West Bank, the region it occupied and annexed during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. V-Dem and LIED do not provide data for the West Bank for this timeframe.

06/10/1967 End Part of Other Country [Jordan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Israel, Defective Democracy]: Following the Six-Day War, which started on 06/05/1967, Israel set up a Military Governorate to oversee the civilian population in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and the western Golan Heights. Although Israel's occupation started in 1967, Jordan did not officially renounce its claim to the territory until 1988.³⁰¹ The unresolved issue of Israeli rule over West Bank Palestinians persisted, with Israel

³⁰¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jordanian_annexation_of_the_West_Bank

considering it vital for security, while the PLO, the political representative for West Bank Palestinians, refused to negotiate or recognize Israel until 1988. This impasse led to years of non-recognition and non-negotiation between the two parties.³⁰²

09/17/1978 Continuation (de facto) Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Israel, Defective Democracy]: Incorporated into the Camp David Accords of 1978, the establishment of a civil administration for the West Bank and Gaza Strip aimed to replace the military government set up by Israel in 1967.³⁰³ Despite the exclusion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from the talks on territories claimed by Palestinians, the Civil Administration, formed thereafter, did not separate civil affairs from the military. While technically under the control of the Civil Administration, in practice, it remained subordinate to the military and the Shin Bet.³⁰⁴ During Menachem Begin's administration (1979–83), Israeli settlements more than tripled, and settlers increased over fivefold, raising suspicions of eventual annexation. From December 1987 to around 1993 the First Intifada took place, which was a prolonged series of protests and violent actions by Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories. It stemmed from collective frustration with Israel's twenty-year military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which commenced after the 1967 Arab–Israeli War. The uprising concluded around the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, with the Madrid Conference in 1991 marking a significant point in its timeline.³⁰⁵ As classified by FH for 1981–1988, West Bank and Gaza Strip score between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH, for the rest of this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free.

01/29/1996 End (de facto) Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Israel, Defective Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy: As a consequence of the 1993 Oslo Accords, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) reached an agreement for a five-year transitional period. During this time, the Israeli military progressively withdrew from Gaza and the Jericho area, facilitating the incremental transfer of self-governance responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority (PA).³⁰⁶ In 1996, both presidential and legislative elections took place. According to assessments from international and local observers, the elections were conducted in a manner

³⁰² <https://www.britannica.com/place/West-Bank>

³⁰³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_Civil_Administration refers to Military Order No. 947, which can be found here:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20140112171005/http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israelmilitaryorders/fulltext/mo0947.htm#>

³⁰⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_Civil_Administration

³⁰⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip#1987:_First_Intifada

³⁰⁶ <https://www.britannica.com/place/West-Bank>

that adhered to principles of freedom and democracy.³⁰⁷ Fatah Chairman Yasser Arafat emerged victorious in the presidential elections, securing 87% of the votes. Concurrently, Fatah also attained a majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), signifying its dominance in the legislative branch of the Palestinian Authority (PA).³⁰⁸ Even though the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) approved the Basic Law, which aimed to establish a formal system of checks and balances, it was never officially ratified. Coupled with the absence of an independent judiciary, this renders the checks and balances virtually non-existent (Karatnycky 1999). Led by Yasser Arafat, the fledgling Palestinian government faced challenges such as economic stagnation, divided popular support, stalled negotiations with Israel, and the threat of terrorism from groups like Islamic Jihad and Hamas, which opposed compromise with Israel.³⁰⁹ Furthermore, the Arafat administration was marked by significant human rights abuses and persistent violent clashes with Israeli forces (Amnesty International 1996). This culminated in the initiation of the Second Intifada after Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount. Following the failed 2000 Camp David summit, intended to resolve Palestinian status issues, the violence escalated, leading to Yasser Arafat's confinement by the IDF until his subsequent death in 2004. In the 2005 presidential elections, Arafat's successor as PLO chairman, Mahmoud Abbas, was elected president. Surprisingly, the 2006 legislative elections were won by the Islamist group Hamas and a Palestinian Authority national unity government was formed, led by Ismail Haniya and comprised of both Hamas and Fatah. However, the resulting Hamas-Fatah coalition disintegrated swiftly, sparking military clashes between the coalition partners. This conflict concluded with Hamas taking sole control of Gaza. During the Battle of Gaza, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip by seizing government institutions and replacing officials from Fatah and other factions.³¹⁰ Consequently, Mahmoud Abbas declared a state of emergency in the remaining Fatah-led territory in the West Bank in June 2007.³¹¹

06/14/2007 End Electoral Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: The Palestinian Authority officially governs a geographically non-contiguous portion of the West Bank, known as Area A, comprising approximately 11% of the territory. However, this area remains susceptible to Israeli incursions. Area B, constituting around 28%, is under joint Israeli-Palestinian military control and Palestinian civil administration. Area C, making up about 61%, is fully under Israeli

³⁰⁷<https://www.elections.ps/tabid/1118/Default.aspx?q=election+1996#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=election%201996&gsc.page=1>

³⁰⁸ https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/

³⁰⁹ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Gaza-Strip#ref279792>

³¹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip#Post-2006:_Hamas_takeover

³¹¹ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Palestinian-Authority>

control. While 164 nations label the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, as „Occupied Palestinian Territory,“ Israel maintains that only territories captured from an „established and recognized sovereign“ in war are considered occupied according to UN definitions.³¹² It is noteworthy that the Palestinian Authority (PA) effectively governs only 39% of the West Bank territory, specifically Areas A and B. The PA lacks authority over the remaining 61% of West Bank territory, currently under Israeli control. Therefore, when referencing the PA administration in the West Bank, it pertains to the civil administration of Area A and B. According to FH, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority governs the West Bank in an „authoritarian manner.“³¹³ Even though presidential and legislative elections being overdue since 2009 and 2010, Mahmoud Abbas and the PA leadership continue to govern on the basis of an expired mandate. The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) has been unable to function since the rift between secular Fatah and Islamist Hamas, leading to its dissolution by Abbas in 2018. Consequently, all new laws are issued by presidential decree. While there are minuscule parties, they maintain close ties to the PA leadership, whereas oppositional parties with connections to Hamas face harsh crackdowns by the PA. This establishes Fatah as the dominant force within the PA. Furthermore, the PA engages in repressive actions against regime-critical journalists and activists.³¹⁴ The West Bank continues to be a focal point of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For Palestinians, it holds significant importance as the core of their envisioned state, alongside the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, right-wing and religious Israelis view it as their ancestral homeland, rich in biblical sites. Some Israelis advocate for either partial or complete annexation of this territory. Furthermore, the West Bank is witnessing a growing population of Israeli settlers.³¹⁵ In 2023, a surge of violence between Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank is evident, resulting in over 500 Palestinians killed by radical settlers or the IDF, along with approximately 30 Israelis. Following the Hamas terrorist attack on 10/07/2023 and the Israeli military campaign in Gaza, the IDF has increased its presence in the West Bank. This includes the establishment of new physical barriers to restrict internal movement within Palestinian territory.³¹⁶ From 1996 to 2009, as indicated above the FH score is given separately for ‘Israeli-Occupied Territories’ and ‘Palestinian Authority-Administered Territories’. Per FH, for 2007-2009, the Israeli-Occupied Territories score between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. According to FH’s classification for the

³¹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/West_Bank#Israeli_Military_Governorate_and_Civil_Administration

³¹³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/west-bank/freedom-world/2024>

³¹⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/west-bank/freedom-world/2024>

³¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/West_Bank#

³¹⁶ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/west-bank/freedom-world/2024>

Palestinian Authority-Administered Territories from 2007 to 2009, a score between 11 and 14 makes the territories not free, which we also place in the not free category. From 2010 onwards, Gaza Strip and the West Bank are classified separately by FH. As classified by FH for this regime period, the West Bank is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. For that timeframe, V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous between 2007 and 2009, in 2011, from 2015 to 2016 and since 2023 and as somewhat present for the remaining years regarding the status of political liberties. For 2007-2009, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. From 2010 to 2012, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 2013 and 2014, V-Dem's JCE is classified as robust, indicating strong and regular judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In 2015 and 2016, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also robust. For 2017 and 2018 again, V-Dem's JCE is classified as robust, indicating strong and regular judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 2019, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are comprehensive. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 2020 and from 2022 onward, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In 2021, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. LIED does not provide data for Palestine West Bank.

One-Party Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Panama

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Colombia, Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy] [Start: 12/31/1841]: On 11/18/1840, the State of Panama seceded from Colombia. However, it was

reincorporated into Colombia on 12/31/1841. LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Panama before 1903.

11/03/1903 End Part of Other Country [Colombia, Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy]/Start (Male) Electoral Autocracy [as Protectorate of USA, Defective Democracy]: On this date, Panama regained independence. We code this regime change event as a military coup, although it constitutes a borderline case in several respects. The Colombian generals tasked with maintaining control over Panama were separated from their troops through a ruse orchestrated by civilians associated with the Panamanian secessionist movement. The now-leaderless troops were compelled to withdraw under pressure from a US gunboat presence, suggesting elements of foreign military intervention. Nonetheless, the primary actors appear to have been generals aligned with the Panamanian secessionist movement, and the provisional government established following independence took the form of a junta. This justifies our coding decision.³¹⁷ In a treaty, the USA guaranteed the independence of Panama while obtaining „in perpetuity the use, occupation and control” of a zone for the construction, operation, and protection of the Panama Canal (Lansford 2021: 1283) and the right to intervene militarily beyond the Canal zone to restore public peace and constitutional order, and the right to supervise elections if requested (Bendel/Hillebrands/Zilla 2005: 511). In 1903 male suffrage was introduced (LIED). On 06/04/1918, the sudden death of President Ramón Maximiliano Valdés triggered a political earthquake and Ciro Luis Urriola, the First Vice-President succeeded him. Elections for the National Assembly were due on 07/07/1918, and the Assembly would choose the man to see out the remainder of Valdés’ term. The new administration probably feared that it would be unable to gain a majority in the National Assembly and issued a decree postponing the municipal and the national elections. The U.S. government raised concerns about the constitutionality of the decree and, citing Article 136 of the constitution, requested its withdrawal (McCain 1965: 73). The opposition gained a majority in the National Assembly, but the government contested several decisions and requested that the American electoral commission should decide the disputes. Towards the end of August. The American chargé gave a partial report of the findings of the committee and urged the National Assembly to elect Ricardo Arias Feraud president. The final judgment was that the government had won a majority of the National Assembly. With the approval of the State Department, Belisario Porras Barahona assumed the presidency of Panama for the second time (Major 1993: 139). The First Vice-President, Pedro Antonio Díaz de Obaldía, assumed the presidency on

³¹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secession_of_Panama_from_Colombia#Formation_of_secessionist_movement

10/01/1918 and was succeeded by Belisario Porras Barahona as soon as he returned from the United States of America on 10/12/1918.³¹⁸ During this period, the Liberals and Conservatives dominated the party system, but the Conservative Party soon became less relevant, and from 1908 all elected presidents belonged to the Liberal Party. Furthermore, despite elections being held regularly outcomes were often doubted and characterized as fraudulent. In the 1930s, the Communist Party, Socialist Party, and the Communal Action Association, led by the Arias brothers, emerged (Bendel/Hillebrands/Zilla 2005: 512). On 06/05/1932, general elections were held in Panama to elect a new president and a national assembly. Harmodio Arias Madrid of the Liberal Doctrinaire Party (PLDo) was elected president, whilst the PLDo emerged as the largest party in the National Assembly, winning 14 of the 32 seats. According to our observations and LIED there were presidential and parliamentary elections with male suffrage. Per LIED they were not competitive until 1931 and competitive from 1932 onwards. In addition, V-Dem's CEI indicates no real cleanliness since 1904. The overall election conditions are ambiguous for the first two years after the end of being part of Columbia. From 1906 to 1919 the elections are not really free and fair. Between 1920 and 1932 the overall conditions score ambiguous outcomes. Since 1932, elections were not free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI. In addition, LIED indicates the absence of political liberties. V-Dem's PCLI indicates that that political liberties were somewhat present. Since 1904, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Although the 1931 revolt toppled Florencio Harmodio Arosemena's administration, it had not removed the structural hegemony of the Panamanian elite, a condition that severely limited the new regime's effectiveness. Before Arosemena's ousting, followers of former president Rodolfo Chiari controlled both, the National Police and the electoral board. After the uprising, the Chiaristas still wielded considerable influence among the police and commanded a majority of votes on the electoral board.³¹⁹ For 1903-1904 and 1910-1912, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1905-1909 and from 1913-1935, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

03/02/1936 Continuation (Male) Electoral Autocracy [as independent country]: On this date, Panama entered into a new agreement with the United States, terminating the U.S. authority to

³¹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1918_Panamanian_presidential_election

³¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1932_Panamanian_general_election

intervene in Panamanian affairs and thus putting an end to its status as a protectorate. The ruling regime during this period was headed by Harmodio Arias Madrid (1932-36). Initially declared provisional president after a 1931 coup, Harmodio was replaced by a constitutional change allowing reelection, which, however, did not materialize. Instead, Harmodio mentored Ricardo Alfaro until his return to the presidency after the 1932 elections. In 1935, Harmodio aimed to secure the presidency for his foreign minister, Juan Demostenes Arosemena, under the newly formed Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR). The election was marred by widespread fraud and violence. In 06/1940, Harmodio's brother, Arnulfo Arias, who led the 1931 coup, won elections marked by fraud and violence. In 01/1941, Arnulfo orchestrated constitutional amendments, extending his term, reducing the legislature's power, restricting suffrage for non-whites, and shutting down newspapers (Conniff 1990: 617, 619-22, Casey et al. 2020: 12). The 1941 constitution introduced limited women's suffrage for educated women over 21 in local elections (Bendel/Hillebrands/Zilla 2005: 512). On 09/10/1941, Justice Minister Ricardo Adolfo de La Guardia assumed the presidency of Panama through a Cabinet election following the departure of President Arnulfo Arias to Havana. La Guardia's accession to power occurred amid political upheaval, as he initiated a coup that ousted Arnulfo Arias from office (Conniff 1990: 623, Casey et al. 2020: 12).³²⁰ De la Guardia became president on the same day. On 05/05/1945 In response to a political crisis, President Ricardo Adolfo de la Guardia Arango suspended the Constitution of 1941, consequently cancelling the next session of the National Assembly, and calling for a Constitutional Assembly election on 05/05/1945.

05/05/1945 Continuation Electoral Autocracy: Political tension continued during spring 1945, but the elections held on 05/05/1945 were peaceful and orderly, with approximately 110.000 voters participating (women voted in the national election for the first time). These elections showed a heavy vote for liberal elements and a coalition of the Liberal Renewal Party of Francisco Arias Paredes, the Liberal Democratic Party of Enrique Adolfo Jiménez, elements of the Liberal Doctrinaire Party of Domingo Díaz Arosemena and elements of the National Revolutionary Party (the „official” party of the de la Guardia administration) united. They controlled 30 of the 46 delegates of the Constitutional Assembly, elected Enrique Adolfo Jiménez Provisional President of the Republic to hold office during the life of the Constitutional Assembly until a new President, elected in accordance with the provisions of the new Constitution, would assume office. This election took place on 06/15/1945.³²¹ On 05/27/1948,

³²⁰ <https://www.nytimes.com/1941/10/10/archives/coup-is-bloodless-panama-drops-chief-who-leaves-country-without.html>

³²¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945_Panamanian_Constitutional_Assembly_election

general elections were held in Panama, electing both a new president and a new national assembly. Vote shares of Domingo Díaz Arosemena (Liberal Union–Socialist Party) and Arnulfo Arias (Authentic Revolutionary Party) were very close. On 08/07/1948, the national electoral jury declared Domingo Díaz Arosemena the winner of the elections.³²² On 10/01/1948, Díaz Arosemena was sworn in as president with Daniel Chanis as First Vice president and Robert Chiari as second vice president. The outcome of the 1948 election had been fiercely disputed, marked by protests, violence, and allegations of fraud from both factions. It is currently impossible to determine definitively which candidate emerged as the true winner (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 86). From 1948 to 1952, National Police Commander Jose Antonio Remón wielded considerable influence, orchestrating the installation and removal of presidents with remarkable ease. One notable instance of his covert interventions was the thwarting of Arnulfo Arias's assumed victory in the 1948 presidential election (Black 1981: 33). The National Police were deployed, reputedly to monitor the elections, but their presence was really a calculated maneuver to influence the election's outcome against Arias (Chin/Wright/Carter 2021: 169). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED, elections were not competitive since 1936. V-Dem's CEI indicates that elections were not really clean until 1945 and not clean afterwards. Moreover, regarding freedom and fairness indicates an ambiguous state until 1945. V-Dem's EF&FI indicates no elections for the following two years. The 1948 elections are classified as not really free and fair. In addition to that, LIED and V-Dem's PCLI outcomes concerning the political liberties remained the same. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. On 07/28/1949, Daniel Chanis Pinzón became acting chief executive after Domingo Diaz Arosemena took a six-month leave for health reasons. Chanis became interim president following Arosemena's death on 08/23/1949 but was overthrown on 11/20/1949 when he did not invalidate a supreme court ruling against powerful business families in Panama. His resignation was forced by the threat of violence, and José Antonio Remón Cantera, chief of the national police, installed his cousin Roberto Chiari, who was removed after a week by the Supreme Court (Conniff 1990: 626). For 1936-1944 and 1947-1949, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. During the period of

³²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Panamanian_general_election#cite_note-1

1945-1946, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

11/24/1949 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Personalist) Regime: The National Guard installed Arias as president through a coup. The deposed acting president had tried to dismiss the head of the National Guard. In response, the Guard ousted him and installed Arias, who had been a candidate in the 1948 presidential election, claiming that a recount showed he had won the election (Pippin 1964: 40-57, Major 1993: 271, Percy 1998: 138-39). However, since the origin of the takeover was a coup by the National Guard, we do not count this regime as a continuation of the electoral autocracy. Since the National Guard is part of the official national security forces, we classify this regime change event as a military coup. After being installed, Arias tried to change the constitution to lengthen his term, jailed hundreds of opponents, and tried to suspend the parliament (Pippin 1964: 69-70, Percy 1998: 138-39, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 86). On 05/08/1951, Arias made an attempt to prolong his rule, dissolve congress, and establish a clandestine police force to strengthen his authority in Panama against the traditional elites. However, this endeavor backfired, leading to his removal from power by the police acting under the direction of the elites. Arias had been impeached by the elected National Assembly, and the impeachment was upheld by the Supreme Court. Despite this, he refused to resign and instead shot one of the officers who approached him for discussion. Following this incident, he was forcefully ousted by the Guard (Pippin 1964: 70-76, Percy 1998: 140, Bendel/Krennerich 1993: 496, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 86). Arias was then replaced by his vice president, Alcibíades Arosemena, who appointed a multiparty cabinet and oversaw competitive elections in 1952. In accordance with LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints were categorized as Intermediate Category 2, between slight and substantial limitations. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties were somewhat present.

05/11/1952 End Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Personalist) Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, national police commander José Antonio Remón became president, running for the National Patriotic Coalition (CPN). He became president in a very questionable

election in which there were many clear examples of manipulation and police intervention in Remon's favor. On 02/28/1953, the enactment of legislation that disadvantaged opposition parties marked the pivotal moment when the gradual „authoritarianization“ of the elected Remon government transitioned into dictatorship. Subsequently, harassment of the opposition persisted, and additional legal disadvantages were gradually imposed (Pippin 1964: 91-93, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 86).³²³ The elections in this period (1946-1964) were still neither free nor competitive (Bendel/Hillebrands/Zilla 2005). On 01/02/1955, Remón's assassination resulted in internal conflict among his closest supporters, leading to a division within the CPN. Those loyal to Remón's established rules and policies were marginalized, allowing traditional political elites, previously sidelined during his tenure, to regain dominance. (Pippin 1964: 130-32, Percy 1998: 141-42, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 86). After the assassination, the first vice-president José Ramón Guizado, initially assumed the office of president. However, he was impeached and imprisoned due to his alleged involvement in the assassination. He was replaced by the second Vice President Ricardo Arias, who completed the remainder of his term of office.³²⁴ General elections were held on 05/13/1956. Prior to the elections, the Remón administration mandated that parties must have 45,000 members to gain official recognition. This criterion, later eased to 5,000, resulted in the exclusion of all opposition parties from the 1956 elections, except for the National Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Nacional-PLN), which could trace its origins back to the original Liberal Party. The CPN candidate Ernesto de la Guardia won the elections.³²⁵ The only opposition candidate Victor Goytia claimed electoral fraud.³²⁶ Many other data sets classify Panama as a democracy from 1955 to 1968 (AF, GWF, MCM, BR). The amendment of the electoral law in the run-up to the 1956 elections, which effectively prevented the participation of all opposition parties, as well as the election manipulations, clearly argue for a classification as an electoral autocracy in the period up to 1960. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. We thus agree with LIED, which also classifies a multiparty autocracy between 1952 and 1959 and an electoral democracy only between 1960 and 1968. LIED confirms that no competitive elections were held during this time. Furthermore, V-Dem's CEI classifies the elections as not really clean since 1953. V-Dem's EF&FI declares the overall election conditions as ambiguous. Furthermore, political

³²³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_Antonio_Rem%C3%B3n_Cantera

³²⁴ <https://countrystudies.us/panama/13.htm>

³²⁵ <https://countrystudies.us/panama/14.htm>

³²⁶ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/panama-1903-present/>

liberties were absent according to LIED but V-Dem's PCLI points out they were somewhat present. Between 1952 and 1954, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. Since 1955, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

05/20/1960 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date general elections were held. The CPN began to disintegrate after being overwhelmed by the unrest and other problems. The Union of National Opposition was formed in 1960 after most of the dissenting factions merged with the PLN. De la Guardia was the first president to serve a full four-year term after the war, and Chiari was the first opposition candidate ever elected to the presidency.³²⁷ The pre-1968 multi-party system aimed at managing the competition for political power among prominent families. Each party typically operated as a tool for its leader, who promised jobs or other benefits to supporters if they won. Among the major parties of the 1960s, only the heavily divided PLN had a long history. The Socialist Party and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) were the only ones with clearly defined agendas. The Panameñista Party (PP), led by the unpredictable former president Arnulfo Arias, was the sole party with a substantial support base, appealing to the disillusioned, yet lacking a distinct ideology or program. In the 1964 presidential elections, seven candidates ran, but only three were taken seriously. Robles, previously a minister in Chiari's government, represented the National Opposition Union, which included the PLN and seven smaller parties. After some behind-the-scenes maneuvering, Robles gained the endorsement of the outgoing president. Juan de Arco Galindo, a former member of the National Assembly and public works minister, and brother-in-law of former President de la Guardia, was backed by the National Opposition Alliance coalition, consisting of seven parties led by the CPN. Arnulfo Arias had the support of the PP, which was already the largest party in the country. The Electoral Tribunal declared that Robles won over Arias by more than 10,000 votes out of 317,312 votes cast. The CPN coalition was far behind the leading two candidates.³²⁸ The results of the elections in 1964 were accepted by all contestants (Bendel/Hillebrands/Zilla 2005). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED, the elections were competitive until 1967. V-Dem's

³²⁷ <https://countrystudies.us/panama/14.htm>

³²⁸ <https://countrystudies.us/panama/16.htm>

CEI indicates no real cleanliness until 1964. Since 1965, no clean elections are scored. Furthermore V-Dem's EF&FI classifies the overall election conditions as ambiguous for the entire period. Regarding the political liberties, LIED states their absence for this time. But V-Dem's PCLI remained at somewhat present scores. Until 1967, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. From 1960 to 1966, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1967, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In the mid-1960s, Panama's political landscape remained under the fragile dominion of the oligarchy. Despite periodic emergence of individuals from the middle class, notably comprising educators and public servants, seeking political influence, their ambitions to ascend to higher social echelons hindered their ability to coalesce with the lower strata to contest oligarchic control. Within the middle class, students emerged as the most vocal constituency, often articulating the grievances of the economically disenfranchised; nevertheless, upon completion of their education, they typically became integrated into the prevailing establishment. The multiparty system in place until the 1968 coup d'état functioned to moderate the competition for political authority among prominent families. Typically, political parties operated as extensions of individual leaders, whose patrons expected employment opportunities or other benefits in the event of their candidate's success (Bendel/Hillebrands/Zilla 2005).³²⁹

10/11/1968 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On 10/01/1968, Arnulfo Arias became president for the third time and, once in office, sought to establish total control. Arnulfo Arias was overthrown in a coup led by General Omar Torrijos and Major Boris Martínez on 10/11/1968 when he attempted to reassign the commander of the National Guard.³³⁰ On 10/12/1968, a two-man provisional junta was installed, led by Colonel José María Pinilla Fábrega and seconded by Colonel Bolívar Urrutia. The junta dissolved the National Assembly, silenced the opposition, and named a ruling cabinet which incorporated military and civilian members. Martínez and Torrijos retained most of the executive power in Panama (Ropp 1982: 37, Priestley 2000: 28, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 87). Following the public announcement of agrarian reform legislation, Martínez was ousted from the power-sharing

³²⁹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Panama_\(1964%E2%80%931977\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Panama_(1964%E2%80%931977))

³³⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968_Panamanian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

arrangement on 02/21/1969, and Torrijos took over the control of the government.³³¹ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were conducted during this period. According to Polity5, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power during this period. For this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent until 1979 and are not really present afterwards. On 08/06/1972, parliamentary elections took place to select a new National Assembly of Community Representatives. However, traditional political parties were prohibited from participating, and the brief legislative sessions left little opportunity to challenge the military's executive authority. While the Liberals and Panameñistas chose to boycott the elections for representatives to the Assembly of Corregimientos, the People's Party of Panama (PPP) fielded 120 candidates. In September, the parliament convened and proclaimed General Torrijos as „the Supreme Leader of the Panamanian Revolution.”³³² Indirect presidential elections were held in Panama on 10/10/1972, resulting in the election of a new President and Vice President. The National Assembly of Community Representatives chose Demetrio B. Lakas as President and Arturo Sucre Pereira as Vice President for a six-year term (1972–1978).³³³ On 10/11/1978, Torrijos stepped down as head of government but remained de facto ruler of the country and appointed Aristides Royo president.³³⁴ In 1979 General Torrijos founded the Democratic Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Democrático, PRD). According to LIED both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Until 1977, according to Polity5, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Between 1978 and 1981, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. Per FH, from 1972 to 1977, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Per FH's evaluation for 1978 and 1979, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. As per FH, in 1980, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. As classified by FH in 1981, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free.. On 03/03/1982 after the death of Torrijos on 07/31/1981, power was supposed to transition to civilian Aristides Royo. However, instead, the military seized on the power vacuum, Aguilar ascended to Torrijo's previous position as military leader, and Royo again found himself in a puppet presidency. On

³³¹ <https://www.laestrella.com.pa/nacional/181011/191003-boris-moral-cruzada-martinez>

³³² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_Panamanian_parliamentary_election

³³³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_Panamanian_presidential_election

³³⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omar_Torrijos

03/03/1982, Paredes seized power of the National Guard from Aguilar and assumed his position as the military leader of the nation. The civilian president chosen by Torrijos was forced to retire a few months later on 07/31/1982 (Kempe 1990: 114-24, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 87). We concur with GWF and the Colpus Dataset that after Trojillo's death, political power remained with the National Guard commander, while Royo acted as figurehead president. Hence, this is coded as a transition from a military autocracy under Flores Aguilar to a military autocracy under Paredes (Chin/Wright/Carter 2021: 186). On 07/30/1982, Paredes forced his puppet president to resign under threat of violence. This forced removal was related to an internal power struggle. On 05/07/1989, Panama held general elections to elect a new president and a legislative assembly. Despite accusations of fraud, the election proceeded, and oppositional candidate Guillermo Endara allegedly won against military ruler Manuel Noriega. The Noriega regime immediately annulled the elections.³³⁵ As documented in LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted during this period, which were not classified as multiparty. In 1982 and 1983, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. From 1984 to 1988, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. In 1989, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. For 1968, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1969 to 1989, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. As classified by FH in 1982 and 1983, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH, in 1984, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. Per FH's evaluation in 1985 and 1986, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH from 1987 to 1989, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free.

12/20/1989 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, the United States of America invaded Panama, deposed military strongman Manuel Noriega and disbanded the base of his power, the Panama Defense Force. On the same day, Guillermo Endara, the apparent

³³⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Panamanian_general_election

victor in a presidential election, was sworn into office. On 12/27/1990, Panama's Electoral Tribunal invalidated the annulment of the 1989 election and confirmed Endara's presidency. Manuel Noriega surrendered on 01/02/1990 and was detained as a prisoner of war and taken to the United States of America.³³⁶ After an internationally monitored election campaign, Ernesto Pérez Balladares became president on 09/01/1994. Since then, Panama has experienced multiple peaceful and democratic transitions of power arranged through popular elections.³³⁷ On 05/05/2019, Panama held general elections. Since incumbent President Juan Carlos Varela was unable to run for a second consecutive term due to constitutional term limits, businessman and politician Laurentino Cortizo from the center-left Democratic Revolutionary Party emerged as the winner with approximately 33% of the vote. He narrowly defeated Rómulo Roux of the center-right Democratic Change party, who secured 31% of the vote.³³⁸ Panama's political framework is characterized by democratic institutions, featuring competitive elections and systematic changes in leadership. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since the country's democratic transition, the elections score constant competitiveness per LIED. V-Dem's CEI states electoral cleanliness since 1992. The overall election conditions are free and fair since 1991 per V-Dem's EF&FI. While there is a general respect for freedoms of expression and association, the nation faces significant challenges due to corruption and impunity, particularly impacting the justice system and upper echelons of governance. Widespread discrimination against racial minorities persists, and indigenous communities encounter difficulties in safeguarding their legal rights, especially concerning land and development initiatives.³³⁹ Per FH, from 1990 to 1993, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. According to FH, from 1994 to 1998, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. As per FH's classification from 1999 onwards, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. LIED classifies political liberties as present since 2000. According to V-Dem's PCLI Panama already guaranteed full political liberties since 1990. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. For 1990-2004, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. From 2005-2019 and

³³⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manuel_Noriega

³³⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Panama

³³⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Panamanian_general_election

³³⁹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/panama/freedom-world/2019>

in 2021, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2020 and from 2022 onward, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Papua New Guinea

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [partially of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 11/06/1884] [partially of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 11/03/1884]: The island of New Guinea was divided into two separate colonial territories between British (and later Australian) and German authorities. On 11/06/1884, a British Protectorate was proclaimed over the southern portion of the eastern half of New Guinea and in 1888 the territory was annexed. When German forces claimed control over the north-east corner of the island (New Guinea) in 1884, Australia claimed the south-east corner (Papua) (Suter 1981). On 09/01/1906, British New Guinea was placed under Australian control and the Governor-General of Australia declared that it was to be known henceforth as the Territory of Papua.³⁴⁰ For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. LIED classifies multiparty executive and legislative elections, as well as universal suffrage, as absent. According to LIED political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present for this period.

09/17/1914 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy, and Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Australia, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy]: On this date, during the First World War, British Imperial Forces occupied German New Guinea and placed it under Australian administration. On 11/21/1914 German forces in the colony surrendered. In 1920, German New Guinea became an Australian territory after Australia was awarded a mandate to administer the area (Nelson 1996).³⁴¹ In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to LIED, no

³⁴⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Papua_Act_1905

³⁴¹ <https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/atwar/first-world-war>

<https://www.loc.gov/item/2021668665/#:~:text=When%20World%20War%20I%20broke,the%20territory%20of%20New%20Guinea.>

multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI.

12/17/1920 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Australia, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy as International Mandate, League of Nations mandate]: Under the Treaty of Versailles, German New Guinea was ceded to Australia as League of Nations Mandate. The British Government, on behalf of Australia, governed the League of Nations Mandate from 12/17/1920.³⁴² For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI.

05/19/1921 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate, United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate, Australia, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy]: On this date, the League of Nations Mandate was transferred from United Kingdom to Australia through the New Guinea Act.³⁴³ For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI.

01/23/1942 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate, Australia, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy]/Start No Central Authority: On this day, the Empire of Japan invaded the Territory of New Guinea, followed by the Territory of Papua on 07/21/1942.³⁴⁴ Despite the construction of a formidable fortress by the Japanese at Rabaul and their occupation of certain areas, the majority of Papua and New Guinea remained under Allied control (Iwamoto 1997:305). In January 1942, the east of New Guinea became the Australian Territories of Papua and New Guinea under separate administrations. However, in February 1942, when military administrations replaced civil administrations, two distinct military units were established: the Papuan Administrative Unit and the New Guinea Administrative Unit. Later, these units merged in March-April 1942 to form the Australian New Guinea

³⁴² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territory_of_New_Guinea

³⁴³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territory_of_New_Guinea

³⁴⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_occupation_of_New_Guinea

Administrative Unit (ANGAU) (Nelson 1996). Due to the constant warfare in the context of the Second World War and the accompanying shifts in control over territory, the period is categorized as No Central Authority. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to our observations and LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present in this timeframe.

08/15/1945 End No Central Authority/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Australia, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy as International Mandate,]: On this date, Japanese forces surrendered, and eastern New Guinea gradually returned to provisional civil administrations. The Provisional Administration of the Territory of Papua-New Guinea continued until the Papua and New Guinea Act was enacted on 07/01/1949 (Nelson 1996). The Act merged their administrations, forming Papua and New Guinea, formally approved placing New Guinea under the international trusteeship system, and provided for a Legislative Council, established in 1951.³⁴⁵ From 1946 to 1950, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to our observations and LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is categorized by us as ambiguous regarding the state of political liberties, indicating an intermediate state between present and absent.

11/10/1951 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Australia, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy as International Mandate]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of Australia, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy as International Mandate]: On this day, the first general elections were held in Papua and New Guinea, electing three members from three single-member constituencies to the legislative council, comprised of the administrator, 16 civil servants, nine members appointed by the Administrator, and three elected Europeans. Voting was limited to residents over 21 who had resided in the territory for the last 12 months and were not classified as native or alien. The Chinese community and Europeans also had voting rights. Candidates had to reside continuously in the territory for three years before their nomination

³⁴⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Papua_New_Guinea

and could not be public employees.³⁴⁶ Women were granted the right to stand for national elections in 1963 and the universal right to vote on 02/15/1964.³⁴⁷ On 06/08/1964, the House of Assembly of Papua and New Guinea replaced the Legislative Council following elections held on 02/15/1964. The territory's name was changed to Papua New Guinea in 1972.³⁴⁸ From 1951 to 1972, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous until 1959 and as somewhat present afterwards regarding the status of political liberties.

12/01/1973 End (de facto) Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate, Australia, Liberal Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy [as self-governing state]: Papua New Guinea continued to be under an Australian Trusteeship by a UN mandate, however, Australia granted the country on this date self-government. Before of that general elections were held in the territory of Papua and New Guinea between 02/19/1972 and 03/11/1972. Before the elections, the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18.³⁴⁹ For 1973 and 1974, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The two years before independence, LIED classifies the elections as not competitive. Since 1973 V-Dem's CEI considers ambiguous cleanliness scores. In addition, V-Dem's EF&FI states the elections as somewhat free and fair. Besides, political liberties were still absent according to LIED. In contrast to that V-Dem's PCLI declares full political liberties.

09/16/1975 Continuation (Monarchical) Defective Democracy [as independent country]: On this date, Papua New Guinea became a fully independent state (Turner 2008) and joined the Commonwealth with the British Crown as ceremonial head of state. Frequent government changes have marked Papua New Guinea's national politics. The 1977 elections saw Michael Somare become prime minister, but he lost a vote of no confidence in 1980 and was replaced by Sir Julius Chan. Somare regained power after the 1982 elections but lost another vote of no confidence in 1985, and Paias Wingti became prime minister. A coalition led by Wingti won the elections in 1987 but was removed by a vote of no confidence in 1988, and Rabbie Namaliu became prime minister. Consequently, legislation that grants immunity from no-confidence

³⁴⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1951_Papua_New_Guinean_general_election

³⁴⁷ https://data.ipu.org/node/131/elections/historical-data-on-women?chamber_id=13487

³⁴⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Papua_New_Guinea

³⁴⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_Papua_New_Guinean_general_election

votes for the first 18 months of a new government's term has been introduced.³⁵⁰ On 12/01/1988, the secessionist Bougainville conflict began between Papua New Guinea's government and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA).³⁵¹ A truce was reached on 10/10/1997, followed by a permanent ceasefire on 04/30/1998. A peace agreement was signed on 08/30/2001, establishing the Bougainville Autonomous District and Province (PA-X Database). Bougainville voted overwhelmingly for independence in a non-binding referendum held from 11/23/2019 to 12/07/2019. An agreement in July 2021 stated that Bougainville would gain independence by 2027 if Papua New Guinea's parliament ratified it.³⁵² Papua New Guinea operates as a democracy with regular elections; however, these polls have frequently encountered issues such as irregularities and violence. Party allegiances tend to be unstable, and since gaining independence in 1975, only two governments have successfully completed a full term.³⁵³ General elections were held in Papua New Guinea between 06/24 and 07/08/2017. The 2017 elections in Papua New Guinea were marred by significant flaws, including reports of bribery and voter fraud. Election-related violence, particularly in the Highlands Region, resulted in dozens of deaths and extensive property damage.³⁵⁴ There are serious irregularities reported during voter registration and ballot counting, with strong indications that the 2017 election experienced systematic manipulation of the electoral roll in certain constituencies.³⁵⁵ General elections were held in Papua New Guinea from 07/04/2022 to 07/22/2022 to elect the members of the parliament for a new five-year term. However, there were accusations of electoral fraud.³⁵⁶ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Ever since the country's independence the elections score constant competitiveness (LIED). According to V-Dem's CEI, cleanliness was ambiguous until 2003. Since 2004, no real cleanliness is achieved. In addition, the overall election conditions were somewhat free and fair until 2006. Since 2007 V-Dem's EF&FI underlines ambiguous election conditions. According to FH, in 1975, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. As per FH's classification from 1976 to 1987, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Per FH's scoring for 1988, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather

³⁵⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Papua_New_Guinea

³⁵¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bougainville_conflict

³⁵² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Bougainvillean_independence_referendum

³⁵³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/papua-new-guinea/freedom-world/2021>

³⁵⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/papua-new-guinea/freedom-world/2022>

³⁵⁵ <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/PNG#pos4>

³⁵⁶ <https://learnrgerman.dw.com/en/electoral-fraud-claims-disrupt-papua-new-guinea-elections/a-39510652>

free category. According to FH, in 1989, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. As per FH's classification from 1990 to 1992, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. Per FH, from 1993 to 1997, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. Per FH's scoring from 1998 to 2002, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 from 2003 onward designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. However, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI acknowledge the constant presence of full political liberties ever since 1978. Between 1975 and 2011, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. Since 2012, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. From 1975 to 2011, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2012-2017 and in 2019, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. In 2018 and from 2020 onward, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. After 2017 the regime is a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

(Monarchical) Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Paraguay

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [Start: 05/14/1811]: On 05/14/1811, Paraguay declared independence from Spain. Subsequently, long periods of dictatorial governments followed that were legitimized by the national Congress or a new constitution, which rendered elections insignificant (León-Roesch/Ortiz Ortiz 2005:412). In 1844, Congress passed a new constitution, which established a powerful president with a ten-year term of office. The president was granted the authority to promulgate legislation and convene congress every five years to approve it (León-Roesch/Ortiz Ortiz 2005:412). In 1870, male suffrage was introduced (Kellam 2013: 29). Although the constitution was liberal and democratic in nature, it played no role in political reality. The constitution of 1870 rapidly lost its relevance (Sacks 1990: 30-31). According to Vanhanen only 0.0 to 3.0 percentage of the population participated in the

elections between 1870 and 1902 (Vanhanen 2019). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections are considered as not competitive by LIED. Moreover, the elections were not clean (V-Dem CEI). V-Dem's EF&FI underlines, no freedom and fairness for the elections were given. Additionally, political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous following V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. On 09/10/1880, independence was recognized by Spain. The Liberal Party (Partido Azul) and the National Republican Association (Partido Colorado), founded by General and President Bernadino Caballero, emerged in 1887. Both parties represented the interests of the oligarchical groups. The Partido Colorado was the dominant political force between 1878 and 1904 (León-Roesch/Ortiz Ortiz 2005:413-414). The political development in this period was marked by the consolidation of elite power, despite nominal democratic reforms. The emerging political parties and electoral processes were often used to legitimize the dominance of influential families, limiting broader political participation (Meyer-Aurich 2006).

01/09/1902 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, President Emilio Aceval was ousted in a coup supported by General Caballero, putting Juan Antonio Ecurra, also from the Partido Colorado, into power (Lewis 1986: 484, Casey et al. 2020: 13). In September 1904 a civil war started. According to LIED, only legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No executive elections were present. In 1902 and 1903, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. In 1904, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

12/19/1904 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Ezcurra signed a peace treaty and relinquished power to the combined Civic and Radical Liberal rebels led by General Ferreira (Lewis 1986: 484, Casey et al. 2020: 13). Ezcurra resigned, and Juan Bautista Ganoa became temporary president on 12/19/1904, followed by Cecilio Báez on

12/09/1905. In 1906, Ferreira orchestrated his own nomination for the presidency and was elected without facing any opposition (Lewis 1986: 484-85, Casey et al. 2020: 13). For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED, only executive elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No legislative elections were present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is categorized by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties, indicating an intermediate state between present and absent.

07/04/1908 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Military Autocracy: Army commander-in-chief Colonel Albino Jara ousted Ferreira in a coup (Lewis 1986: 485, Casey et al. 2020: 13). The Revolutionary Committee took control of the government, dissolved the National Congress (Senate and Chamber of Deputies), and declared a state of siege on 07/04/1908. On 07/05/1908, the Revolutionary Committee placed civilian leader and Radical Liberal Emiliano Gonzalez Navarro in office as provisional president.³⁵⁷ In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1908, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For 1909, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the state of political liberties.

11/25/1910 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: On this date, elections uncontested by both major opposition parties were held which gave power to Radical Liberal candidate Manuel Gondra (Lewis 1986: 584, Casey et al. 2020: 13). Based on the constitution of 1870 there was de jure universal male suffrage (Bruneau 1990: 161). However, de facto voting rights were still restricted based on several criteria, including property ownership, income, literacy, and age. This effectively limited political participation to a small elite class, primarily comprising landowners, wealthy individuals, and those who were

³⁵⁷ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/paraguay-1904-present/>

considered „educated.“ The restrictions ensured that political power remained concentrated in the hands of the upper classes, excluding the vast majority of the population, such as the rural poor, indigenous groups, and those without formal education. Therefore, only five percent of the population participated in the elections. Furthermore, the president was elected unopposed (Vanhanen 2019). The election scored an absence of competitiveness according to LIED. V-Dem's CEI indicates no electoral cleanliness. Moreover, the elections were not free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate the same outcomes as between 1900 and 1902 concerning the presence of political liberties. As in the period 1900-1902, the implementation of the constitution thus appears to be deficient to non-existent (Sacks 1990: 30-31). Therefore, we classify the regime in this period as an electoral oligarchical autocracy. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

01/11/1911 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, after a period of considerable instability, Colonel Albino Jara led a coup which overthrew the Radical Liberal regime (Lewis 1986: 486, Casey et al. 2020: 13).³⁵⁸ Jara became provisional president from 01/19/1911 to 07/05/1911 and chose Liberato Marcial Rojas as his successor on 07/06/1911.³⁵⁹ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In 1911, LIED identifies political liberties absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is categorized by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

02/18/1912 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: In elections uncontested by either the Civic Liberals or the Colorados, power was transferred to Radical Liberal candidate Manuel Franco. Estimates suggest that electoral participation rose to around 10-15% of the eligible male population. This relatively modest increase reflects a variety of challenges, such as limited political engagement, logistical issues with voter registration and turnout, and potential resistance to broader political participation. While the expansion of suffrage was a significant legal change, the practical impact on voter turnout was constrained by existing

³⁵⁸ https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albino_Jara

³⁵⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albino_Jara

social, economic, and political factors. Informal restrictions included socio-economic inequalities, limited access to information, geographic isolation (especially for rural and indigenous populations), and coercion or influence by political elites. However, based on the absence of formal restrictions we code the regime no longer as an electoral oligarchical autocracy. Franco died in 1919, and power was transferred to his Vice President Jose P. Montero. On 08/15/1920, Gondra was elected president in uncompetitive elections. After brief factional fighting between Gondra and Schaerer in October 1921, Gondra resigned but Schaerer abstained from seizing power and instead the two factions agreed on Eusebio Ayala as provisional president. After Schaerer and opposition Colorado Party members attempted to foment a coup, Ayala announced the postponement of elections which led to a 13-month civil war. During the war, Ayala resigned and Eligio Ayala³⁶⁰ took over as president and was elected president in 1923. Ayala introduced electoral reforms which led the Colorado Party to contest the 1927 legislative elections and the 1928 presidential elections which were won by the Radical Liberal candidate Jose P. Guggiari. After the 1932 elections, Ayala returned to the presidency (Lewis 1986: 486-95, Casey et al. 2020: 13-14). Until 1928 presidents were elected unopposed. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In the period between 1912 and 1936 only between 0.0 and 9.1 percentage of the population participated in the elections (Vanhanen 2019). During the entire time competitive elections were absent, following LIED. V-Dem's CEI scores no cleanliness. Furthermore, no freedom and fairness are achieved for the elections (V-Dem EF&FI). Furthermore, LIED considers the political liberties as absent. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI declares their presence as ambiguous. The constitution of 1870 was still in force and therefore, de jure universal male suffrage (Bruneau 1990: 161). Generally, the liberal decades was also characterized by a „deeply factionalized political oligarchy”.³⁶¹ According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, 1912-1935, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

02/17/1936 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Ayala was ousted in a military coup, called the February Revolution (Lewis 1991: 234, 236, Casey et al. 2020:

³⁶⁰ The two Ayalas are not related to each other.

³⁶¹ <https://countrystudies.us/paraguay/14.htm>

14).³⁶² Afterward, war hero Colonel Rafael Franco, who had been in exile, returned to Paraguay to take charge of the newly established military government. Decree-Law 1952 conferred unrestricted powers to a „committee of civil mobilization” (Lewis 1991: 235-36, Casey et al. 2020: 14). In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1936, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. In 1936, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

08/13/1937 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Colonel Ramon Paredes overthrew Franco in a military coup in favor of the Liberal Party. Felix Paiva, a civilian, became president (Lewis 1991: 239-42, Casey et al. 2020: 14). In accordance with LIED, only legislative elections were held in 1937, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No executive elections were present. In 1938 multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1937 and 1938, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For that short period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is categorized by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties, indicating an intermediate state between present and absent.

04/30/1939 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: After the Liberal Party had realized that they needed a more popular president with national prestige if they wanted to stay in power, they chose General José Félix Estigarribia as their candidate.³⁶³ On 04/30/1939 General José Félix Estigarribia was elected indirectly and without opposition, because the Colorado Party, the other relevant party at that time, had boycotted the presidential election.³⁶⁴ Highly respected for his efforts in the Chaco War as Commander in Chief of the Paraguayan Army, the candidate of the Liberal Party initiated a new period of authoritarianism supported by the military and shifting factions of civilians.³⁶⁵ In August 1939, Estigarribia officially took

³⁶² [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/February_Revolution_\(Paraguay\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/February_Revolution_(Paraguay))

³⁶³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Paraguay

³⁶⁴ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/paraguay-1904-present/>

³⁶⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_F%C3%A9lix_Estigarribia

office after the New Liberal faction and army had eliminated any left-over opposition. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The election was not competitive (LIED). In addition, no cleanliness was scored (V-Dem CEI) and the overall election conditions were not free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). Moreover, political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI. In 1939, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. In 1940, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1939, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

02/19/1940 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Personalist (Military) Autocracy: On this date Estigarribia carried out a self-coup and dissolved the parliament (Lewis 1993: 175-78, Wild/Llloyd 2018, Lewis 1991: 242, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 87). The newly drafted constitution was approved on 08/04/1940. It granted the president extensive powers. The rule of Estigarribia came to a sudden end on 09/07/1940 when he and his wife died in a plane crash. The Liberal Party opted for General Higinio Morinigo as interim president in the hope of having chosen a more submissive candidate.³⁶⁶ However, he took full control of the government on 11/30/1940 and gradually suppressed opponents, banned all parties and restricted individual liberties. Therefore, he was the only candidate in the presidential election on 02/14/1943.³⁶⁷ He became a „non-party dictator without a large body of supporters”.³⁶⁸ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held in 1940. Thereafter, only legislative elections were held until 1942, but they were not categorized as multiparty. From 1943 onward, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. LIED classifies no electoral competitiveness. Moreover, the election was not free, fair and clean (V-Dem EF&FI, CEI). Nevertheless, due to his astute handling of relevant parts of the military, he stayed in power until 1948.³⁶⁹ Regarding the political liberties they were absent (LIED) and not really present following V-Dem's PCLI. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. According to our classification the regime is not an electoral autocracy since during this period,

³⁶⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Paraguay

³⁶⁷ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/paraguay-1904-present/>

³⁶⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Paraguay

³⁶⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Paraguay

no freely functioning parliament existed and Morínigo ruled without legislative oversight. From 1940 to 1948, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

06/03/1948 End Personalist (Military) Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: A military coup supported by the Colorado party ousted President Morínigo. In the long-promised 1948 elections Natalicio González was elected unopposed. Based on our observations, both executive and legislative elections were held during this period, but they were not categorized as multiparty, which contradicts the observations of LIED. During the entire time elections were not competitive, following LIED. Moreover, no cleanliness was achieved (V-Dem CEI). The overall conditions were considered as not free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. Furthermore, LIED's score regarding the political liberties remains absent. V-Dem's PCLI scores changed to not real presence of political liberties. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. Suspecting that Morínigo would not relinquish power to González, a group of Colorado military officers, including Stroessner, removed Morínigo from office. He was replaced by civilian one-party Colorado government (Leon-Roesch 1993: 514, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 87).³⁷⁰ The appointed Juan Frutos, a supreme court justice became acting president, before the presidency was handed over to González.

01/30/1949 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: Gonzalez was only a few months in office when Raimundo Rolón, the Minister of Defense, staged a coup and became the acting president.³⁷¹

02/26/1949 Continuation Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Rolón was deposed by a joint civilian and military movement. Felipe Lopez was appointed as provisional president in the aftermath.³⁷² In 1949, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present.

³⁷⁰ <http://tinyurl.com/4x5f65a>

³⁷¹ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/paraguay-1904-present/>

³⁷² <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/paraguay-1904-present/>

04/17/1949 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: Felipe Lopez was elected president unopposed on this date and inaugurated on 05/14/1949. However, on 09/12/1949, the Colorado Party ousted him due to his failure to unify the party and restore civil order. The process within the Colorado Party that led to the ousting was controlled primarily by the party's military faction and influential political elites. The party appointed Federico Chavez to complete Lopez's term. He was sworn in as president on 08/15/1950 and re-elected without opposition on 02/15/1953.³⁷³ Based on our observations, both executive and legislative elections were held during this period, but they were not categorized as multiparty, which contradicts the observations of LIED. According to LIED, elections during this regime period were not competitive. V-Dem's CEI indicates no cleanliness. The overall election conditions are classified as not free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. In addition to that, political liberties were still absent per LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were not really present. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For 1949-1954, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

05/04[-07]/1954 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A brief military conflict led by General Stroessner ousted the civilian president Chavez. The motive was that Chavez began to militarize a national police force at the expense of the military. An interim president reigned temporarily until the Colorado Party and the coup makers decided that Stroessner should be president. He became president two months later as the result of a single-candidate election (Roett/Sacks 1991: 53-54, Leon-Roesch 1993: 507, 514, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 87-88).³⁷⁴ The following autocracy of Alfredo Stroessner is colloquially known as El Stronismo.³⁷⁵ In 1961, female suffrage was introduced.³⁷⁶ Since there were in the presidential elections only one candidate from the military and no other choice the regime is classified as a military autocracy even if parliamentary elections took place. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held until 1958, but they were not categorized as multiparty. In 1959, only executive elections were held and in the period between 1960 and 1962, both executive and legislative elections were held again, but they were not classified as

³⁷³ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/paraguay-1904-present/>

³⁷⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1954_Paraguayan_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1954_Paraguayan_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

³⁷⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictatorship_of_Alfredo_Stroessner
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictatorship_of_Alfredo_Stroessner

³⁷⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

multiparty. From 1963 onward, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held conducted. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. From 1955 to 1988, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. As classified by FH from 1972 to 1975, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH, in 1976 and 1977, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Per FH's evaluation from 1978 to 1985, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH's classification from 1986 to 1988, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. Stroessner's regime represents a borderline case between military and personalist autocracy. In day-to-day governance, the regime exhibited personalist features: Stroessner ruled alone without visible junta structures, no collective military leadership was apparent in decision-making, and his 35-year tenure suggested deep personalization of power. The Colorado Party functioned as a captured instrument of his rule. These surface characteristics resemble personalist patterns. However, three decisive factors support classification as military autocracy. First, the 1989 military coup led by General Rodríguez revealed that the armed forces retained latent institutional capacity to remove the ruler through organized action rather than regime collapse. Second, legitimation remained functional rather than charismatic: Stroessner justified rule through claims to national security, order, and anticommunism, not through personality cult or ideological deification. Third, elite loyalty operated through military discipline and institutional hierarchies rather than through personalized patronage networks or ritualized devotion. The absence of personality cult distinguishes Stroessner from paradigmatic personalist autocrats. While the regime's daily operations appeared highly personalized, the institutional foundation remained military. According to Va-PoReg's principle that the institution capable of organized removal determines regime type, Paraguay qualifies as military autocracy despite borderline features.

02/03/1989 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Andrés Rodríguez and other military officials overthrew Stroessner, supported by the Roman Catholic Church and the United States of America. The Congress and Council of State

designated Rodríguez as provisional president.³⁷⁷ Rodríguez had previously served as Stroessner's closest confidant for 35 years. Their relationship became so intimate that Rodríguez's daughter married Stroessner's elder son.³⁷⁸ Approximately 500 soldiers on both sides are estimated to have lost their lives as a result of Stroessner's capture.³⁷⁹ In accordance with LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1989 to 1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. For the given period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present since 1990.

12/01/1991 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, the election for a National Constitutional Assembly took place, which were won by the Colorado Party.³⁸⁰ In 1992, the National Constitutional Assembly adopted a new constitution that established the basis for a competitive presidential election in 1993 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 51). Elections, generally considered free and fair, are coded as the endpoint of a series of democratizing reforms carried out between 1989 and 1993 by the Rodríguez administration. The 1989 election of Rodríguez is not considered transitional because he was a Stroessner regime insider and relative by marriage who had originally achieved office via coup in what Abente Brun (Abente-Brun 1999: 93) calls „an internal adjustment made by the ruling coalition”. The formal and informal rules under which he won the election were very similar to those under which Stroessner had won elections. Starting in the early 1990s, the Rodríguez government implemented several democratizing reforms. These included ending the compulsory party affiliation of officers, prohibiting the military and police from engaging in partisan activity, revising electoral rules that were disadvantageous to opposition parties to proportional representation, and drafting a new constitution (Leon-Roesch 1993: 505, Lambert 2000: 383-85, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 87-88). The elections of 1993 were not entirely peaceful. Despite confirmed cases of fraud, independent analysts concluded that the fraudulent activity had no effect on the outcome, and that Wasmos's eight-point margin of victory was

³⁷⁷ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andr%C3%A9s_Rodr%C3%ADguez_\(politician\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andr%C3%A9s_Rodr%C3%ADguez_(politician))

³⁷⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andr%C3%A9s_Rodr%C3%ADguez_\(politician\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andr%C3%A9s_Rodr%C3%ADguez_(politician))

³⁷⁹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andr%C3%A9s_Rodr%C3%ADguez_\(politician\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andr%C3%A9s_Rodr%C3%ADguez_(politician))

³⁸⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Paraguayan_Constitutional_Assembly_election

large enough to offset any illicit activity. Carte's team of international observers noted that opposition candidates tallied almost 60 percent of the vote between them.³⁸¹ In the presidential election on 5/9/1993, the Colorado Party secured pluralities in both houses of Congress, with evident military backing and extensive utilization of state resources to fund its campaign (Lansford, 2021: 1300). The conservative Colorado Party has dominated the presidency for the majority of the past 75 years. The only recent exception, left-wing former president Fernando Lugo, faced a legal but highly controversial „express impeachment“ in 2012. In the 2018 election, Mario Abdo Benítez from the Colorado Party secured the presidency with slightly over 46 percent of the vote. Efraín Alegre, representing the opposition Alianza Ganar coalition, garnered 43 percent. While international observers generally deemed the election fair, there were claims of irregularities such as fraud, vote-buying, and a media blackout impacting other candidates.³⁸² Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since the country's transformation, the elections held are considered as competitive (LIED). V-Dem's CEI states the cleanliness as ambiguous from 1992 to 2002. Since 2003 somewhat cleanliness outcomes are scored. Since 1991 the overall elections conditions are somewhat free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). Paraguay's constitution grants its indigenous inhabitants the right to engage in the economic, social, and political spheres of the nation. Nevertheless, in practice, the indigenous population faces marginalization and neglect. According to a June 2008 census, 48 percent of indigenous individuals were unemployed, and 88 percent lacked access to medical care. The judiciary, influenced by the ruling party and the military, suffers from pervasive corruption, leading to inefficiencies within the courts. Political interference in the judiciary is a significant issue, with judges frequently facing pressure from politicians and investigations being obstructed. Constitutional freedoms of expression and the press are inconsistently upheld, with ownership of Paraguay's primary media outlets concentrated in three influential corporations whose interests often shape media content. Regarding the political liberties they remain absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI classifies them as somewhat present from 1991 to 1992, in 2013 and in 2016. For the remaining years full political liberties are achieved. Despite these challenges, Paraguay boasts a robust culture of largely autonomous non-governmental organizations dedicated to human rights and governance (Freedom House, 2010: 515-518).³⁸³ Between 1992 and 1997, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or

³⁸¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Paraguayan_general_election

³⁸² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/paraguay/freedom-world/2022>

³⁸³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/paraguay/freedom-world/2023#CL>

subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For 1992-1998, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. From 1999 to 2005, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. 2006 and 2007, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 2008-2011, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. 2012 and 2015, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. 2013 and 2014, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2016 and 2017, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 2018 onward, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Since 1999, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Abente-Brun 1995, Fournier/Burges 2000, Lambert 1997, Martini/Lezcano 1997, Roett 1989, Sosna 2001, Valenzuela 1997, Zagorski 2003, Sonntag 2001)

Persia see Iran

Peru

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [Start: 08/14/1879]: On 07/28/1821 independence from Spain was declared and on 08/14/1879 it was recognized by Spain. From 09/08/1899 to 09/08/1903 Eduardo López de Romaña, member of the Civilista Party, was elected as

constitutional president of the Peruvian Republic.³⁸⁴ López de Romaña was a member of the landowning elite, reflecting the Aristocratic Republic's pattern of presidents emerging from the country's most privileged classes also known as the twenty-four friends.³⁸⁵ This era is marked by a combination of relative political stability, swift economic advancement, and modernization, alongside significant social and political transformations. Despite these developments, electoral processes were limited, governed by stringent property ownership and literacy requirements, and frequently influenced or controlled by the ruling Civilista regime.³⁸⁶ Only in 1931 suffrage was extended to literate men, in 1955 women suffrage was introduced and in 1979 suffrage was extended to illiterates (Kellam 2013).³⁸⁷ Therefore, we classify the regime in this period as an electoral oligarchy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Therefore, the elections held were not competitive (LIED). During this period no cleanliness was scored (V-Dem CEI). The overall election conditions are classified as ambiguous by V-Dem's EF&FI. Additionally, political liberties were absent (LIED). However, V-Dem's PCLI already considers them as somewhat present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1900 to 1912, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 1913, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

02/04/1914 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Guillermo Billinghurst was overthrown in a military coup headed by Colonel Oscar R. Benavides, Javier and Manuel Prado, and conservative members of the Civilista Party (Klaren 1993: 38, Casey et al. 2020: 14).³⁸⁸ In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties were somewhat present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1914, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on

³⁸⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eduardo_L%C3%B3pez_de_Roma%C3%B1a

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eduardo_L%C3%B3pez_de_Roma%C3%B1a#:~:text=A%20member%20of%20the%20landowning,called%20Aristocratic%20Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eduardo_L%C3%B3pez_de_Roma%C3%B1a#:~:text=A%20member%20of%20the%20landowning,called%20Aristocratic%20Republic;); https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Peru

³⁸⁶ <https://countrystudies.us/peru/16.htm>

³⁸⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage_in_Peru

³⁸⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guillermo_Billinghurst; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guillermo_Billinghurst

the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

08/18/1915 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: Presidential and parliamentary elections were held on 05/16&17/1915. José Pardo, who headed the Civilista Party, won the presidency.³⁸⁹ On 08/18/1915 Benavides left office and Pardo took over. The military's withdrawal in 1915 was a negotiated exit, coordinated with civilian elites, particularly the Civilista Party, as part of a planned restoration of oligarchic rule. Rather than seeking to establish a lasting dictatorship, the military had intervened primarily to remove President Billinghurst and stabilize the political order in favor of traditional elite interests. The transition back to civilian control through tightly controlled elections reflected a strategic realignment within the ruling class, not a democratizing shift (Klarén 1993: 38, Casey et al. 2020: 14).³⁹⁰ On 07/04/1919, Augusto B. Leguía was reinstated as president, an event that incited rebellion among certain oligarchic groups. Nevertheless, on the same date, 07/04/1919, his allies orchestrated a coup to ensure his ascension to power. Throughout his subsequent term, Leguía severed ties with the traditional oligarchy that had previously reigned over Peruvian politics for the last two decades. He exiled a number of leading politicians, then dissolved the parliament with the support of the gendarmerie. In the elections that followed, he committed significant electoral fraud, effectively converting the legislature into an entity that merely ratified his decisions (Klarén 1986: 588, 625, 631, 635, Klarén 1993: 39-40, Casey et al. 2020: 14-15). Although he presided over the creation of a new constitution, he disregarded constitutional norms and ruled as a dictator.³⁹¹ Only in 1931 suffrage was extended to literate men, in 1955 women suffrage was introduced and in 1979 suffrage was extended to illiterates (Kellam 2013).³⁹² In the elections between 1915 and 1930 only between 3.1 and 3.8 percentage of the population participated (Vanhanen 2019). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED, the elections were not competitive during the entire time. V-Dem's CEI indicates no electoral cleanliness. From 1915 to 1918 the overall election conditions were ambiguous. In 1919 per V-Dem's EF&FI elections were not really free and fair and not free and fair since 1920. LIED scores concerning the political liberties did not change. V-Dem's PCLI points out their somewhat presence until 1919. Since 1920, ambiguous outcomes are

³⁸⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_Pardo_y_Barreda

³⁹⁰ https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elecciones_generales_de_Per%C3%BA_de_1915

³⁹¹ <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Augusto-Bernardino-Leguia-y-Salcedo>
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Augusto-Bernardino-Leguia-y-Salcedo>

³⁹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage_in_Peru

given. Between 1916 and 1918, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. Since 1920, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. Therefore, we classify the regime in this period as an electoral oligarchy. For the years 1915-1918, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1919, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. From 1920 to 1928, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For 1929 and 1930, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. BMR, RoW and LIED classify the period as an electoral/multiparty autocracy.

08/27/1930 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date Leguía was deposed by a military coup.³⁹³ A junta formed, and Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro became President.³⁹⁴ Following his assassination, General Oscar Benavides was appointed president by a constituent assembly in 1933. When the results of the 1936 elections proved unfavorable, Benavides nullified them. He was subsequently succeeded by Manuel Prado in 1939 (Klarén 1986: 639, Klaren 1993: 41, 44-45, Albertus 2015: 195, 197, Casey et al. 2020: 15). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held in 1930. Subsequently between 1931 and 1933, multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted. From 1934 onward, multiparty executive and legislative elections remain absent. Between 1933 and 1939, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1931 and from 1933 to 1939, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1932, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the given period,

³⁹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augusto_B._Legu%C3%ADa#Overthrow

³⁹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1939_Peruvian_general_election;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis_Miguel_S%C3%A1nchez_Cerro

LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

10/22/1939 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: On this date, general elections were held in Peru to elect the President and both houses of the Congress. In the presidential elections the result was a victory for Manuel Prado Ugarteche of the Concentración Nacional coalition, who received 77.5% of the vote. The Concentración Nacional also won a landslide victory in the Congressional elections, winning 45 of the 48 seats in the Senate and 111 of the 140 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.³⁹⁵ Given the peaceful transition of power from Benavides to Prado, we code this regime change event as a voluntary exit by the ruler. It is worth noting, however, that Prado remained loyal to Benavides's policies. Our coding also captures the subsequent transfer of power from Prado to Bustamante and the associated process of liberalization (see below for further details).³⁹⁶ Sociologist Dennis Gilbert describes the era spanning from 1930 to 1968 as marked by a „tripartite“ political system, wherein the military frequently acted on behalf of the oligarchy to quell the dissent of the „disorderly“ populace, symbolized by APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) and the PCP (Partido Comunista Peruano).³⁹⁷ Jose Bustamante emerged victorious in the competitive elections of 1945, leading to Prado stepping down from office (Klaren 1993: 44, Albertus 2015: 197, Casey et al. 2020: 15). He restored freedom of the press and civil rights. Furthermore, he planned for a democratization of government and hence limiting the influence of the military and the oligarchy.³⁹⁸ However, neither women suffrage (until 1955) nor suffrage for illiterates (until 1979) was granted.³⁹⁹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. However, LIED declares the elections as competitive until 1947. From 1940 to 1947 no cleanliness was scored according to V-Dem's CEI. V-Dem's EF&FI classifies the overall conditions as not really free and fair until 1944. Since 1945, the overall conditions outcomes are ambiguous. Political liberties were absent according to LIED. For the time since 1940 V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were somewhat present. In addition, the quantitative criterion of participation of at least 15% of the population is not met. Between 1939 and 1948, the percentage of the population which participated in the elections was between 0.0 and 6.0 (Vanhanen 2019). According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered

³⁹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis_Miguel_S%C3%A1nchez_Cerro

³⁹⁶ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Peru_R: 3

³⁹⁷ <https://countrystudies.us/peru/19.htm>

³⁹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_Luis_Bustamante_y_Rivero

³⁹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage

slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. In 1948, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. For 1940-1944, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1945, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1946 and 1947, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

10/27/1948 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup led by General Manuel A. Odría ousted President José Bustamante and installed a military junta (Kantor 1969: 474, Soldevilla 1993: 536, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 88). It came as a surprise that Odría legalized opposition parties in 1956 and called fresh elections.⁴⁰⁰ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1949. From 1950 onward, both executive and legislative elections were held but they were not categorized as multiparty. In 1948 and 1949, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. Since 1950, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. For 1948, V-Dem's JCE is classified as moderate, indicating occasional judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In 1949, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1950 to 1955, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present.

06/17/1956 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, general elections were held to elect the President and both houses of the Congress. Manuel Prado Ugarteche of the Pradist Democratic Movement won the presidential election (Masterson 1991: 148-49, Soldevilla 1993: 525, 532, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 88). They were the first

⁴⁰⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manuel_A._Odr%C3%ADa

elections in Peru in which women could vote.⁴⁰¹ Although female suffrage had been introduced in 1955, the suffrage was still restricted. Illiterates were only allowed to vote in 1979.⁴⁰² Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this time the elections scored competitiveness according to LIED. Whereas V-Dem's CEI indicates not real cleanliness scores from 1957 to 1961. V-Dem's EF&FI declares the overall election conditions as ambiguous since 1956. While LIED states that no political liberties were present for this time, according to V-Dem's PCLI indicates the presence of political liberties can be viewed as ambiguous in 1956. Since 1957 they are considered as somewhat present. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For 1956, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1957 to 1961, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

07/18/1962 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup led by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Perez Godoy, ousted the outgoing civilian President Manuel Prado Ugarteche and installed a military junta (Pike 1967: 302).⁴⁰³ In the June 1962 presidential election, no candidate had received the 1/3 of votes required to win, so the choice went to Congress. Haya de la Torre, APRA 's leader, and Odría , the former president agreed to a coalition in which Odría would be president and Haya de la Torre's deputy. The military ousted the outgoing president in order to prevent the UNO-APRA alliance from taking office, annulled the election, and established a four man junta of the leaders of the services to rule until another election could be held (Pike 1967: 299-300, Kantor 1969: 477, Masterson 1991: 174-77 , Klaren 2000: 320, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 88). On 03/03/1963 General Lindley overthrew Godoy due to policy differences. Lindley took over as chairman of the junta. In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the year 1962, V-Dem's JCE is classified as robust, indicating strong and regular judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating

⁴⁰¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1956_Peruvian_general_election

⁴⁰² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage

⁴⁰³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1962_Peruvian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In 1962, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were somewhat present.

06/09/1963 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: Civilians reclaimed power through competitive elections, finalizing the transition to democracy (Masterson 1991: 183, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 88). However, illiterates, a large portion of the population, had no right to vote. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED the elections were nevertheless competitive. V-Dem's CEI classifies the cleanliness as ambiguous since 1964. V-Dem's EF&FI also scores the overall conditions as ambiguous. In addition to that political liberties were still absent (LIED). Since 1964 V-Dem's PCLI scores them as fully present. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For 1963, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1964 to 1967, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. In this regime period Peru is according to our observations a borderline case between an electoral hybrid regime and a defective democracy.

10/03/1968 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: Military coup led by army chief of staff General Velasco, who deposed the elected president Fernando Belaúnde and installed a – leftist revolutionary - military junta with Velasco as the chairman.⁴⁰⁴ The reason for the coup was a scandal over an oil contract that prompted the armed forces to overthrow the government (Einaudi 1974: 163, Masterson 1991: 229-30). On 08/29/1975 Velasco was overthrown by the military government for not carrying out the revolution. Furthermore, economic decline, unemployment and violence were growing Bermudez took over the junta (Balmaseda 1992). The military leadership agreed to elections for a Constituent Assembly, held on 06/18/1978. In these multiparty elections the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance emerged as the largest party in the multiparty elections.⁴⁰⁵ In 1979 suffrage was granted for the illiterate.⁴⁰⁶ However, power was held until 05/18/1980 by the military and the executive was neither directly nor indirectly legitimized by popular elections. In accordance with LIED, no

⁴⁰⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968_Peruvian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

⁴⁰⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978_Peruvian_Constituent_Assembly_election

⁴⁰⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, from 1972 to 1974, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH from 1975 to 1979, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1968, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the span of 1969-1977, V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1978 and 1979, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not really present until 1977, are in an ambiguous state in 1978 and were somewhat present in 1979.

05/18/1980 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: The parliament, dominated by APRA and other opposition forces, organized free presidential elections on this date. These elections are viewed in the literature as a transition to democracy (Soldevilla 1993: 518, Orsini 2000, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 88).⁴⁰⁷ Fernando Belaunde Terry, representing the Christian Democratic party, secured victory as the opposition candidate (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 52). In July 1980 the new constitution was fully implemented, and the new state institutions were inaugurated (Lea/Milward/Rowe 2001: 176). The bicameral parliament comprised the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Citizens aged at least 18 years and possessing full civil and political rights were entitled to vote. Additionally, voting was compulsory for citizens until the age of 70 (IPU 1980). Throughout much of this period, political and civil liberties were generally respected. According to FH, from 1980 to 1988, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. Per FH, in 1989 and 1990, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. According to FH, in 1991, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. V-Dem's PCLI full political liberties were present until 1989. Since 1990 the outcomes have changed to somewhat present. However, according to LIED political liberties were not present. The occurrence of human rights abuses and the imposition of periodic states of emergency during counter-insurgency operations against the Maoist Shining Path guerrilla

⁴⁰⁷ <https://www.janda.org/ICPP/ICPP2000/Countries/3-SouthAmerica/37-Peru/Peru63-00.htm>

severely undermined the state of Peruvian democracy (Gastil 1986: 354). The democratic situation deteriorated significantly, particularly in the late 1980s. On 06/10/1990 relatively unknown Alberto Fujimori won the Peruvian general election. Towards the end of this period, Peru faced significant institutional challenges due to a severe economic downturn, widespread corruption associated with drug trafficking, and heightened counter-insurgency efforts against the Shining Path. Expanded martial law extended military control over more than half of the country, severely limiting political expression amidst a climate of pervasive violence and fear caused by the Shining Path and MRTA guerrilla movements (Soldevilla 1993: 518, Orsini 2000, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 88, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 52, Lea/Milward/Rowe 2001: 176).⁴⁰⁸ Repressive measures by the military, security forces, and affiliated paramilitary groups exacerbated the situation. Fujimori's first year in office saw a dramatic increase in political violence, with an average of ten deaths per day, up from four deaths per day in 1989, with the trend worsening in the latter half of 1991 (Freedom House, 1992: 369). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this time elections were competitive according to LIED. V-Dem's CEI underlines that somewhat cleanliness is achieved. According to V-Dem's EF&FI the elections are somewhat free and fair. Between 1980 and 1989, based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. In 1990 and 1991, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For 1980, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1981-1989, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In 1990, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. In 1991, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive.

⁴⁰⁸ <https://www.janda.org/ICPP/ICPP2000/Countries/3-SouthAmerica/37-Peru/Peru63-00.htm>

04/05/1992 End Defective Democracy/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: When opposition parties deadlocked President Alberto Fujimori's neo-liberal economic agenda, he launched, on this date, a self-coup with military support. He ordered the military to occupy the legislative chambers and removed all Supreme Court justices who were deemed insufficiently loyal. He suspended most of the Constitution and by the end of that day, every major institutional check on Fujimori's authority had been neutralized, allowing him to rule by decree under the stated goal of combating insurgency and corruption. Subsequently, he called for elections to a new congress which drafted a new constitution (Soldevilla 1993: 518, Conaghan 2005: 41-45, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 88-89). On 11/22/1992 elections took place for the Democratic Constituent Congress. This assembly was elected to draft a new constitution. These elections were marked by controversy. The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, the second-largest party in the Chamber of Deputies at the time, boycotted the elections. Fujimori's Cambio 90–New Majority alliance won a significant portion of the seats, securing 44 out of the 80 available seats in the Democratic Constituent Congress (Cameron 1998). On 04/09/1995 general elections were held, the first under the newly drafted constitution. Fujimori was re-elected with 64,4% of the votes and his Cambio 90-New Majority won 67 of the 120 seats in the unicameral Congress. The former UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and his Party Union for Peru came second with 21,8% and 17 seats.⁴⁰⁹ Because after the self-coup new elections were held the new regime is coded as an electoral autocracy and not a personalist autocracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. However, no competitive elections were held during this regime period (LIED). From 1993 to 1999 ambiguous cleanliness is scored and in 2000 no real cleanliness is stated (V-Dem CEI). However, somehow surprisingly given the CEI score the elections are considered as somewhat free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. Per FH, in 1992, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH, from 1993 to 1995 the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH, in 1996, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. As classified by FH from 1997 to 1999, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Moreover, LIED's outcome concerning the political liberties did not change. According to LIED political liberties were still not present and V-Dem's PCLI scores switched to an ambiguous presence. In 1992, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced

⁴⁰⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995_Peruvian_general_election

minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. Since 1993, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1992, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1993 to 1999, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

11/21/2000 End Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Democratizing Regime: Fujimori resigned in response to the publication of evidence of corruption and human rights abuses. Remaining members of Fujimori's inner circle also resigned and/or agreed to turn power over to an interim government led by the opposition until the next election. Generals allied with Fujimori were forced to retire later the same month (Taylor 2001: 18, Conaghan 2005: 228-42, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 89). According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. For the year 2000, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In 2000, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were somewhat present.

04/08/2001 End Democratizing Regime/Start Defective Democracy: Following the fraudulent presidential elections of 2000, free and fair elections were held on this date.⁴¹⁰ Following the 2021 general elections, Congress saw the entry of ten parties. International observers regarded these elections as competitive and peaceful. The Peru Libre party, led by Castillo, emerged as the largest faction in Congress with 37 seats. The right-wing FP party, previously led by Fujimori and known for its dominance, secured 24 seats. However, no single party achieved a majority in the Congress.⁴¹¹ Elections are held regularly, including in 2006, 2011, 2016 and 2021. International election observer missions are regularly deployed, for example the European Union Election Observation Mission. In general, the missions conclude that the important democratic benchmarks are met, but that reforms are still necessary regarding electoral law, electoral administration and party funding (Amnesty International 1996).⁴¹²

⁴¹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_Peruvian_general_election

⁴¹¹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/peru/freedom-world/2022>

⁴¹² <https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/relations-non-eu-countries/types-relations-and-partnerships/election-observation/mission-recommendations-repository/search>

Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. However, since 2001, the elections are considered as competitive by LIED. V-Dem's CEI declares the elections with a constant cleanliness since 2002. Moreover, V-Dem' EF&FI confirms constant free and fair election conditions. Nevertheless, in December 2022, Peru's president Pedro Castillo was impeached and imprisoned after trying to dissolve Congress illegally, whereafter Dina Boluarte, the previous vice-president, was inaugurated by Congress. After the impeachment, the new government declared a state of emergency after large scale pro-castillo protests turned violent, limiting rights of assembly and employing the military.⁴¹³ Many protestors call for a new election.⁴¹⁴ Dina Buolarte is the sixth president in five years.⁴¹⁵ This is mainly due to the fact that the provisions for impeachment proceedings in the 1993 Constitution are very broadly worded, which means that the legislature can initiate proceedings without cause.⁴¹⁶ The independence of the judiciary is problematic and Peru scores constantly relatively poorly in Freedom House's Rule of Law category. Corruption is also a constant, systematic problem. The reactions to the protests in 2022 and 2020, which were accompanied by restrictions on political and civil rights and the use of police violence, led Freedom House to downgrade Pero to partly free in 2021 and 2023 reports.⁴¹⁷ As per FH's classification in 2004, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. According to FH, from 2005 to 2019, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. Per FH, in 2020, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. As per FH's classification in 2021, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. As classified by FH since 2022, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. Since 2001 both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI point out that political liberties are achieved. Overall, Peru always seems to score on the border between free and partly free. From 2001 to 2018, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. Elections are usually free and fair, and show only minor defects, but checks and balances between the different branches are distorted and civil rights are restricted in the light

⁴¹³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/peru/freedom-world/2023>

⁴¹⁴ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/24/democracy-line-peru>

⁴¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dina_Boluarte

⁴¹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_Peru

⁴¹⁷ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/peru/freedom-world/2023>; <https://freedomhouse.org/country/peru/freedom-world/2021>

of protests. For 2001, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 2002-2006 and 2010-2023, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. For the years 2007 to 2009, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. According to our observations Peru is a defective democracy.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Cameron 1994a, Cameron/Mauceri 1997, Carrión 2006, Cotler 1978, Cotler 1986, Dietz 1992, Kenney 2004, Sonntag 2001, Levitsky/Cameron 2003)

Philippines

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 10/12/1898]: On 06/12/1898, a revolutionary movement in the Philippines declared itself independent from the Spanish Empire. On 10/12/1898 the Philippines became a colony of the United States of America de jure with the Treaty of Paris. However, from 1899 on to 04/16/1902 the Filipinos fought back against the USA's occupation.⁴¹⁸ On 07/30/1907 the first election for the 80 members Philippine Assembly were held which was created by the Philippine Organic Act from 1902. These elections marked to begin of Philippines way towards self-determination. In 1916 it was renamed the House of Representatives of the Philippines.⁴¹⁹ On 11/15/1935 the US-congress approved a 10-year transition period to independence of the Philippines. The Philippines then held a referendum on the new constitution and an island-wide plebiscite on independence. Both were approved by huge margins.⁴²⁰ Males over 25 who could speak English or Spanish, with property and tax restrictions, were allowed to vote as early as 1907. However, universal male suffrage started only in 1935. In 1937, women's suffrage was approved in a plebiscite.⁴²¹ LIED confirms the presence of legislative multiparty elections since 1907. However, the electorate between was primarily composed of the educated and property-owning elite, limiting broad public participation in governance. While the Philippine Assembly was

⁴¹⁸ <https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/APA/Historical-Essays/Exclusion-and-Empire/The-Philippines/>

⁴¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_Assembly

⁴²⁰ <https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/APA/Historical-Essays/Exclusion-and-Empire/The-Philippines/>

⁴²¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

established in 1907, allowing for an elected body of Filipino legislators, real power remained with American officials. Key administrative positions were held by Americans, and the U.S. had not only control over defense and foreign policy, but also the economy. Political liberties were absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present until 1906 and as ambiguous from 1907 onward. For the relevant regime period, 1900-1934 V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

09/16/1935 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]: The first national elections with male suffrage were held on 09/16/1935. But universal suffrage was absent until 1937 (LIED). According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, 1935-1941 V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

01/03/1942 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]: The only political party allowed during the occupation was the Japanese-organized Kalibapi.⁴²² On 10/14/1943 the Philippines were nominally declared independent. However, the occupation regime continued until 08/17/1945. For 1942-1944, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. LIED lists elections and male suffrage as absent. For the given period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent.

08/17/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]: After the occupation of Japan ended the Philippines were under the colonial rule of the USA again. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held and universal suffrage was granted. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on

⁴²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_occupation_of_the_Philippines

decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1945, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In 1945, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are present.

07/06/1946 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this day, the Philippines became independent. The 1935 constitution remained in effect. Elections were held under universal suffrage (including all ethnicities).⁴²³ On 04/23/1946 general elections were held. Manuel Roxas became the last President of the Commonwealth and the Republic's first. Furthermore, the Liberal Party secured victories in nine out of 16 senatorial seats. In the House of Representatives, the Liberals secured a majority by winning 50 seats, while the Nacionalistas and the Democratic Alliance only managed to secure 33 and six seats.⁴²⁴ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this period the country held competitive elections per LIED. For the first four years V-Dem's CEI indicates ambiguous cleanliness outcomes. From 1950 to 1953 the elections were not really clean. Between 1954 and 1969 ambiguous cleanliness is scored again. Since 1970, the elections are not really clean again. Regarding the overall elections' conditions, they were somewhat free and fair until 1948. For the following four years they switched to ambiguous scores. Between 1953 and 1968 the elections were somewhat free and fair. In 1969 they were ambiguous for one year before they were somewhat free and fair again in 1970 (V-Dem EF&FI). However, no political liberties were present for this time (LIED). Whereas V-Dem's PCLI scores somewhat political liberties. The constitutional structure is based on the model of the USA, it is a bicameral system consisting of the lower body, the House of Representatives, and the upper body the Senate (Manglapus 1959: 613).⁴²⁵ The political regime is characterized by a two-party system and the presidential term lasts four years, a second term is permitted (Choi 2001: 489). From 1946 to 1949, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Between 1950 and 1968, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. From 1969 to 1971, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints

⁴²³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

⁴²⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946_Philippine_presidential_election

⁴²⁵

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_of_the_Philippines#:~:text=The%20Congress%20of%20the%20Philippines%20\(Filipino%3A%20Kongreso%20ng%20Pilipinas\),an%20upper%20body%2C%20the%20Senate.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_of_the_Philippines#:~:text=The%20Congress%20of%20the%20Philippines%20(Filipino%3A%20Kongreso%20ng%20Pilipinas),an%20upper%20body%2C%20the%20Senate.)

during this time. For the year 1946, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1947 to 1970, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 1971, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

09/22/1972 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Personalist Autocracy: The declaration of martial law, on this date, was accompanied by decisive actions: Congress was shut down, and a wide array of individuals, including opposition leaders, journalists, members of Congress, student activists, and members of the Constitutional Convention, were arrested. These steps effectively dissolved the existing political opposition, consolidating power in the hands of President Marcos (Grossholtz 1973: 102, Ziehl 1986: 119-20, Seekins 1993, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 89). Two explicit justifications for the coup were „to save the republic“ (from various plots) and „to reform society“ (after the failure of American-style democracy).⁴²⁶ Since the congress was dissolved in this period and Marcos ruled by decree with almost unlimited power the precondition of a pure personalist regime is fulfilled. The martial law period under Marcos is noted for its human rights abuses, targeting political opponents, student activists, journalists, religious workers, and others who opposed his regime. The extent of these abuses included thousands of extrajudicial killings, documented tortures, disappearances, and incarcerations. In 1972 LIED records only the occurrence of executive elections but does not categorize them as multiparty. No legislative elections were held. From 1963 no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1972, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1973-1977, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the

⁴²⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martial_law_under_Ferdinand_Marcos

executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

04/07[&27]/1978 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: On these dates a fraudulent parliamentary election took place. From his prison cell, Aquino was allowed to take part in the elections. It was the first time Lakas ng Bayan („People's Power“) participated in elections. However, due to the fraud, the opposition party gained no seats in the parliament.⁴²⁷ On 01/17/1981 Marcos lifted martial law. On 06/16/1981 presidential elections were held which were boycotted by almost all opposition parties.⁴²⁸ Because parliamentary and presidential elections took place the regime has to be classified as an electoral autocracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Those elections are considered as not competitive (LIED). No cleanliness was scored (V-Dem CEI). The elections were not free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI. Per FH's evaluation from 1978 to 1983, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH, in 1984, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH, in 1985, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. Besides both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI confirmed that political liberties were absent for the whole time. However, in key aspects it was a continuation of the personalist autocracy of the previous period. Between 1978 and 1980, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. Since 1981, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. For 1978-1985, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

02/25/1986 End Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, Marcos resigned in response to a mutiny of officers and massive demonstrations protesting a stolen election. His resignation allowed the newly elected government to take office (Seekins 1993, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 89, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 53). The newly elected government under Corazon Aquino drafted the 1987 constitution, that limited presidential power and re-established the bicameral Congress.⁴²⁹ The 1992 presidential elections, conducted under the new constitution, were deemed the first held under regular and peaceful conditions

⁴²⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978_Philippine_parliamentary_election

⁴²⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Philippine_presidential_election_and_referendum

⁴²⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corazon_Aquino

since 1965.⁴³⁰ In June, the Philippines smoothly navigated a presidential transition from Aquino to Fidel Ramos. However, Ramos' victory, with just 23 percent of the vote amidst seven contenders and no run-off system, hardly provides him with a clear mandate. Starting in 1991 FH classified the Philippines as partly free (McColm 1993). On 01/20/2001 standing President Estrada was impeached for his involvement in a gambling scandal. In his trial, members of congress refused to examine a piece of evidence which led to mass anger and a rejection of the proceedings and president. The armed forces and police reassigned their loyalties to Vice President Arroyo and Estrada was ousted. Despite the shift from authoritarian rule in 1986, the Philippines grapples with inconsistent adherence to the rule of law, marked by a notable bias favoring political and economic elites. Oversight and accountability mechanisms within democratic institutions are either feeble or subject to subversion. Lingering violent insurgencies, persisting for decades, have diminished in recent years but remain a concern. Opposition politicians, particularly in recent years, face heightened harassment and politically motivated charges, impeding their ability to challenge incumbents amid an atmosphere of violence and restricted access to state resources for those outside of power.⁴³¹ The general election on 05/12/2025, featured the contested implementation of new automated voting technology from Miru Systems, raising significant concerns about electoral integrity and transparency.⁴³² LIED classified the Philippines between 1990 and 1998 as a polyarchy (equivalent to a liberal democracy). According to our observations this seems to be a misclassification. FH in accordance with our observations state that „the rule of law and application of justice are haphazard and heavily favor political and economic elites”. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1986 the country scored constant competitiveness for its elections (LIED). V-Dem's CEI indicates ambiguous cleanliness from 1988 to 2003. For six years, not really clean elections were stated. Since 2010 the outcomes turned back to ambiguous cleanliness. From 1987 to 1997 the elections were somewhat free and fair. In 1998 and for the next two years the overall conditions are classified as free and fair. Since 2001 somewhat freedom and fairness are achieved (V-Dem EF&FI). According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 in 1986 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. As per FH's classification in 1987, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. According to FH, in 1988

⁴³⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corazon_Aquino

⁴³¹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/philippines/freedom-world/2022>

⁴³² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Philippine_general_election

and 1989, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. Per FH, from 1990 to 1995, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. As per FH's classification from 1996 to 2004, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 from 2005 onward designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. In addition to that, LIED indicates that political liberties were present since 1990. V-Dem's PCLI indicates some changes for this time. In 1986 and since 2020 the political liberties are ambiguous. Between 1987 and 2004 and between 2010 and 2015 full political liberties are given. For the remaining years the outcomes score a somewhat presence. From 1987 to 1991, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. Since 1992, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. For 1986, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In 1987, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1988-1993, 1998 and for 2002-2017, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 1994-1997 and 1999-2001, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 2018 onward, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Over most of the time in this regime period the Philippines were a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Celoza 1997, Hutchcroft 1991, Thompson 1995, Thompson 1998, Brownlee 2008, Croissant 2002, Slater 2010)

Poland

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Russian Empire, Autocratic Monarchy Austria-Hungary, Constitutional Monarchy and German Empire, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 10/24/1795]: Prior to the partition of Poland in 1795, only the male nobility was allowed to take part in political life. The final partition of Poland took place on 10/24/1795.⁴³³ In the midst of World War I, on 01/14/1917, Berlin established the puppet „Kingdom of Poland”. This arrangement involved a governing Provisional Council of State and, commencing from 10/15/1917, a Regency Council (Rada Regencyjna Królestwa Polskiego). The Council administered the country under German auspices until the election of a king.⁴³⁴ LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Poland before 1918.

11/11/1918 End Part of Other Country [in this case: part of different countries, namely of Russia, Communist Ideocracy, Austria-Hungary, Constitutional Monarchy and Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Democratizing Regime: Poland regained its independence, after World War I, fixed in the Treaty of Versailles.⁴³⁵ Yet there were various regions of today's Poland that were not included. On 11/14/1918, Following its dissolution, the Council relinquished all authority to Józef Piłsudski, who assumed the role of Chief of State (Naczelnik Państwa). After consultation with Piłsudski, Daszyński's government disintegrated, making way for a new government led by Jędrzej Moraczewski.⁴³⁶ For 1918, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are comprehensive. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. In 1918, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present.

01/26/1919 End Democratizing Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, free and fair elections for a constituent assembly based on universal suffrage for men and women over 21 were held. The decree introducing universal suffrage was signed by Piłsudski on 11/28/1918, immediately after restoring the independent Polish state.⁴³⁷ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this democratic transition, the elections were competitive (LIED). V-Dem's CEI scores somewhat cleanliness since 1920. The overall election conditions

⁴³³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partitions_of_Poland

⁴³⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Polish_Republic

⁴³⁵ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Poland#Second_Polish_Republic_\(1918–1939\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Poland#Second_Polish_Republic_(1918–1939))

⁴³⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Polish_Republic

⁴³⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

are considered as somewhat free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. The March Constitution of 03/17/1921 was a critical milestone, formalizing parliamentary democracy with a bicameral legislature and limited presidential powers. The president, elected by parliament, had to nominate a prime minister and form a government with approval from the Sejm (lower house) and could only dissolve it with Senate (upper house) consent, illustrating strong institutional constraints. However, the parliamentary rule during this regime period does not seem to have been institutionalized effectively and the president, instead of the prime minister, had control over foreign affairs.⁴³⁸ Rights of minorities were established, and royal titles and state privileges banned (Bernhard 2005, Bernhard 1999).⁴³⁹ LIED considers political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were present. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, 1919-1925, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. The legislature was marked by continuous ineffectiveness, which gave rise to the opposition of the new democratic system and triggered Piłsudski's march on Warsaw.⁴⁴⁰

05/12[-14]/1926 End Defective Democracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: The regime change was the result of a military coup led by Józef Piłsudski and loyal factions within the armed forces against the constitutional government of President Stanisław Wojciechowski and Prime Minister Wincenty Witos.⁴⁴¹ Although Piłsudski held no formal military command at the time, the coup was executed through coordinated armed action by military units and resulted in the violent overthrow of the constitutional government. Despite lacking full support from the entire officer corps, the decisive role of the military actors makes this a military coup. The subsequent regime under Piłsudski was immediately established as a post-coup authority, reflecting the decisive role of military force despite resting on the loyalty only of parts of the military rather than the armed forces as a whole. The Sanation movement, which endorsed authoritarian rule, was built upon a group of individuals closely associated with Piłsudski.⁴⁴² It preached the primacy of the national interest in governance, and contended against the system

⁴³⁸ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Poland_R: 1, Poland_V: 1

⁴³⁹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/March_Constitution_\(Poland\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/March_Constitution_(Poland));

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Polish_Republic#:~:text=The%20Second%20Polish%20Republic%20was,the%20President%20having%20limited%20powers

⁴⁴⁰ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Poland_R: 1

⁴⁴¹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_Coup_\(Poland\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_Coup_(Poland))

⁴⁴² <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanation>

of parliamentary democracy. Following the coup, Piłsudski did not directly head the government but indirectly controlled the regime. In accordance with LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For 1926 and 1927, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties were somewhat present.

03/04/1928 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, parliamentary elections took place. Unlike subsequent elections during the Sanation period, opposition parties were allowed to campaign with minimal hindrances and succeeded in securing a significant number of seats.⁴⁴³ The Sanation government nullified the 05/1930 election results by dissolving the parliament in August. Under mounting pressure on the opposition, a new campaign was initiated, and new elections were scheduled for November. Taking advantage of the anti-government demonstrations as a pretext, 20 members of the opposition parties, including many leaders of the Centrolew alliance (comprising the Socialists, Polish People's Party „Piast“, and Polish People's Party „Wyzwolenie“), were arrested..⁴⁴⁴ Following Piłsudski's death in 1935, his regime retained control, and a compromise candidate, chosen between ruling factions, succeeded him (Lukowski/Zawadzki 2019, Casey et al. 2020, Rothschild 1966, Rothschild 1962, Rothschild 1963).⁴⁴⁵ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this regime period, LIED classifies the elections as not competitive. V-Dem's CEI indicates ambiguous cleanliness scores until 1929. Since 1930 elections were not really clean. According to V-Dem's EF&FI the overall election conditions were ambiguous until 1929. Since 1930, not really free and fair elections were held. according to LIED political liberties are still absent. V-Dem's PCLI declares them as somewhat present until 1929. Since 1930 the outcomes changed to an ambiguous presence. Until 1934, according to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Since 1935, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. For 1928-1934, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as

⁴⁴³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1928_Polish_legislative_election

⁴⁴⁴ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanation>

⁴⁴⁵ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_Coup_\(Poland\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_Coup_(Poland))

indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1935-1938, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

10/06/1939 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy and USSR, Communist (One-Party) Ideocracy]: On this date, the Germans established the General Government over the part of Poland which fell to Germany under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Poland had been invaded by Nazi Germany from the west on 09/01/1939 and the regime surrendered on 09/27/1939. This invasion was the Start of World War II. On 10/06/1939 the last Polish troops capitulated; the German-occupied area was partly annexed to Germany. During the German occupation, three million Polish Jews were murdered, half of all Jews murdered by the Nazi regime during the Holocaust.⁴⁴⁶ Part of the country was occupied from the east by the USSR. In June 1941 Germany took over the Soviet-occupied areas (Lukowski/Zawadzki 2019: 327 f.).⁴⁴⁷ On 01/17/1945 the Russian army, accompanied by the Polish First Army arrived in Warsaw.⁴⁴⁸ No elections were held during this period (LIED). LIED identifies political liberties as absent for this period. V-Dem does not provide data for Poland during the German occupation.

01/17/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right Wing (Fascist) Autocracy and USSR, Communist (One-Party) Ideocracy]/Start Communist Ideocracy: On this date, Soviet troops reached Warsaw and took over the city. On 12/31/1944, a provisional government had been established, a coalition of leftist parties controlled by the communist Polska Partia Robotnicza (Polish Worker's Party, PPR). The provisional government announced on this date governed a substantial part of Poland, from which the Soviets had driven German troops. It faced no serious domestic challenges because of the defeat in October 1944 of the Warsaw uprising led by the Home Army. We code this regime change event as a foreign-imposed regime change, specifically as an occupation rather than a liberation by foreign forces, since Soviet forces did not support the Warsaw Uprising but waited for its defeat in order to install a pro-Soviet government after the Nazi retreat.⁴⁴⁹ After the Home Army's defeat, Mikolajczyk, premier of the Polish government-in-exile in London, agreed to negotiate with the communists. When other members of the government-in-exile refused to support his compromise, he

⁴⁴⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Holocaust_in_Poland

⁴⁴⁷ <https://rulers.org/rulp2.html#poland>

⁴⁴⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Poland#Second_Polish_Republic_\(1918–1939\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Poland#Second_Polish_Republic_(1918–1939))

⁴⁴⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warsaw_Uprising

resigned from the government-in-exile. He joined the communist dominated coalition in 1945. Although non-communist leaders held some formally important positions in this and later governments, the communists held control. Through their control of the security forces and the Interior Ministry, they assured the repression and disorganization of more popular parties and won the 1947 election (Hiscocks 1963: 87-91, 101-6, Lukas 1982: 4-8, 20-28, 70-75, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 89). The communist regime in Poland ascended to power with the coercive apparatus being under Soviet control (Johnson 1981: 8, Naimark 2010: 178). Stalin covertly established the Polish National Liberation Committee (PKWN) by recruiting former Polish Communists residing in Moscow (Naimark 2010: 178). In Poland as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet military missions oversaw the reorganization of military forces, embedded commanders, advisers, and technicians within the armed forces and defense ministries and purged pre-communist officer corps (Johnson 1981: 2, 7-8). In the early 1950s, the defense minister, chief of the general staff, commander of the ground forces, heads of all service branches, and commanders of all four military districts were former Soviet officers (Johnson 1981: 08). Soviet troops remained in Poland throughout the entire communist regime's tenure (Barany 2016: 101). Throughout the history of the communist regime in Poland, there were riots against it. On 10/21/1956 the communist party denounced Ochab's handling of the riots and what they called his political opportunism. Gomulka was instated as party secretary. In the face of a stagnating post-war economy, Polish Communist leader Władysław Gomułka, the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), decided to end government subsidies for food and other everyday items in late 1970.⁴⁵⁰ On 12/14 to 12/19/1970 riots over wages were violently suppressed under Gomułka which led to the Communist party ousting him from leadership positions.⁴⁵¹ Edward Gierik became his successor. On 09/06/1980 a new round of price increase riots exacerbated by the formation of the Solidarity movement and prompted the communist party to remove the aging Gierik replacing him with Kania. By the beginning of 1981, Solidarity boasted a membership exceeding 10 million people, encompassing nearly 80% of the total workforce. In that year, Solidarity organized its inaugural national congress, during which Lech Walesa, a key figure in the union's establishment, was elected president.⁴⁵² On 10/12/1981 Kania was ousted from his position by the communist party under pressure from the USSR because of his inability to tackle Solidarity and for his anti-Soviet comments. General Wojciech Jaruzelski assumed power and

⁴⁵⁰ <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/polish-shipyard-workers-initiate-regime-change-1970-71>

⁴⁵¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970_Polish_protests

⁴⁵² <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/solidarno-solidarity-brings-down-communist-government-poland-1988-89>

declared martial law. The Military Council of National Salvation, a military junta, was established. It consisted of 21 members: fifteen generals, one admiral and five colonels.⁴⁵³ However, since the takeover of a general occurred in the framework of the communist regime it is not classified as a regime change (to a military autocracy). In the beginning of 1982, the Citizens' Committees of National Salvation were formed, composed mostly of PZPR members. In July 1982, they joined the newly formed Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth.⁴⁵⁴ According to LIED, only executive elections were held until 1946, but they were not categorized as multiparty. In 1947 multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted and from 1948 onward, both executive and legislative elections were held but they were not categorized as multiparty. Per FH, from 1972 to 1979, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH in 1980, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. As classified by FH from 1981 to 1986, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Per FH's evaluation from 1987 to 1988, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. From 1947 to 1980, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. In 1981 and 1982, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. From 1983 to 1988, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For 1944-1986, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1987 and 1988, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the given period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent and are not really present from 1980 and 1981 and since 1986.

06/18/1989 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: In 1989, negotiations dubbed the Roundtable Talks unfolded between the martial law government led by Wojciech Jaruzelski and the Solidarity opposition movement. These discussions yielded a transitional agreement, allocating two-thirds of parliamentary seats to the Communists and their allies. The remaining one-third of seats was subjected to competitive elections, resulting in a resounding victory for

⁴⁵³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_Council_of_National_Salvation

⁴⁵⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_Council_of_National_Salvation

Solidarity. Despite Communist predominance, the parliament in 06/1989 appointed Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a prominent figure in Solidarity, as the first non-communist to helm an Eastern European government since the late 1940s (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 53). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED considers the election as competitive. V-Dem's CEI scores ambiguous cleanliness. Moreover, the overall election conditions are ambiguous according to V-Dem's EF&FI. Per FH, in 1989, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. As per FH's classification in 1990, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Furthermore, in 1989 no political liberties were present according to LIED. But since 1990, LIED confirms their presence. V-Dem's PCLI scores somewhat political liberties in 1989. Since 1990, political liberties are given. In 1989 and 1990, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. For 1989, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1990, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. The end of communist rule occurred because some of the small parties that had historically been coopted into the communist led front, defected to join the opposition (Pease 1994, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 89).⁴⁵⁵ In January 1990 the Communist Polish United Workers' Party dissolved. Based on our observations our judgement differs from LIED and V-Dem. The elections of 1989 were clearly not democratic according to common standards.

10/27/1991 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date, free and fair parliamentary elections were held.⁴⁵⁶ Lech Walesa became the first elected president.⁴⁵⁷ In 1992, the „Little Constitution“ was adopted, establishing a parliamentary-presidential system and setting the groundwork for democratic governance. This interim constitution paved the way for the more comprehensive 1997 Constitution, which further solidified democratic institutions (Michta 1997). Poland's integration into Western political and economic structures was marked by its accession to NATO in 1999 and the European Union on 05/01/2004. These memberships reflected Poland's commitment to democratic values and international cooperation.⁴⁵⁸ Throughout this period, Poland worked on reforming its judiciary to align with EU standards,

⁴⁵⁵ <http://tinyurl.com/9zhlcdb>

⁴⁵⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Polish_parliamentary_election

⁴⁵⁷ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Poland#Third_Polish_Republic_\(1989–today\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Poland#Third_Polish_Republic_(1989–today))

⁴⁵⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Poland_\(1989%E2%80%93present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Poland_(1989%E2%80%93present))

ensuring judicial independence and adherence to the rule of law. These reforms were essential for consolidating democracy and were closely monitored by EU institutions. The political landscape during this period was dynamic, with shifts between left-wing and right-wing parties. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) governed in the early 2000s, followed by the conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS) winning the 2005 elections. In 2007, the centrist Civic Platform (PO) secured victory, with Donald Tusk becoming Prime Minister. When President Lech Aleksander Kaczyński died in a plane crash in 2010, the marshal of the Sejm, Bronisław Maria Komorowski, took over as acting president and was later elected president, underscoring the effectiveness of constitutional procedures.⁴⁵⁹ According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. For the relevant regime period, 1991-2015, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. For the given period, LIED identifies political liberties as present, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present. The country scored constant electoral competitiveness since 1991 per LIED. Elections were clean in this regime period per V-Dem's CEI. For the timeframe, the overall election conditions were free and fair per V-Dem's EF&FI.

12/22/2015 End Liberal Democracy/Start Defective Democracy: On 12/22/2015, the Law and Justice Party (PiS), having secured a parliamentary majority in the October 2015 elections⁴⁶⁰, passed the „Law on the Constitutional Tribunal,“ severely undermining judicial independence. This event marked the beginning of systematic autocratization, characterized by the deliberate dismantling of key liberal democratic checks and balances. Since the 2015 election won by PiS, politicians and government-affiliated entities have filed almost 200 lawsuits against independent media outlets and journalists.⁴⁶¹ Poland's electoral system and its execution have typically safeguarded free and fair elections. However, legislative modifications introduced in 2017/2018 have elevated the possibility of political influence over the National Electoral Commission (PKW), responsible for managing elections and overseeing party finances, including the authority to withhold state subsidies.⁴⁶² On 04/29/2020, the Commission launched an infringement procedure on the law of 12/20/2019 amending a series of legislative acts governing the functioning of the justice system in Poland.⁴⁶³ On 03/31/2021, the Commission decided to refer Poland to the Court of Justice and asked for the interim measures. On

⁴⁵⁹ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Poland_R: 3

⁴⁶⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Polish_parliamentary_election

⁴⁶¹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/poland/freedom-world/2022>

⁴⁶² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/poland/freedom-world/2022>

⁴⁶³ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_772

07/14/2021, the Court of Justice imposed interim measures on Poland, related to the functioning of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court in Poland, granting the request of the Commission on all points.⁴⁶⁴ The 2016-2018 made reforms of the Polish judiciary are described as drastically weakening the judiciary's independence.⁴⁶⁵ While there has been a decline in democratic quality and Poland was moving in the direction of a defective democracy it fulfilled in a comparative perspective still the criteria of a democracy.⁴⁶⁶ On 10/15/2023 Poland held parliamentary elections, which the OSCE characterized as free and competitive. While voters were given political alternatives, the ruling party PiS enjoyed a disproportionate competitive advantage through its influence over public media and the use of state resources, creating an uneven playing field. Freedom of assembly and association were respected during the election. Voter turnout was high, with approximately 74%.⁴⁶⁷ While the PiS won the most seats with 34.4%, the Civic Coalition under Donald Tusk formed a coalition with The Left and the Third Way Party to take power from the PiS, with a combined seat count of more than 50%. While judiciary independence is still in question, election-related cases were handled by the highest court with transparency.⁴⁶⁸ After two months of waiting, President Duda swore in Donald Tusk as Prime Minister in a peaceful transition of power. Donald Tusk and the President entered a constitutional dispute after Duda pardoned two right-wing lawmakers. Duda has threatened the use of his power of veto to impede Tusks efforts of reform, putting Poland's semi-presidential system to the test.⁴⁶⁹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections were competitive following LIED. Moreover, the elections were clean until 2019. Since 2020 somewhat cleanliness is scored (V-Dem's CEI). V-Dem's EF&FI underlines the presence of free and fair elections until 2018. Since 2019, according to V-Dem's CEI, the overall electoral conditions can be interpreted as somewhat free and fair. According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Additionally, political liberties were present until 2016. Since 2017, LIED considers them as absent. V-Dem's PCLI scores full liberties until 2016. Since 2017, the scores changed to somewhat present. In 1991, according to Polity5, the

⁴⁶⁴ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_4587

⁴⁶⁵ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/poland-judicial-independence-remains-at-risk-according-to-new-report-from-greco#>

⁴⁶⁶ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/poland/freedom-world/2022>

⁴⁶⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Polish_parliamentary_election

⁴⁶⁸ <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/poland/555072>

⁴⁶⁹ <https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-police-arrest-mps-andrzej-duda-donald-tusk-mariusz-kaminski-maciej-wasik/>

executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. Until 1994, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. Since 1995, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For 2016-2018, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. From 2019 to 2022, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Bernhard 2005, Dziewanowski 1977, Materska-Sosnowska 2010, Roos 1964)

Portugal

01/01/1900 Constitutional Monarchy [Start: 12/01/1640]: Portugal has been a ruling monarchy since 10/05/1143 when it formed as a country. From 1821 onwards, it was a constitutional monarchy.⁴⁷⁰ The House of Braganza began its reign over Portugal on 12/01/1640, when John IV was proclaimed King of Portugal. The discontent Portuguese nobility, tired of the policies and taxation under the Spanish Habsburgs, rallied behind John, who had a claim to the throne through his ancestry. This day is known as Restoration of Independence Day in Portugal, marking the end of 60 years of the Iberian Union under Spanish rule. The last dynastic regime in Portugal before 07/01/1900, was the House of Braganza-Saxe-Coburg and Gotha. The exact start date for this lineage within the House of Braganza was 09/16/1837, with the accession of Queen Maria II and King Ferdinand II as king consort after the period of civil wars known as the Liberal Wars in Portugal.⁴⁷¹ However, there was no regime change in 1837 and it was de facto a continuation of the rule of the House of Braganza. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held until 1906. From 1900 to 1906, as per Polity5's classification,

⁴⁷⁰ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Portugal/Overseas-empire>

⁴⁷¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Braganza-Saxe-Coburg_and_Gotha

the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the given timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

05/08/1907 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start Autocratic Monarchy: On this date, prime minister João Franco exercised dictatorial power for the first time, ruling by decree without parliamentary approval. In response, dissidents from the Progressive Party formed an alliance with the Republicans. By early January 1908, several Republican Party leaders and Progressive Party dissidents were arrested and convicted for allegedly plotting a coup d'état. Franco requested and obtained a decree from the king authorizing the deportation of Republican insurgents to the overseas colonies. On 02/01/1908, King Carlos I of Portugal and his heir, Luís Filipe, were assassinated in Lisbon's Praça do Comércio. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED no multiparty executive or legislative elections were conducted in 1907. In 1907, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

04/05/1908 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Constitutional Monarchy: On this date, parliamentary elections took place. The Regeneration Party secured the most seats in Parliament, winning a total of 62.⁴⁷² From 1908 onward only multiparty legislative elections were held again during this period. In 1908 and 1909, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is categorized by us as ambiguous regarding the state of political liberties, indicating an intermediate state between present and absent.

⁴⁷² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1908_Portuguese_legislative_election

10/05/1910 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start Non-electoral Transitional Regime: The revolution on this date led to the deposition of King Manuel II and the change from a ruling monarchy to a non-electoral transitional regime.⁴⁷³ For the relevant regime period, 1910 and 1911, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. In 1910, LIED still identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. The regime is a borderline case between a democratizing regime and a non-electoral transitional regime.

05/28/1911 End Non-electoral Transitional Regime/Start (Male) Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date elections to a constituent assembly took place.⁴⁷⁴ However, only adult males had the right to vote.⁴⁷⁵ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Elections were not competitive according to LIED and according to V-Dem's CEI they were not really clean. In 1911 and 1912 the overall election conditions were ambiguous. From 1913 to 1914 the elections are classified as somewhat free and fair before they turn back to ambiguous for the remaining regime period (V-Dem EF&FI). Moreover, LIED underlines the absence of political liberties for this time. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI indicates an ambiguous presence of political liberties. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For 1912-1916, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. Teófilo Braga was provisional president of the new republic. After Manuel José de Arriaga had been elected new president, Braga retired from his office. Arriaga was president from 08/24/1911 to 05/29/1915.⁴⁷⁶ According to our observations Portugal in this period does not fulfill our criteria for a democracy and is classified as an electoral hybrid regime.

12/08/1917 End (Male) Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date Sidónio Pais overthrew the government of Afonso Costa in a military coup (Birmingham 2018: 155-56, Casey et al. 2020: 15). For 1917, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as

⁴⁷³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5_October_1910_revolution

⁴⁷⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1911_Portuguese_Constituent_National_Assembly_election

⁴⁷⁵ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Portugal/The-First-Republic-1910-26>

⁴⁷⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manuel_de_Arriaga

indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. In 1917, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is categorized by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

04/28/1918 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, parliamentary elections took place, which were boycotted by major political parties, including the Democratic Party, the Evolutionist Party, and the Republican Union, which had dominated the 1915 elections. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections are considered as not competitive (LIED). V-Dem's CEI scores not really cleanliness outcomes. Moreover, the overall election conditions were ambiguous (V-Dem EF&FI). Besides, according to LIED no political liberties were present. V-Dem's PCLI still considers their presence as ambiguous. Consequently, the National Republican Party, led by Pais, secured the majority of seats in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. For 1918, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

12/14/1918 End Electoral Autocracy/Start (Male) Electoral Hybrid Regime: Pais was assassinated on this date and Portugal saw in the views of many observers a return to some kind of democracy (Birmingham 2018: 156, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 90, Casey et al. 2020: 15). As the assassination of Pais occurred in a wider context of political unrest and strikes, we code this regime change event as a popular uprising, as it caused the collapse of the Pais-Regime, and consider the subsequent election as a resulting event.⁴⁷⁷ Just two days later, on 12/16/1918, presidential elections were held. João do Canto e Castro was elected as President, succeeding the late Sidónio Pais. These elections were conducted by the Congress of the Republic, following the 1911 constitution, rather than through a direct popular vote. The election had to be repeated as the first round did not meet the required quorum. João do Canto e Castro won with an overwhelming majority of 99.28% of the votes. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED views the elections as not competitive for the entire time. V-Dem's CEI indicates that the elections in 1918 were not really clean and not clean in

⁴⁷⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sid%C3%B3nio_Pais

1919. Since 1920, V-Dem's CEI indicates not really cleanliness outcomes. The overall election conditions are considered as ambiguous at this time by V-Dem's EF&FI. Furthermore, regarding the political liberties, LIED declares their absence. Between 1918 and 1919 ambiguous political liberties were given. Since 1920, somewhat political liberties are achieved (V-Dem PCLI). Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. From 1919 to 1925, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. Again, the regime in this period is a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

05/28/1926 End (Male) Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup of nationalist origin led by General Gomes da Costa overthrew the unstable electoral hybrid regime (Opello 1991: 57). António Óscar de Fragoso Carmona, who had been the Minister for Foreign Affairs between 06/03-06, was the leader of the most conservative and authoritarian wing of the military regime, which considered the more moderate Gomes da Costa a liability.

07/09/1926 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Carmona led a counter coup together with general João José Sinel de Cordes. He named himself president and immediately assumed dictatorial powers. The period is known as Ditadura Militar.⁴⁷⁸ Restricted female suffrage was first allowed in 1931; it was further extended in 1933.⁴⁷⁹ In 1928, Carmona appointed António de Oliveira Salazar as Minister of Finance. Impressed by Salazar's charisma and qualities, Carmona nominated Salazar as Prime Minister in 1932 and largely turned over control of the government to him.⁴⁸⁰ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Since 1930, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. For 1926, V-Dem's JCE is classified as moderate, indicating occasional judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1927 to 1931, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1932, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as

⁴⁷⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ditadura_Nacional

⁴⁷⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

⁴⁸⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%93scar_Carmona

indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the given timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent.

03/19/1933 End Military Autocracy/Start Right-Wing (Corporatist) Autocracy: On this date the corporatist constitution was approved in a referendum. The regime was renamed Estado Novo (New State).⁴⁸¹ António de Oliveira Salazar served as prime minister until 1968. Salazar was followed as prime minister by Marcello Caetano. The regime can be characterized as a right-leaning corporatist government. While the ruling elite from 1926 to 1974 remained largely the same, a new regime is coded for the period following 1933. The ideology of the Estado Novo was based on an interpretation of the Catholic social doctrine similar to the regime of Engelbert Dollfuss in Austria.⁴⁸² Salazar created the National Union as a de facto single-party, while it was officially a non-party organization. The National Union was set up to control and restrain public opinion rather than to mobilize it (Costa 1995).⁴⁸³ The National Union functioned more as a political extension of the government rather than exerting direct control over it. The National Union membership was mostly drawn from local notables: landowners, professionals and businessmen, Catholics, monarchists or conservative republicans.⁴⁸⁴ The regime was not entirely dependent on Salazar's personal charisma. It also had a strong institutional basis. Salazar was willing to share power with other members of the regime, such as his close associate Marcelo Caetano. There was also no specific personality cult. We classify Portugal in this period as a right-wing (Corporatist) autocracy. In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held in 1933. In 1934 only executive elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty and from 1935 onward, multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1933-1973, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties were absent.

⁴⁸¹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estado_Novo_\(Portugal\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estado_Novo_(Portugal))

⁴⁸² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

⁴⁸³ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estado_Novo_\(Portugal\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estado_Novo_(Portugal))

⁴⁸⁴ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Union_\(Portugal\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Union_(Portugal))

04/25/1974 End Right-Wing (Corporatist) Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A rebel armed forces group overthrew the Caetano government due to concerns over the economic conditions and the status of the ongoing colonial wars. The junta was established with the intention of returning the government to a democracy. The event is called the Carnation Revolution (Portuguese: Revolução dos Cravos) or 04/25.⁴⁸⁵ The coup was coupled with a popular civil resistance campaign against the Caetano government (Opello 1991: 84-86, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 90).⁴⁸⁶ We categorize the regime change event as a military coup because the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), composed of mid-ranking officers, coordinated the overthrow of the Caetano regime by seizing key institutions and forcing the government to surrender within a single day. Although civilian demonstrations emerged in support of the military action, the regime change was initiated, organized, and executed by military actors, making the military coup the decisive mechanism (Graham 1975). On 09/30/1974 Spínola was forced into resigning by the leftist officers in the junta after an attempted coup. Gomes became chairman. On 03/11/1975 the country saw a failed right-wing coup d'état and on 09/25/1975 a failed left-wing coup d'état. In 1975, Portugal granted independence to its African overseas territories.⁴⁸⁷ For the year 1974, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to FH until 1975, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. In 1974, LIED still identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties are somewhat present.

04/25/1975 End Military Autocracy/Start Liberal Democracy: Exactly one year after the Carnation Revolution the first free and fair elections (for a Constituent Assembly) since 1925 took place. Since then, Portugal is a stable parliamentary democracy with „regular transfers of power between political parties”.⁴⁸⁸ On 04/25/1976 a legislative election was held, and the Socialist leader Mario Soares was appointed Prime Minister.⁴⁸⁹ Portugal has a semi-presidential system of government with a unicameral parliament.⁴⁹⁰ The president is considered the effective leader. The office has been held by members of the Party of Democratic Renovation (PRD), the

⁴⁸⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carnation_Revolution

⁴⁸⁶ <http://tinyurl.com/8buumze>

⁴⁸⁷ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Portugal#The_Third_Republic_\(1974–present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Portugal#The_Third_Republic_(1974–present))

⁴⁸⁸ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/portugal>

⁴⁸⁹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Portugal#The_Third_Republic_\(1974–present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Portugal#The_Third_Republic_(1974–present))

⁴⁹⁰ [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI\(2021\)659378](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2021)659378)

Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Democrat Party (PSD) in that order.⁴⁹¹ The political landscape in Portugal is characterized by a multiparty system with parties acting freely and competitively. Elections are generally deemed free and credible. All citizens are treated equally by the constitution, but problems concerning corruption and discrimination persist. Freedom of religion, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly are upheld. On 01/30/2022 legislative elections were held, the ruling Socialist Party secured an absolute majority with 120 seats, while the center-right opposition Social Democratic Party (PSD) came in second with 77 seats. Chega gained traction, securing twelve seats, a significant increase from the 1 seat it held in the previous parliament. Liberal Initiative secured eight seats, Left Bloc (BE) obtained five seats, the leftist and green Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU) won six seats, and both the People-Animals-Nature (PAN) party and the leftist and green Livre secured 1 seat each.⁴⁹² Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED affirms that competitive elections were held since 1976. The first three years after the military autocracy, V-Dem's CEI scored somewhat electoral cleanliness. Since 1980, constant clean elections are given. Moreover, the overall election conditions are classified as somewhat free and fair. Since 1983, freedom and fairness are achieved (V-Dem's EF&FI). As per FH's, from 1976 onward, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. In addition to that, ever since 1975 both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI underlines that Portugal guarantees constant political liberties. From 1976 to 1981, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. Since 1982, according to Polity5, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. From 1975 onward, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (da Fonseca 2009, Graham 1975, Graham/Makler 1979, Hersvik/Larsen 2003, Livermore 1976, Martins 1969, Payne 2002, Robinson 1979, Schmitter 1980, Tavares de Almeida 2010, Veser 1999)

⁴⁹¹ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Portugal_V: 2, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_Portugal

⁴⁹² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/portugal/freedom-world/2023>

Puerto Rico

01/01/1900 (de facto) Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 04/11/1899]: On 07/25/1898, during the Spanish-American War, the U.S. invaded Puerto Rico. Following the U.S. victory, Spain ceded Puerto Rico, along with the Philippines and Guam, to the U.S. under the Treaty of Paris, effective from 04/11/1899.⁴⁹³ In the initial decades of the 20th century, Puerto Rico was under the governance of the U.S. military, and key positions, including the governor, were appointed by the President of the United States. The Foraker Act of 1900 introduced a level of civilian popular government in Puerto Rico, establishing a popularly elected House of Representatives. However, the upper house and the governor continued to be appointed by the United States. In 1914, the Puerto Rican House of Delegates unanimously supported independence from the United States. However, the U.S. Congress rejected this move, deeming it „unconstitutional“ and in violation of the 1900 Foraker Act.⁴⁹⁴ In 1917, the Jones–Shafroth Act, commonly referred to as the Jones Act, was enacted by the U.S. Congress. This legislation conferred U.S. citizenship upon Puerto Ricans born on or after 04/25/1898. The Jones Act also established a popularly elected Senate to form a bicameral legislative assembly and outlined a bill of rights. Additionally, it permitted the popular election of the Resident Commissioner for a four-year term.⁴⁹⁵ On 05/21/1948, a bill was proposed in the Puerto Rican Senate aiming to restrict the rights of the independence and Nationalist movements on the island. This legislation criminalized activities such as printing, publishing, selling, or exhibiting materials intended to undermine or destroy the insular government. It also prohibited the organization of any society, group, or assembly with similar destructive intent. The law was repealed in 1957. Following the November 1948 election, Luis Muñoz Marín became Puerto Rico's first governor to be popularly elected, succeeding the U.S.-appointed Piñero on 01/02/1949.⁴⁹⁶ In 1950, the U.S. Congress granted Puerto Ricans the right to organize a constitutional convention, subject to a referendum. The referendum, held in 1951, supported the creation of their own government under a constitution. The commonwealth status, defined as a 'permanent association with a federal union,' was chosen in the referendum. A second referendum ratified the constitution in 1952, establishing Puerto Rico as an Estado Libre Asociado (Associated Free State) or Commonwealth. In 1967, the Legislative Assembly

⁴⁹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puerto_Rico#History

⁴⁹⁴ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puerto_Rico#American_territory_\(1898%E2%80%93present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puerto_Rico#American_territory_(1898%E2%80%93present))

⁴⁹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puerto_Rico#U.S._citizenship_and_Puerto_Rican_citizenship

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puerto_Rico#U.S._unincorporated_organized_territory_with_commonwealth_constitution

conducted the first plebiscite, offering three political status options. The Commonwealth option, endorsed by the PPD, won with 60.4% of the votes. Efforts to address the status issue in the 1970s and 1993 upheld the Commonwealth status. In the 1998 plebiscite, none of the options gained majority support, with the „none of the above“ option prevailing, maintaining the commonwealth status quo by default.⁴⁹⁷ In comparison to other U.S. territories like Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, or American Samoa, Puerto Rico has greater autonomy over its internal affairs. While Puerto Rico holds a level of authority over its internal matters similar to that of an American state, it lacks the sovereignty enjoyed by a state in the Union. Being a possession of the United States, Puerto Rico does not benefit from the same constitutional protections granted to states.⁴⁹⁸ Residents of Puerto Rico who are U.S. citizens are not eligible to cast votes in U.S. presidential elections. However, both major political parties, Republicans and Democrats, conduct primary elections in Puerto Rico to select delegates responsible for voting on the parties' presidential candidates.⁴⁹⁹ As per FH's classification for 1972-2015, the territory is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. After 2015, FH no longer lists Puerto Rico. Neither LIED nor V-Dem provide any data for Puerto Rico.

Indirect Rule Colonial Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Qatar

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [Start: 09/12/1868]: On 09/12/1868 Muhammad ibn Thani signed a treaty with the British, effectively establishing Qatar (previously considered to be a dependency of Bahrain) as an independent state (Brewer et al. 2007). The treaty included that the Al-Thani family was recognized as the ruler of the Qatar peninsula (Tok/Alkhater/Pal 2016). For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For this timeframe political liberties were absent per LIED and V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent.

11/03/1916 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom (Electoral Oligarchy)]: On 11/03/1916 Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim Al-Thani signed a protectorate

⁴⁹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Puerto_Rico#Political_status

⁴⁹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Puerto_Rico#Implications_of_the_current_political_status

⁴⁹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puerto_Rico#Government

agreement with the British (Tok/Alkhater/Pal 2016). In exchange for military protection, Qatar relinquished autonomy in foreign affairs (Stasz et al. 2007). For 1916-1970, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

09/03/1971 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as independent country]: On 09/03/1971 Qatar regained full independence. On 02/22/1972 Hamad overthrew the Emir, his cousin, and ascended to the throne. On 06/27/1995 concerns over political repression in the ruling family allowed Khalifa at Thani to overthrow his relative Hamad. The hereditary emir of Qatar holds complete executive and legislative authority and exercises control over the judiciary. After consulting with the ruling family and other notable figures, the emir appoints the prime minister, cabinet, and selects an heir-apparent. In 2013, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani abdicated as emir, passing the reins of power to his fourth-born son, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. Subsequently, in 01/2020, Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifa al-Thani assumed the roles of prime minister and interior minister, succeeding Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser al-Thani, a fellow member of the ruling family.⁵⁰⁰ Political parties are prohibited, and the sole elections are for an advisory municipal council. Despite Qatari citizens being among the wealthiest globally, most of the population comprises noncitizens who lack political rights, have limited civil liberties, and face restricted economic opportunities. After years of delay, the emir announced in November 2020 that elections for two-thirds of the body's seats would take place in October 2021. The Constitution of 2003 stipulated that 30 of the 45 seats on the Advisory Council should be filled through elections every four years, with the emir appointing the other 15 members. Though official turnout for the election was 63.5 percent, in July 2021 Tamim signed a law restricting the voter franchise to native Qataris, whose families had settled in Qatar before 1930. The exact number of citizens denied voting rights due to the law is unclear. After public outcry and some small-scale protests, Emir Tamin supported amending the law to include all citizens for future elections. Nonpartisan elections for the 29-member Central Municipal Council, tasked with advising the minister for municipal affairs, have been conducted since 1999. Council members serve four-year terms. Municipal elections are open for active and passive participation for men and women since 1999.⁵⁰¹ The current electoral laws apply to elections for both the Central Municipal Council and the Advisory Council. Qatari citizens aged 18 and older, who can demonstrate that their male ancestors were settled in Qatar before 1930, are

⁵⁰⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/qatar/freedom-world/2023>

⁵⁰¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

eligible to vote, except for those serving in the military or employed by the Interior Ministry.⁵⁰² In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1971 to 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 2019 onward, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Per FH, from 1972 to 1975, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH from 1976 to 1988, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. As classified by FH from 1989 onward, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. For the entire period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent.

Autocratic Monarchy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Herb 1999, Herb 2003, Herb 2004)

Réunion

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: xx/xx/1642]: Initially uninhabited, Réunion was explored by Portuguese navigators in the early 1500s. In 1642, the island was officially claimed by the French.⁵⁰³ It saw settlement in the mid-1600s when the French East India Company created a stopover for ships traveling to India via the Cape of Good Hope. Enslaved Africans were introduced to work in coffee and later sugar plantations. In 1848, following the abolition of slavery, indentured laborers from mainland Southeast Asia, India, and Eastern Africa were brought to the island. Réunion remained under French colonial rule until 1946.⁵⁰⁴ LIED does not provide any data for Réunion's colonial period.

⁵⁰² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/qatar/freedom-world/2023>

⁵⁰³ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%A9union#History>

⁵⁰⁴ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Reunion#ref6135>

03/19/1946 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Part of Other Country [France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, Réunion became an overseas department of France.⁵⁰⁵ Réunion is classified as an overseas department and region of France (referred to in French as a *département et région d'Outre-mer* or DROM). It operates under the jurisdiction of Article 73 of the French Constitution, ensuring that laws and regulations are universally applicable, similar to those in metropolitan France.⁵⁰⁶ FH, LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Réunion. Due to the legal equality of the overseas territory with the regions of mainland France, as well as its representation in the French Parliament and in the European Union, Réunion can be regarded as a part of France.

Part of Other Country [France, Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Romania

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [Start: 03/25/1881]: On 01/24/1859 the Autonomous Principality of Romania was founded. In 1866 Romania became a kingdom and achieved independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. Romania reached international recognition of on 07/13/1878 by the Treaty of Berlin. On 03/25/1881 the Kingdom of Romania was established formally as a constitutional monarchy, although we classify the regime as an autocratic monarchy, resulting from insufficient constraints on the executive branch. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In accordance with LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were somewhat present.

11/23/1916 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]: On this date Mackensen's elite troops crossed the Danube at two points close to Svishtov.⁵⁰⁷ By early 1917, the Romanian army was defeated, and three-quarters of the country were occupied by German and Austro-Hungarian forces.⁵⁰⁸ According to LIED

⁵⁰⁵ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%A9union#History>

⁵⁰⁶ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%A9union#Politics>

⁵⁰⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romania_in_World_War_I

⁵⁰⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romania#World_Wars_and_Greater_Romania

multiparty legislative elections were held. However, they were not competitive (LIED). According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties were somewhat present.

11/12/1918 End Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Constitutional Monarchy: On 11/11/1918, a day before Germany surrendered, King Ferdinand mobilized the Romanian army once more to support the Entente Powers.⁵⁰⁹ Universal suffrage for men was established by Royal Decree in November 1918, the first elections based on universal suffrage took place in November 1919.⁵¹⁰ According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during the year 1918. In 1919 multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted. Between the period from 1920 to 1927 only multiparty legislative elections were held again. Thereafter in 1928 and 1929 multiparty executive and legislative elections were present. From 1930 onward, only multiparty legislative elections were held once again during this period. No executive elections were present. Literate women were given the right to vote in the local elections in 1929. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, 1918-1937 V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. LIED still identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were somewhat present.

02/10/1938 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start Autocratic Monarchy: King Carol II organized a self-coup in which the constitution was suspended, martial law was proclaimed and in which he seized emergency powers.⁵¹¹ The electoral law of 1939 extended the active voting rights to all literate citizens which were 30 years old or older. However, this was meaningless, since he established a dictatorship, which abolished the parliamentary system, dismissed the government, and banned political parties (Hitchins 2014: 168, 174, Casey et al. 2020: 15). The 1938 Constitution of Romania was the fundamental law of Romania from the time of its

⁵⁰⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romania#World_Wars_and_Greater_Romania

⁵¹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

⁵¹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carol_II_of_Romania#The_1937_election_and_the_Goga_government

adoption until 1940. It formed the legal basis for the royal dictatorship of King Carol II.⁵¹² The constitution was severely authoritarian and corporatist in nature. It codified Carol's emergency powers, turning his reign into a legal dictatorship. It abandoned the principle of separation of powers in favor of royal supremacy.⁵¹³ The king exercised legislative power through a Parliament elected according to corporatist principles. He exercised executive power through a government that he appointed and dismissed without parliamentary involvement. He could dissolve Parliament at any time and rule by decree, and was the sole person empowered to amend the Constitution.⁵¹⁴ According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held in 1938. During 1939 only legislative elections were conducted but they were not categorized as multiparty. No executive elections were present. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For 1938 and 1939, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

09/14/1940 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy: After signing in 1940 lopsided treaties with Nazi Germany that resulted in the loss of large Romanian territories, Carol appointed General Antonescu as the new leader. General Antonescu quickly consolidated power and forced Carol to abdicate. After this, Antonescu became the leader of Romania and formed a coalition with the fascist Iron Guard. He eliminated political parties and repressed political opponents (Hitchins 2014: 204-5, 208, Casey et al. 2020: 16). The so-called National Legionary State was declared on 09/14/1940 by Michael I, son of Carol II, the former acting under the pressure of Antonescu.⁵¹⁵ Several antisemitic decrees were enacted by the National Legionary State. Jewish-owned rural property was expropriated on 10/04 October, followed by forests on 11/17, and finally by river transport on 12/04. On 01/02/1941, the Iron Guard attempted a coup, combined with a pogrom against the Jews of Bucharest.⁵¹⁶ Within four days, Antonescu successfully suppressed the coup. The Iron Guard was forced out of the government. After the Legionary Rebellion, more than 9,000 individuals were implicated and later apprehended. Out of this number, precisely 1,842 individuals received sentences of varying lengths, spanning from a few months to life imprisonment.⁵¹⁷ German officials, under the

⁵¹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1938_Constitution_of_Romania

⁵¹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1938_Constitution_of_Romania

⁵¹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1938_Constitution_of_Romania

⁵¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Legionary_State#History

⁵¹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Legionary_State

⁵¹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Legionary_State

directives of Hitler, including the newly appointed Ambassador Manfred Freiherr von Killinger, assisted Antonescu in eliminating the Iron Guardists.⁵¹⁸ While the so-called National Legionary State dissolved on 02/14/1941 the fascist dictatorship continued under Antonescu. Antonescu completely accepted Hitler's ideas about Operation Barbarossa as a „race war“ between the Aryans, represented by the Nordic Germans and Latin Romanians on the Axis side vs. the Slavs and Asians, commanded by the Jews on the Soviet side.⁵¹⁹ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For the given period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For 1940-1943, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

08/23/1944 End Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy/Start Autocratic Monarchy: Ion Antonescu was overthrown by Michael I with the support of several political parties so Michael could join the Allies in the Second World War and stop supporting the Axis.⁵²⁰ In August 1944, during a Soviet offensive into Romania, King Mihai ordered the arrest of Antonescu and appointed General Constantin Sănătescu as prime minister. Sănătescu formed a new government and sought peace with the Allied Powers (Hitchins 2014: 214-218, Casey et al. 2020: 16).⁵²¹

09/12/1944 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: Shortly after, Romania formally joined the Allied effort as Soviet troops entered Romania. The Red Army occupied most of Romania as enemy territory prior to the signing of the Moscow Armistice of 09/12/1944. On 03/06/1944 the Soviets forced King Michael to appoint Petru Groza, a communist sympathizer, as prime minister. He in turn appointed a communist dominated coalition government and a communist commander of the armed forces. With control over the police, military, judiciary, communication, propaganda, and public works, the communists consolidated their political power for the following three years. King Michael was forced to abdicate by the leader of the communist party on 12/31/1947 (Hitchins 2014: 219, Van Dyke 1947: 373-78, Sudetic 1990, Tismaneanu 2003: 90-95, Casey et al. 2020: 16, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 90). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1945. In 1946, multiparty executive and legislative

⁵¹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ion_Antonescu

⁵¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ion_Antonescu

⁵²⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1944_Romanian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

⁵²¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constantin_S%C4%83n%C4%83tescu

elections were held during this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1944-1946, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. LIED still identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties were not really present.

02/10/1947 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Communist Ideocracy: On this date, the Paris Peace Treaty between Romania and the Soviet Union was signed, formally ending the Soviet Union's occupation regime. The treaty officially terminated the state of war between Romania and the Allied Powers. However, Soviet troops did not fully leave Romanian territory; they remained in the country pursuant to Article 21 of the treaty, which permitted continued Soviet military presence to maintain lines of communication with Soviet forces in Austria. At this point, the Romanian Communist Party had already gained considerable political power, although the complete consolidation of communist rule was not achieved until King Michael's forced abdication in December 1947 and the subsequent months. There could be no question of negotiations between equal actors; the massive power asymmetry left Romania no genuine room for negotiation. The treaty was concluded under clear Soviet pressure, it nonetheless established a formal, legal framework under international law for the transition from direct occupation regime to a communist ideocracy with continued Soviet military presence. In the Va-PoReg classification logic, this event is coded as a negotiated transition, as the formal termination of the occupation regime was regulated through an international treaty, notwithstanding the fact that the power asymmetry precluded any substantial Romanian bargaining position. On 12/31/1947 King Michael was forced to abdicate at gun point by the leader of the communist party. As a result, the party secretary gained additional powers. The universal suffrage was granted by the 1948 Constitution of Romania.⁵²² In accordance with LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, 1947-1989, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

⁵²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. For the entire communist period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. Ceaușescu's rule from 1965 onward intensified the autocratic features of the communist regime. As Gelius (2013) emphasizes, Ceaușescu established a highly centralized personalist regime in which all key institutions—including the legislature, judiciary, and party—were subordinated to his authority. Political pluralism was eliminated, dissent suppressed, and a cult of personality institutionalized. The Securitate secret police played a central role in controlling the population and silencing opposition. The regime relied heavily on ideological indoctrination, show trials, and repression to maintain control. This form of rule reflected the ideal type of a communist ideocracy: the leadership claimed ideological legitimacy, enforced orthodoxy, and permitted no institutional constraints or autonomous spheres.

12/22/1989 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: In March 1989, an open letter to President Nicolae Ceaușescu, authored by six notable figures from the Romanian Communist Party (PCR), was published. This letter openly challenged Ceaușescu, criticizing his approach to governance and the economic strategies he had implemented.⁵²³ In December after a period of extreme austerity, ethnic tensions rose and became anti-government, which led to a campaign of violent repression, the riots grew and attracted support of the military. On 12/22/1989, in reaction to a popular uprising, Ceausescu and his wife escaped the capital. Following a brief military show trial, they were executed by firing squad on 12/25/1989 (Bachman 2006, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 90).⁵²⁴ Roman became the effective leader as prime minister (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 54). During the uprisings, the political organization National Salvation Front took over the governing part and soon became a political party.⁵²⁵ Roman was forced to resign on 10/01/1991 due to protests and was succeeded by Theodor Stolojan who led a caretaker government and negotiated the new constitution and organized the subsequent general elections.⁵²⁶ According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties were somewhat present. For the relevant

⁵²³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letter_of_the_Six

⁵²⁴ <http://tinyurl.com/965e5ty>

⁵²⁵ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Salvation_Front_\(Romania\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Salvation_Front_(Romania))

⁵²⁶ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Romania_R: 2

regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

05/20/1990 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date general elections were held. Ion Iliescu became president. In the elections, the NSF secured a significant victory, partly due to its media dominance and the opposition's inability to organize a strong effort. The opposing side comprised revamped National Peasant and Liberal parties, led by former emigrants whose agendas from the interwar era appeared unfamiliar to most voters.⁵²⁷ The State Department of the United States raised apprehensions regarding organized violence and irregularities in the election process. However, they ultimately determined that these issues did not impact the results and declared the elections to be free and fair.⁵²⁸ Anyhow, based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as not competitive from 1990 to 1991. From 1990 to 1992, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. Per FH, in 1990, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH in 1991, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. According to FH, in 1992 and 1993, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. For 1990 and 1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In 1992, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. According to Tom Gallagher (2005), the period from 1990 to 1996 was characterized by the entrenchment of former communist elites around Ion Iliescu, who ruled through an extensive network of patronage, institutional manipulation, and repression. Gallagher argues that this era represented not a true democratic transition but rather the consolidation of power under a new façade of electoral legitimacy—a process he labels as the „theft of a nation.“ On 10/11/1992 in the second round of the presidential elections on this day Iliescu won against oppositional candidate Emil Constantinescu, candidate of the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR).⁵²⁹ We do not share LIED's assessment that elections in Romania were competitive since 1992. V-Dem's CEI indicates ambiguous cleanliness scores

⁵²⁷ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Romania/National-communism#ref253522>

⁵²⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1990_Romanian_general_election

⁵²⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Romanian_general_election

since 1990. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI already indicates full political rights since 1991. From 1993 to 1995, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive encountered still substantial institutional limitations on power. In 1996, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. Per FH, in 1994 and 1995, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. As per FH's classification in 1996, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. On 11/17/1996, general elections were held. The government of Ion Iliescu, a successor to the Communist party, was defeated in a regularly scheduled election by Emil Constantinescu of the liberal Democratic Convention. The 1996 election was the first relatively clean election, and the first time the post-Communist successor party had been forced to yield power (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 54-55). Until this election Romania was a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

01/01/1997 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Defective Democracy: We choose 01/01/1997 as the regime change date because it marks the official assumption of office by Emil Constantinescu following the 1996 elections. While the electoral breakthrough occurred in November 1996, the effective transfer of executive power and the start of governance under new democratic conditions began only with the inauguration. From 1997 to 2004 according to V-Dem's CEI the elections in Romania were somewhat clean. In 2005 ambiguous cleanliness is scored. Between 2006 and 2016 there is a return to somewhat clean elections. Since 2017 the elections are considered clean (V-Dem CEI). Following V-Dem's EF&FI the overall election conditions are somewhat free and fair until 2003. From 2004 to 2007 the overall conditions are classified as somewhat free and fair. Since 2008, full freedom and fairness is achieved again (V-Dem EF&FI). In addition, per LIED political liberties are absent until 2005 and present afterwards. As per FH's classification from 1997 to 2003 the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. According to FH, in 2004, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. Per FH, from 2005 onward, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. Until 2003, based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. Since 2004, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. The judiciary operates generally independent, the lifting of the Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification (CVM) by the European

Commission at the end of 2022 reflected progress.⁵³⁰ In 2004, concurrent elections for the presidency and the parliament were held and Adrian Nastase, who was prime minister at the time, ran for presidency against Traian Basescu. Basescu won the elections and Nastase resigned from the office of prime minister. Basescu, as new president, appointed Călin Constantin Anton Popescu-Tăriceanu of the National Liberal Party as prime minister. At this point, the president is considered the effective ruler instead of the prime minister. On 01/01/2007 Romania joined the European Union.⁵³¹ In April 2007 Basescu was impeached by the parliament for unconstitutional conduct but he returned to office in May 2007 when he won a national referendum that was supposed to confirm his impeachment. In 2012, he was again tried for impeachment by the parliament and this time the national referendum turned out in favor for impeachment, but because the required quorum of 50% was not met, Basescu was reinstated as president. In 2014, after having served two terms, he could not run again for presidency.⁵³² Romania has a dual executive with a bicameral parliament, consisting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Romania has a multiparty system with parties operating freely in a competitive environment.⁵³³ On 12/06/2020 parliamentary elections for both houses were held, which was generally free and credible.⁵³⁴ In October 2021, the governing party (PNL) was defeated in a vote of no confidence. Subsequently, in November, a coalition government was established, headed by Nicolae Ciucă of the PNL, in partnership with the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR).⁵³⁵ Regarding to our classification Romania is a defective democracy. The 2024 presidential election was annulled after the first round of voting. In the first round Calin Georgescu, a far-right independent candidate, won the most votes. Georgescu had been viewed as a minor candidate without a real chance. On 12/06/2024 the Constitutional Court annulled the election two days before the second round was scheduled. The election was annulled due to allegations of Russian interference.⁵³⁶ The annulment was followed by a wave of protests that grew in scale and intensity over time.⁵³⁷ On 05/18/2025 the independent candidate Nicușor Dan was elected president, but his opponent George Simion requested that the election should

⁵³⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/romania/freedom-world/2023>

⁵³¹ https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/country-profiles/romania_en

⁵³² <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Romania_R: 3-4, Romania_V: 3-4

⁵³³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/romania/freedom-world/2023>

⁵³⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/romania/freedom-world/2023>

⁵³⁵ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/romania/freedom-world/2022>

⁵³⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Romanian_presidential_election

⁵³⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024%E2%80%932025_Romanian_election_annulment_protests

be annulled because of mass voter fraud. His request was rejected by the Constitutional Court and Dan became president on 05/26/2025.

For 1993-2003, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 2004 to 2012, in 2017 and in 2021, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 2013-2016, in 2020 and in 2022, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2018, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 2019, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2024, V-Dem's LCE remains moderate, while V-Dem's JCE shifts to a moderate interpretation. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. From 1996 onward, Romania is classified as free by FH, with a score of 4, except in 2004 when it received a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free. LIED classifies the country from 2006 on as a polyarchy (liberal democracy), while RoW does not and classifies it as an electoral democracy. Its classification according to V-Dem is comparable to that of a better-functioning semidemocracy, where democratic principles are largely upheld but serious challenges to democratic governance persist. In some years, V-Dem classified Romania as a full democracy, did however not consistently do so. We agree in this case with RoW. According to our observation Romania is a democracy, however, does not fulfill the high standards of a liberal democracy in a comparative perspective.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Gilberg 1990, Freedom House 1989, King 1980, Paun 2008, Verheijen 1999, Gelius 2013)

Russia/Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

[Regarding the time from 1917 to 1991 Russia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are subsumed under the same code in almost all data sets. For instance, Gleditsch and Ward

assigned Russia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the same code (365). Certainly, when considering the classification of Russia during the Soviet era in a dataset on political regimes, it is not appropriate to code Russia as „Part of other country.“ Instead, Russia should be viewed as the core territory of the Soviet Union, due to several key reasons: 1. Central Role: Russia held a central political, economic, and military role within the Soviet Union. It was not merely one of the Soviet republics but served as the heartland from which the Soviet system was governed. Moscow, located in Russia, was the capital of the Soviet Union and the seat of its central government. 2. Historical Continuity: There is a significant historical continuity between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) within the Soviet Union and the contemporary Russian Federation. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation was recognized as its principal legal successor. This includes inheriting the Soviet Union's permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, among other international roles and responsibilities. 3. Dominant Influence: The Russian SFSR, by virtue of its size, population, and economic capacity, exerted a dominant influence over the policies and direction of the Soviet Union. This influence extended beyond mere governance, impacting the cultural, social, and economic life across the Soviet territories. Therefore, coding Russia during the Soviet era as „Part of other country“ like Ukraine and all other Soviet republics would not accurately reflect its unique status and role within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Soviet Union. Instead, recognizing Russia as the core area of the USSR is more appropriate, considering its central governance role, historical continuity, and dominant influence over the union's affairs.]

Russia

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [Start: 11/02/1721]: On 11/02/1721 the Russian Empire was formed, making Russia into a monarchy.⁵³⁸ From 1894, Tsar Nicholas II reigned the Empire, making him the last Emperor of Russia. Under him, the opposition, especially from the far left and center was repressed.⁵³⁹ On 01/22/1905 the so called First Russian Revolution began as a massive wave of political and social unrest. The displeasure of the demonstrators was directed against the Tsar. As a result, Tsar Nicholas II was compelled to enact several reforms. In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited

⁵³⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Empire

⁵³⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_II_of_Russia

authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1900 to 1905 V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1906 and 1907, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. From 1908 to 1916, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. On 05/06/1906, the Russian Constitution of 1906 was adopted, which created the State Duma and a multi-party system. However, the Duma had limited powers and was outranked by the Tsar.⁵⁴⁰ Therefore, the Russian Empire nominally became a constitutional monarchy. According to LIED, only legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No executive elections were present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. While formally Russia was a constitutional monarchy after 05/06/1906 according to our criteria it remained to be an autocratic monarchy.

02/25/1917 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: The February Revolution ended the rule of the Tsar. On 03/15/1917 universal suffrage was established by a declaration of the Provisional Government.⁵⁴¹ The provisional government aimed to organize elections for the Russian Constituent Assembly and its convention. Initially led by Prince Georgy Lvov, the provisional government embarked on a series of short-lived reforms in its early weeks under his prime ministership. These reforms aimed to significantly liberalize Russia, introducing universal adult suffrage, granting freedoms of press and speech, abolishing capital punishment, and removing all legal restrictions based on religion, class, and race.⁵⁴² In July 1917 Alexander Kerensky took over.⁵⁴³ According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1917, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that

⁵⁴⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Revolution_of_1905

⁵⁴¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

⁵⁴² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Republic;

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Russia_1918?lang=en

⁵⁴³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Provisional_Government

legislative constraints on the executive were limited. While the direction of the transitional regime was liberalizing, it was nonetheless a borderline case with an unclear future.

11/07/1917 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Communist Ideocracy: On this date the Communists seized power in Petrograd by armed military and civilian supporters (Brooker 1995: 51, Skallerup 1991). However, „a partially democratic election of the Constituent Assembly still took place later in November. On 01/18/1918, this assembly passed a decree declaring Russia to be a democratic federal republic.⁵⁴⁴, but had been dissolved by the Bolsheviks on the day after the proclamation. After the communist party under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin took over, there were still many who opposed the Communist Party. This conflict sparked the Civil War, pitting the White Army against the Red Army. The White Army comprised the opposition party, while the Red Army consisted of the government's armed forces and those who supported Vladimir Lenin. The Civil War led to the loss of 10–30 million lives.⁵⁴⁵ For 1918-1922, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. According to LIED, only legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No executive elections were present. LIED still identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are not really present.

12/28/1922 End Russia [Communist Ideocracy]: On this date, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic became part of the USSR. However, the communist regime continued to rule. From that point on the country in the dataset is listed as USSR.

See **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

12/28/1922 Start Communist Ideocracy [as Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] [Start: 11/07/1917]: On this date, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic became part of the USSR. However, the communist regime continued to rule. From that point on the country in the dataset is listed as USSR. Following Lenin's death in 1924, Joseph Stalin came to power. During this period, the Gulag system of forced labor camps was further extended. Additionally, Stalin executed the Great Purge, aiming to eliminate both real and perceived adversaries.⁵⁴⁶

⁵⁴⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Republic

⁵⁴⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_communism_in_the_Soviet_Union

⁵⁴⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union

After the outbreak of World War II, Germany invaded the USSR.⁵⁴⁷ The Western territories of the USSR, roughly 15 to 20% of its entire territory, were occupied by German forces between 06/22/1941 and 10/1944. In the aftermath of World War II, the territory occupied by the Red Army formed various Soviet satellite states. The beginning of the Cold War saw the Eastern Bloc of the Soviet Union confront the Western Bloc of the United States, with the latter grouping becoming largely united in 1949 under NATO and the former grouping becoming largely united in 1955 under the Warsaw Pact. Following Stalin's death in 1953, a period known as de-Stalinization occurred under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev.⁵⁴⁸ The internal development of the USSR underwent significant changes. This period was symbolized by Khrushchev's „Secret Speech“ in 1956, which criticized Stalin's methods and indicated a shift towards more lenient domestic policies. There was an increased focus on improving living standards and consumer goods production, alongside sustained investment in heavy industry. Khrushchev also initiated agricultural reforms, most notably the Virgin Lands Campaign, which had mixed success. Leonid Brezhnev's leadership from 1964 to 1982, often referred to as the Era of Stagnation, marked a return to more conservative and bureaucratic elements, reversing many of Khrushchev's reforms. This period was characterized by an emphasis on heavy industry with less attention paid to consumer goods and agriculture, leading to economic stagnation. Political and social life remained tightly controlled, with limited tolerance for dissent. Brezhnev's foreign policy was defined by the Brezhnev Doctrine, which justified Soviet intervention in Warsaw Pact countries to maintain communist regimes. These shifts in leadership and policy within the USSR reflected the evolving nature of the Soviet regime, impacting both domestic and international dynamics during this critical period of the Cold War. For a detailed exploration of these transformations, the following sources provide extensive information.⁵⁴⁹ On 03/11/1985 Mikhail Gorbachev took over as General Secretary of the Communist Party. Implementing his policy of glasnost ('openness'), a significant cultural thaw unfolded under Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership. Freedoms of expression and information saw substantial expansion, enabling the press and broadcasting to express unprecedented candor in their reporting and criticism. The government eventually completely rejected the country's legacy of Stalinist totalitarian rule. Gorbachev's perestroika ('restructuring') policy aimed at the initial, modest efforts to democratize the Soviet political system. From 1923 to 1988, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and

⁵⁴⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union

⁵⁴⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union

⁵⁴⁹ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Soviet-Union>; <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Communist-Party-of-the-Soviet-Union>

V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For 1989, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1990 and 1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. According to LIED, only legislative elections were held until 1935 but they were not categorized as multiparty. From 1936 to 1989, both executive and legislative elections were held yet they were not classified as multiparty. Between 1990 and 1991 multiparty executive and legislative elections were present. Some elections to party and government positions saw the introduction of multicandidate contests and the use of the secret ballot.⁵⁵⁰ For the communist period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent until 1986, are not really present until 1989 and were in an ambiguous state in 1990.

08/21/1991 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Democratizing Regime: On 06/12/1991 a free and fair presidential election in Russia took place, which was won by Boris Yeltsin.⁵⁵¹ The communist candidate, Nikolai Ryzhkov roughly received 17.2 per cent of the vote. On the level of the USSR civilian and military communist hardliners, including Vice President Gennady Yanayev greatly opposing Michail Gorbachev's domestic reforms and his plan to break up the Union into independent republics launched a coup on 08/21/1991. The coup was broken by public action and a reluctance by the hardliners to shed blood. In the aftermath, Gorbachev was not in effective command with power in effect being transferred to Boris Yeltsin.⁵⁵² We code this regime change event as a popular uprising to emphasize the role of anti-authoritarian protests in thwarting the coup attempt. Since Yeltsin only was elected on the Russian level, we classify the regime on the level of the USSR in this period as a democratizing regime. In 1991, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties, indicating an intermediate state between present and absent.

12/21/1991 End Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Electoral Liberal Transitional]: On this date the USSR was officially abolished.

For the time after 12/21/1991, see **Russia**.

⁵⁵⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Gorbachev

⁵⁵¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Russian_presidential_election

⁵⁵² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Soviet_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat_attempt;
<https://www.britannica.com/place/Soviet-Union/The-attempted-coup>

Additional sources (Brzezinski 1956, Huber et al. 2015, LaPorte/Morgan/Worley 2008, Malia 1994, Voslensky 1984, White 2010, Zaslavsky/Brym 1978)

Russia

[officially known as the Russian Federation]

12/21/1991 End Non-Electoral Liberal Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On 12/21/1991 the USSR was officially abolished when representatives of eleven of the constituent republics signed an accord that replaced it with the Commonwealth of Independent States. On 12/25/1991, the Russian Federation officially became an independent state (Roeder 1993: 244).⁵⁵³ Nevertheless, in 1990, the Congress of People's Deputies was elected under Soviet regulations, allocating the majority of seats to members of the Communist Party and other affiliated „public organizations.“ The Congress convened biannually to deliberate on constitutional matters and approve government personnel changes. The Supreme Soviet, a smaller standing legislature, was elected from the ranks of the Congress members. Civil and political liberties were overwhelmingly safeguarded (McColm 1993: 424-428). From this point on the regime is classified as an electoral hybrid regime since the presidential elections from 06/12/1991. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED considers the elections as not competitive until 1992 and competitive afterwards. V-Dem's CEI indicates an ambiguous state regarding the cleanliness of the elections. Whereas V-Dem's EF&FI considers the elections as somewhat free and fair. In 1992, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For 1992, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. In addition, no political liberties were present per LIED, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were somewhat given. Between 1992 and 2003 V-Dem's LDI classifies the degree of liberal democracy at a level which we label as not really. In this period Russia was a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

⁵⁵³ <http://tinyurl.com/4xqb473>

09/21/1993 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: Boris Yeltsin, facing political deadlock and resistance to a shock therapy agenda moved to eliminate his political opponents. The final act of his self-coup was to suspend the legislature which he did effectively. When the parliament refused to dissolve, voted to impeach him and proclaimed the vice president as acting president, Yeltsin ordered troops to storm the parliament.⁵⁵⁴ With his vice president already suspended, Yeltsin had full executive control.⁵⁵⁵ In 1993, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions, according to Polity5. For 1993, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. In 1993, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present.

12/12/1993 End Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: In December 1993, a new federal assembly was elected under revised rules. Eight parties that had backed the parliament against Yeltsin were barred from participating (Ellison 1993, Simes 1994: 67-70, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 90). Hence, the elections were of ambiguous quality to say the least. We consider the regime period to be a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral autocracy, an electoral hybrid regime. After Yeltsin retired at the end of 1999, incumbent prime minister and acting president Vladimir Putin won the presidential elections in the first round. LIED identifies the elections as competitive. V-Dem's CEI indicates an ambiguous state regarding the cleanliness of elections. The overall elections conditions were somewhat free and fair until 1995. For three years the conditions are considered as ambiguous. Between 1999 and 2002 somewhat freedom and fairness are given according to V-Dem's EF&FI. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Between 1994 and 1999, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power. From 2000 to 2003, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For 1994-1999, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. In 2000, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were

⁵⁵⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleksandr_Rutskoy \o "Aleksandr Rutskoy

⁵⁵⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Russian_constitutional_crisis

limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In 2001, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2002 and 2003, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. As classified by FH until 1997, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. Per FH's scoring for 1998, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH from 1999 to 2003, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present until 2000 and are ambiguous afterwards.

12/07/2003 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: Scholars often cite the 2003 parliamentary election as a pivotal moment in Russian politics, as it signaled the federal parliament's transformation into little more than a rubber-stamp institution.⁵⁵⁶ During the 2004 and 2008 elections, state-controlled media had displayed clear bias in favor of the incumbent and observers described the elections as neither free, nor fair.⁵⁵⁷ From 2003 onwards, both V-Dem's LDI and FH rank Russia as low as possible for liberal democratic freedoms. After two four-year presidential terms from 2000 to 2008 in office, Putin remained the de facto leader, while working as prime minister with Dmitry Medvedev took over as president.⁵⁵⁸ Putin returned to the presidency in 2012, violating the constitution's two-term limit.⁵⁵⁹ Medvedev became prime minister from 2012 to 2020. Alleged forgeries were reported 2012 that could have affected Putin's victory in the first round.⁵⁶⁰ Since 2003, politics in Russia has been dominated by the pro-Putin United Russia party which holds a supermajority in the State Duma, the ruling party effectively controls proceedings, rendering the parliament little more than a rubber stamp for Kremlin and government agendas.⁵⁶¹ The eighth presidential elections took place in Russia from 03/15 to 17/2024. The process was widely anticipated as predetermined, with prominent opposition leader Alexei Navalny barred from running due to a controversial

⁵⁵⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Russian_legislative_election

⁵⁵⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_Russian_presidential_election

⁵⁵⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmitry_Medvedev

⁵⁵⁹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/russia/freedom-world/2022>

⁵⁶⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Russian_presidential_election

⁵⁶¹ [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI\(2021\)698018](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2021)698018)

prior conviction. Navalny's death in prison just before the election raised suspicions, further undermining the credibility of the electoral process. Increased political repression under Putin's administration, particularly following the conflict with Ukraine, lead us – based on reports on international observers - to classify the election as not free and fair. The elections also took place in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine, where reports of irregularities, including ballot stuffing and coercion, surfaced.⁵⁶² Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 2004, the country lost its electoral competitiveness according to LIED. V-Dem's CEI declares the cleanliness as ambiguous until 2007. Since 2008, not real cleanliness is scored. Until 2020, the freedom and fairness was classified as ambiguous again. In 2021 the election underlined no real freedom and fairness (V-Dem EF&FI). According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Regarding the political liberties, they were absent for the entire time (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous until 2013, as not really present until 2021 and as absent since 2022 regarding the state of political liberties. From 2003 to 2006, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks. Since 2007, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. From 2004 to 2007, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Since 2008, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources Russia 1900-1917, 1991 onwards (Beichelt 2004, Evans 2008, Fish 2005, Kubicek 1994, Remington 2000, Shevëtišova/Tait 2007, Van Herpen 2013, Cameron 1994b, Cameron 1998, Dawisha/Parrott 1997, Hanson 2006)

Rwanda

[Also known as Ruanda]

⁵⁶² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Russian_presidential_election

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 07/01/1890]: On this date, Rwanda became a part of German East Africa and specifically part of the military district of Tanganyika-Kivu on 07/01/1890. From 1899 to 1907 Rwanda was part of the military district of Ruanda-Urundi. During this time LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Rwanda.

05/01/1916 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Belgium, Defective Democracy]: Belgian forces invaded Rwanda and Burundi during World War I. The Belgian occupation had a lasting effect in Rwanda. The territory captured was administered by a Belgian military occupation authority („Belgian Occupied East African Territories“).⁵⁶³ The most lasting effect was how the colonial authorities racialized the differences between Hutu, Twa and Tutsi. This had a profound effect on Rwanda as it would be a constant source of internal conflict and violence. The Belgian occupation force expanded labor conscription; 20,000 men were drafted act as porters for the Mahenge offensive, and of these only one-third returned home, most of them were Hutu.⁵⁶⁴ The people categorized as Tutsi were then favored for the most prestigious work and with a greater amount of power and decision making through the aristocracy and the King.⁵⁶⁵ For 1916-1921, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. LIED lists elections as absent during this period. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent.

07/20/1922 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Belgium, Defective Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Belgium, Defective Democracy as International Mandate]: The League of Nations officially awarded Ruanda-Urundi to Belgium as a B-Class Mandate on 07/20/1922.⁵⁶⁶ As a mandate, it was subject to international oversight through the League's Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) in Geneva, Switzerland.⁵⁶⁷ Administratively, the mandate was divided into two parts, Ruanda and Urundi, each under the nominal leadership of a tribal chief. On 12/13/1946, the newly formed United Nations voted to end the mandate over Ruanda-Urundi and replace it with the new status of „Trust Territory“. To provide oversight, the PMC was superseded by the United Nations Trusteeship Council. The transition was

⁵⁶³ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruanda-Urundi>

⁵⁶⁴ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruanda-Urundi>

⁵⁶⁵ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwanda>

<https://www.britannica.com/topic/mandate-League-of-Nations>

⁵⁶⁷ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruanda-Urundi>

accompanied by a promise that the Belgians would prepare the territory for independence.⁵⁶⁸ Rwanda became UN trust territory (Ruanda-Urundi). Rwanda constituted the northern half of the Belgian mandate of Ruanda-Urundi after World War I and of the Belgian administered trust territory of the same name after World War II. The Decree of 07/14/1952 by the Belgian authorities introduced an element of democracy to the Rwandan political system, implementing a complex electoral system for parliament. In 1954, an election was held. Between 1946 and 1959 Rwanda is according to our classification a borderline case between a direct and an indirect rule colony. As the 1954 elections did, however, not grant universal suffrage, but only to sub-chiefs and chiefs of local councils⁵⁶⁹, we continue to classify this case as a direct rule colony. According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections as well as universal suffrage were absent for the whole period. Resistance to the Tutsi monarchy by the more numerous Hutus intensified in the 1950s and culminated in November 1959 in a bloody revolt that overthrew the monarchy and led to the emigration of thousands of Tutsis (Lansford 2021: 1392).⁵⁷⁰ The following months were marked by violence and the death of many Tutsis. The Tutsi king fled the country in 1960.⁵⁷¹ Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as absent. For 1922-1959, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In 1960, V-Dem's JCE is classified as robust, indicating strong and regular judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

10/18/1960 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Belgium, Liberal Democracy as International Mandate]/Start Non-Electoral Liberal Transitional (Multiparty) Regime [as International Mandate]: On this date Rwanda gained autonomy. Belgium saw itself forced to organize elections in 1960, following the violent uprising. Under the leadership of Grégoire Kayibanda, the Party of the Movement for Hutu Emancipation (Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation du Peuple Hutu) also known as Parmehutu emerged as the spearhead of the revolution. Communal elections were held in 1960, resulting in a massive transfer of power to Hutu elements at the local level through an overwhelming victory of the Party of the Movement for Hutu Emancipation (Lansford 2021: 1392). The monarchy was not officially abolished until a constitutional referendum in 1961 (Limpitlaw 2016). However, since the monarch fled the

⁵⁶⁸ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruanda-Urundi>

⁵⁶⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1954_Rwandan_parliamentary_election

⁵⁷⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Rwanda

⁵⁷¹ <https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994#ref1111304>

country Rwanda was de facto already a republic in this period. Since the Hutu party was only elected for at the local level its government on the national level is considered as a non-electoral regime. On 01/28/1961 Rwanda proclaimed itself a republic, under the leadership of Dominique Mbonyumutwa. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. In 1960, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present.

09/25/1961 End Non-Electoral Liberal Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the countries' first multiparty parliamentary elections were held under UN auspices, with Parmehutu gaining a victory on the national level.⁵⁷² Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The election was not competitive according to LIED. V-Dem's CEI scores no cleanliness. However, V-Dem's EF&FI classifies the election as somewhat free and fair. According to LIED no political liberties were present. V-Dem's PCLI categorizes them as not really present. In 1962, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. For 1961, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Kayibanda assumed the presidency on 10/26/1961, marking the formal end of trusteeship on 07/01/1962. His rule was marked by increasing power centralization and the attempt to build a court that was more akin to a presidential monarchy.⁵⁷³ Subsequently, Tutsi émigrés sought to reinstate the monarchy, leading to their defeat in December 1963. This defeat sparked widespread reprisals against the remaining Tutsis, resulting in 10.000 to 15.000 fatalities and the displacement of 150.000 to 200.000 Tutsis to neighboring countries (Lansford 2021: 1392). Universal suffrage was introduced in 1961.⁵⁷⁴

07/01/1962 End Electoral Autocracy [as International Mandate]/Start One-Party Autocracy: Rwanda attained independence under the governance of Parmehutu, a single-party system established to advance the interests of the predominant Hutu ethnic group. Prior to independence, a popular uprising led by Hutus resulted in armed ethnic conflict, leading to the loss of tens of thousands of lives and the exile of over 100.000 Tutsis. Tutsis were excluded from representation in the government elected in September 1961, which promoted Hutu dominance and pursued a policy of violent repression against Tutsis (Weinstein 1977: 55-64,

⁵⁷² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_Rwandan_parliamentary_election

⁵⁷³ Filip Reyntjens (2018) Understanding Rwandan politics through the *longue durée*: from the precolonial to the post-genocide era, *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 12:3, 514-532, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2018.1462985

⁵⁷⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 90-91).⁵⁷⁵ In accordance with LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted until 1964. From 1965 onward, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1962, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1963 to 1969, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1970-1972, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Per FH, in 1972, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free.

07/05/1973 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: General Juvénal Habyarimana overthrew Tutsi President Kayibanda and at first attempted to equalize the two ethnic groups. Later, his policy reflected extreme favoritism to his Hutu ethnic group (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 90-91).⁵⁷⁶ Habyarimana's regime was also corrupt. He and his associates enriched themselves through embezzlement and other forms of theft. The regime's corruption had a devastating impact on the Rwandan economy and led to widespread poverty and inequality. There were no elections during Habyarimana's rule. Habyarimana established a one-party state in which he was the only candidate for president. In 1975 he founded the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement, MRND). It was the only legal political party in Rwanda during his rule. All other political parties like the Parmehutu party, which had been dominated by Hutus from southern Rwanda, were banned.⁵⁷⁷ However, the MRND served more or less as a mere vehicle for Habyarimana to consolidate his power and to control the political regime.⁵⁷⁸ Nevertheless, the government remained almost entirely in military hands until 1978.⁵⁷⁹ A new constitution promulgated in December 1978 provided for a return to civilian rule. The new

⁵⁷⁵ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.html>

⁵⁷⁶ <http://tinyurl.com/3upnvxt>; <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.html>

⁵⁷⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Revolutionary_Movement_for_Development

⁵⁷⁸ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Revolutionary-Movement-for-Development>

⁵⁷⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juv%C3%A9nal_Habyarimana

constitution created a presidential republic with no term limits for the President and made the National Revolutionary Movement for Development the sole legal party.⁵⁸⁰ In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1973, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. From 1974 to 1978, V-Dem's JCE is classified as robust, indicating strong and regular judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For Rwanda V-Dem's JCE and LCE were not in line with our observations on judicial and legislative constraints on the executive in this period.

12/24/1978 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: On this date, a constitutional referendum and presidential elections with Habyarimana as the sole candidate took place. Parliamentary elections followed in 1981, with two MRND candidates contesting each of the 64 seats. Habyarimana was re-elected again in 1983 and 1988, whilst parliamentary elections were held under the same system in 1983 and 1988.⁵⁸¹ From this point on it seems extremely hard to classify the regime as a military autocracy. However, GWF, HTW, MCM, REIGN and BR all classify this regime still after this point as a military autocracy/regime. We would emphasize here that it is a borderline case between a personalist and a military autocracy in the phase until 1978, afterwards it is a borderline case between a personalist and a one-party autocracy. We classify the regime as a personalist autocracy because, firstly, the military no longer exercised control over Habyarimana. Secondly, the MRND was only founded by Habyarimana in 1975, thus at a time when he was already in power. This is a case of a regime party that was founded for the sole purpose of allowing the ruler to remain in power. Therefore, it could not exercise independent control or elect its leader. Another point in favor of this view is that the MRND was banned after Habyarimana's death in 1994 and there was no legal successor to the party.⁵⁸² Therefore, both the parliamentary and presidential elections served only to confirm the candidates. Following Habyarimana's demise in a plane crash, ethnic

⁵⁸⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978_Rwandan_constitutional_referendum

⁵⁸¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Revolutionary_Movement_for_Development

⁵⁸² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Revolutionary_Movement_for_Development

extremists instigated the Rwandan genocide on 04/06/1994.⁵⁸³ Habayrimana was succeeded as president by Théodore Sindikubwabo. As the genocide began, Major General Paul Kagame of the Rebel forces of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), made up mostly of exiled Tutsi Rwandans who had served in Museveni's insurgent force or the Ugandan army, warned of resuming the civil war if killings persisted. The next day, the RPF repelled a government attack on the national parliament, launching their own offensive from the north to connect with isolated troops in Kigali. Kagame refused dialogue with the interim government, doubting its commitment to stopping the genocide.⁵⁸⁴ In accordance with LIED, only executive elections were held until 1980 but they were not categorized as multiparty. No legislative elections were present. From 1981 onward, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1979 to 1981, V-Dem's JCE is classified as robust, indicating strong and regular judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1982 to 1989, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1990 to 1992, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1993, V-Dem's JCE is classified as robust, indicating strong and regular judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. For the given period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI likewise indicates that political liberties were absent until 1990 and not really present from 1991 onwards.

07/04/1994 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date the Tutsi RPF led by Major General Kagame took Kigali. On 07/19/1994 President Theodore Sindikubwabo fled the country when the invading Rwandese Patriotic Front rebels defeated the security forces and ended the genocide. Augustin Bizimungu was installed as president. Yet, Paul Kagame was regarded as Rwanda's de facto leader during his tenure as Vice President and Minister of

⁵⁸³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pasteur_Bizimungu;
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Rwanda_2015?lang=en

⁵⁸⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwandan_genocide

Defense under Bizimungu from 1994 to 2000.⁵⁸⁵ A Tutsi-led ruling group was established, which became more inclusive over time (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 91).⁵⁸⁶ In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 2000. Thereafter, only legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No executive elections were present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For 1994, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1995 to 1999, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2000 to 2002, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In this timeframe, LIED still identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as pointing out that political liberties are absent until 1999 and are not really present afterwards.

08/25/2003 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: Rwanda held its first direct presidential elections on 08/25/2003, following the Rwandan Civil War and marking the first multi-party presidential elections in the country's history. Paul Kagame, representing the RPF, won the election with 95% of the vote and was elected for a seven-year term. However, outside observers widely criticized the elections as fraudulent. According to scholar Timothy Longman, the elections did not serve as a transition to democracy but rather as a means for the RPF to consolidate their rule through forced mobilizations, which left the Rwandan population disillusioned.⁵⁸⁷ Prior to the presidential elections, the constitutional court ruled that the MDR and the PDC were illegal parties because of their role in the events of 1994 (Lansford 2021: 1394). Parliamentary elections were held between 09/29/2003 and 10/02/2003. They were the first parliamentary elections since 1988 and the second multi-party national elections in the country's history. They were held following the approval of a new constitution in a referendum in August 2003.⁵⁸⁸ During the 2008 legislative elections, the FPR once more established an electoral coalition, which secured 42 seats in the direct elections. Additionally, the Social

⁵⁸⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Kagame

⁵⁸⁶ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.html>; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486>

⁵⁸⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Rwandan_presidential_election

⁵⁸⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Rwandan_parliamentary_election

Democratic Party obtained seven seats, and the Liberal Party secured four. Despite the boycott by the primary opposition groups, international observers deemed the elections to be free and fair (Lansford 2021: 1394). In the 2017 presidential election, Kagame secured a significant victory, obtaining 98.8 percent of the vote according to official records. Frank Habineza of the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda (DGPR) and independent candidate Philippe Mpayimana shared the remaining percentage. However, the electoral process faced several challenges, including political intimidation, unfair registration procedures, and accusations of fraud during the voting process itself.⁵⁸⁹ Kagame was re-elected on 07/15/2024 to a fourth term.⁵⁹⁰ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED affirms that no competitive elections were held since 2003. From 2003 to 2007 no clean elections were stated. Since 2008 V-Dem's CEI scores not real cleanliness. Moreover, V-Dem's EF&FI indicates that elections were not really free and fair until 2007. Between 2007 and 2012 the overall conditions can be classified per EF&FI as ambiguous. Since 2013, not really free and fair elections are indicated. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score of 11 or 12 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. In addition to that, political liberties are absent for the entire time (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI classifies them as constantly not really present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 2003 to 2016 and in 2020, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 2017-2019 and from 2021 onward, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Eriksen 2005, Stolz 1999)

Saarland

07/10/1945 Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [France, Non-Electoral Liberal Transitional Regime]: Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces, French occupation troops entered the Saar region on 07/10/1945, establishing a separate occupation administration under French control.

⁵⁸⁹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/rwanda/freedom-world/2021>

⁵⁹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Rwandan_general_election

Although the Saarland was initially administered as a military occupation zone, France soon initiated a process of controlled liberalization that differentiated the Saar from the more directly governed territories of occupied Germany. By early 1946, the French authorities permitted the formation of political parties, and on 09/15/1946 the first postwar democratic municipal elections were held. These developments created indigenous representative institutions with genuine though limited authority over local governance. While ultimate sovereignty, foreign affairs, and control over major economic and security policies remained firmly in French hands, domestic administrative and political life within the Saar began to operate through bodies that possessed domestic legitimacy and a measure of autonomous decision-making capacity.

17/12/1947 End Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy [as protectorate-type of France, Liberal Democracy]: With the promulgation of the Saar Constitution on 17 December 1947, the Indirect Rule Occupation Regime formally ended, and the Saarland was transformed into an autonomous political entity under French protection. The new constitutional framework established a parliamentary democracy with a freely elected Landtag, a government responsible to it, and fundamental rights guarantees, thereby fulfilling the institutional criteria of a liberal democracy. However, this democracy operated under significant structural limitations that justified its classification as a Defective Democracy. Despite the existence of democratic institutions and electoral competition, the Saarland's sovereignty was incomplete: France retained decisive influence over foreign policy, defense, customs, and monetary matters. The Saar economy was integrated into the French economic sphere through customs and currency union, and French authorities exercised substantial leverage over major policy domains, including industrial and trade policy.

01/01/1957 End Saarland [Defective Democracy]: The regime persisted until 01/01/1957, when the Saarland joined the Federal Republic of Germany and regained full sovereignty, marking the end of its protectorate status and the transition from a defective democracy to a fully sovereign liberal democracy within the West German constitutional order.

For the time after 01/01/1957, see Germany, West.

Saint Barthélemy

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy as Part of Guadeloupe)] [Start: 03/16/1878]: By 1648, the French settled on the island, initially with about 50 to 60 settlers, supported by Phillippe de Longvilliers de Poincy, the lieutenant-governor of

the French West India Company. However, the island faced economic difficulties and was frequently targeted by pirates and the British, who attacked it in 1744. Consequently, King Louis XVI considered it of little value and traded the island to Sweden in 1784 in exchange for trade privileges in Gothenburg. Slavery was practiced on the island under the 1787 Ordinance concerning the Police of Slaves and free Colored People. The last legally owned slaves in the Swedish colony were granted freedom by the state on 10/09/1847. In 1852, a devastating hurricane struck the island, followed by a fire, which severely impacted the economy. In response to these challenges, Sweden sought to relinquish control of the island. After a referendum in 1877, Sweden sold the island back to France in 1878, and it was subsequently administered as part of Guadeloupe.⁵⁹¹ LIED does not take Saint Barthélemy in consideration for its colonial time.

03/19/1946 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy as Part of Guadeloupe)]/Start Part of Other Country [as Part of Guadeloupe, France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the inhabitants of the island were granted full French citizenship with all associated rights and privileges. Saint Barthélemy was a French municipality within Guadeloupe, an overseas region and department of France, for an extended period. In 2003, following a referendum, the island's inhabitants expressed their desire to break away from Guadeloupe's administrative control.⁵⁹²

07/15/2007 End Part of Other Country [of France, Liberal Democracy as Part of Guadeloupe)]/Start Defective Democracy [as protectorate-type of France, Liberal Democracy]: Saint Barthélemy split off from Guadeloupe and transformed into an Overseas Collectivity (COM). Saint Barthélemy gained the right to vote for both legislative and executive powers and is represented in the French Senate and Assembly. However, a representative of the French state oversees these institutions and has the authority to postpone legislative decisions, dissolve the parliament or the executive, and establish an interim government. Important policy areas, such as foreign affairs and security policy, are determined by France. On 01/01/2012, Saint Barthélemy stopped being an outermost region of the European Union (EU) and instead became an Overseas Country or Territory (OCT).⁵⁹³ The island is governed by a president elected every five years, a unicameral Territorial Council comprising nineteen members elected by the public for five-year terms, and an executive council consisting of seven members. The first elections for these councils took place on 07/01/2007, with the most recent election occurring in 2022.⁵⁹⁴

⁵⁹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint_Barth%C3%A9lemy#History

⁵⁹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint_Barth%C3%A9lemy#History

⁵⁹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint_Barth%C3%A9lemy#History

⁵⁹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint_Barth%C3%A9lemy#Politics_and_government

FH, LIED and V-Dem do not treat Saint Barthélemy in their data. The autonomy rights, representation in the French Parliament, and limited sovereignty make it difficult to categorize the regime. Saint Barthélemy, as well as the other overseas collectivities, represents a special case. Due to its higher degree of autonomy compared to other French administrative zones, such as the départements et régions d'outre-mer, the region cannot be classified as an Indirect Rule Colonial Regime. Instead, it can be categorized as a Defective Democracy with the additional designation of a protectorate-type. It is considered defective because, due to France's position, these territories do not possess full sovereignty.

Defective Democracy [as protectorate-type of France, Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 08/14/1816]: In 1657, Oliver Cromwell granted the English East India Company a charter to administer Saint Helena, and the subsequent year, the Company chose to strengthen the island's defenses and establish a settlement with planters. Ascension Island, previously unoccupied, was strategically occupied by the Royal Navy on 10/22/1815. Similarly, Tristan da Cunha was annexed as a dependency of the Cape Colony (British South Africa) on 08/14/1816, as part of the resolution of the Napoleonic Wars, driven by similar strategic considerations.⁵⁹⁵ On 08/28/1833 Saint Helena became a crown colony by the Government of India Act.⁵⁹⁶ Ascension Island became a dependency of Saint Helena in September 1922, with Tristan da Cunha following suit in January 1938. These three islands were collectively governed under the flagship of „Saint Helena and Dependencies”.⁵⁹⁷ Saint Helena does not appear in LIED's data for this time.

01/01/1967 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: St. Helena gained a degree of self-rule with an Order in Council and Royal Instructions in 1966 (implemented in January 1967), establishing local executive and legislative councils.⁵⁹⁸ As this new order awarded universal suffrage to the residents of St. Helena but still

⁵⁹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint_Helena,_Ascension_and_Tristan_da_Cunha#English_colonisation

⁵⁹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_India_Act_1833

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Saint_Helena,_Ascension_and_Tristan_da_Cunha#Formation_and_Constitution,_1922%E2%80%93present

⁵⁹⁸ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Saint-Helena-island-South-Atlantic-Ocean/History>

gave most authority to the appointed executive council and governor, we classify it as a self-ruling colonial regime.⁵⁹⁹ LIED still does not provide any data.

01/01/1983 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: The British Nationality Act of 1981 reclassified Saint Helena and other crown colonies as British Dependent Territories. As a result, the residents lost their designation as 'Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies,' as outlined in the British Nationality Act of 1948, and were deprived of their right of abode in Britain. The implementation of the Saint Helena Constitution occurred in 1989, stipulating that the governance of the island would be overseen by a governor, a commander-in-chief, and both an elected executive and legislative council. The inception of the Commission on Citizenship in 1992 marked the reinstatement of the residents' privileges, encompassing the right of abode. Subsequently, in 2002, the restoration of the right to British citizenship was accomplished.⁶⁰⁰ The relationship with Great Britain evolved, leading to the approval of a new constitution by both parties in July 2009. This constitution, in effect from 09/01, included a bill of rights, curtailed some of the governor's powers, and granted more authority to elected council members.⁶⁰¹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. V-Dem, LIED and FH do not list Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha.

Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Saint Kitts and Nevis

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 09/03/1783]: In 1882 the islands were united as Saint Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla (Saint Christopher also called Saint Kitts). The islands were part of the Leeward Islands from 1833 to 01/01/1960 (see under Antigua and Barbuda). Despite being one of the smallest territories in the West Indies, St. Kitts holds historical significance as Britain's first colony in the region, established in 1623. Ownership of the island was disputed with France until 1783 when Britain gained undisputed control through the Treaty of Versailles. St. Kitts, along with Nevis and Anguilla, formed a tripartite entity and joined the West Indies Federation in 1952 (Lansford

⁵⁹⁹ <http://sainthelena.island.info/government.htm>

⁶⁰⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint_Helena#1981_to_present

⁶⁰¹ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Saint-Helena-island-South-Atlantic-Ocean/History>

2021: 1401). LIED misclassifies that legislative and multiparty elections were present since 1937. Universal suffrage was absent during this time (LIED). LIED identifies political liberties as absent for the given period. LIED does not treat Saint Kitts and Nevis before 1937.

10/06/1952 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On 10/06/1952 the first general elections with universal suffrage were held.⁶⁰² LIED confirms the presence of legislative and multiparty election as well as universal suffrage since 1952. Political liberties were absent according to LIED.

02/27/1967 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date St. Kitts and Nevis achieved independence as an independent state in association with the United Kingdom as a member of the West Indies Associated States. This arrangement granted the islands full internal self-government, while the United Kingdom retained responsibilities for defense and foreign affairs.⁶⁰³ Three months later, Anguilla rejected governance from Basseterre (Lansford 2021: 1401). Anguilla received its own constitution on 02/10/1976, leading to the formal dissolution of its union with Saint Kitts and Nevis in 1980.⁶⁰⁴ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections are considered as competitive during the entire time (LIED) and political liberties were achieved according to LIED.

09/19/1983 Continuation (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as independent country]: On 09/19/1983 independence was reached as the Federation of Saint Christopher (or Saint Kitts) and Nevis. Nevis got limited self-government.⁶⁰⁵ In this year it became a commonwealth realm with the British Crown as ceremonial head of state. In 1984, early elections were held, resulting in the Nevis Reformation Party (NRP) winning all three seats in Nevis, while the People's Action Movement (PAM) secured six seats in St. Kitts. In contrast, the Labour Party won two seats. Despite the Labour Party winning the popular vote nationwide, the distribution of seats favored the NRP and PAM.⁶⁰⁶ Throughout its history, St. Kitts and Nevis has been known for

⁶⁰² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965_Laotian_coups

⁶⁰³ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Saint-Kitts-and-Nevis/History>

⁶⁰⁴ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Saint-Kitts-and-Nevis/History>

⁶⁰⁵ <https://www.gov.kn/the-constitution/#:~:text=The%20Constitution%20of%20Saint%20Kitts,the%20citizens%20of%20the%20federation.;>

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Kitts_and_Nevis_1983?lang=en

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Saint_Kitts_and_Nevis#Saint_Kitts_and_Nevis_\(1883_%E2%80%93_present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Saint_Kitts_and_Nevis#Saint_Kitts_and_Nevis_(1883_%E2%80%93_present))

conducting elections that are characterized by fairness and freedom. However, the 1993 elections faced significant opposition and led to protests from the opposing party. The situation escalated to the point where the Regional Security System (RSS) was temporarily deployed to restore order in the country. Following the general election held on 08/05/2022, Terrance Drew got elected as the fourth and current Prime Minister of Saint Kitts and Nevis. His victory came as his party, the St. Kitts-Nevis Labour Party (SKNLP), won the election.⁶⁰⁷ Periodic elections are held under universal suffrage with regular changes in government.⁶⁰⁸⁶⁰⁹ FH lists Saint Kitts and Nevis as free since 1984 while V-Dem does not list the country. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Since the country's independence, LIED confirms the presence of competitive elections and political liberties are guaranteed ever since. V-Dem does not list the country in its database. (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Hillebrands/Schwehm 2005)

Saint Lucia

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 05/30/1814]: From 1782 to 1803, St. Lucia changed hands multiple times between Britain and France. During this period, the British had to quell a strong revolutionary movement supported by rebellious slaves before finally gaining control in 1803. On 05/30/1814 Saint Lucia was officially transferred to Britain through the Treaty of Paris⁶¹⁰, subsequently becoming a crown colony.⁶¹¹ St. Lucia was part of the Windward Islands from 1838 - 01/01/1960 (see under Grenada), along with Dominica, Grenada, and St. Vincent (Lansford 2021: 1404). Throughout the 20th century, St. Lucia experienced a significant increase in self-government. In 1924, a constitution was established, granting the island its initial system of representative government. This introduced a limited number of elected members to the legislative council, which was previously composed entirely of appointed individuals. The right to vote was, however, tied to

⁶⁰⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Saint_Kitts_and_Nevis

⁶⁰⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1952_Saint_Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla_general_election

⁶⁰⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Saint_Kitts_and_Nevis_general_election

⁶¹⁰ <https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaties-of-Paris-1814-1815>

⁶¹¹ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Saint-Lucia/History>

the possession of property and literacy tests. Thereby, the electorate made up a very small portion of the actual inhabitants of Saint Lucia, excluding the largely native and former slave populations (Midgett 1983). LIED does not treat Saint Lucia for this regime time.

10/12/1951 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this day, universal adult suffrage was implemented, resulting in elected members becoming the majority in the council.⁶¹² The introduction of ministerial government took place in 1956. St. Lucia briefly became a part of the West Indies Federation in 1958, a semi-autonomous dependency of the United Kingdom. However, the federation collapsed in 1962 when Jamaica withdrew, leading to an unsuccessful attempt at creating a smaller federation. Subsequently, the United Kingdom and the islands of Grenada, St. Vincent, Dominica, Antigua, St. Kitts and Nevis, Anguilla, and St. Lucia established. LIED confirms that multiparty and legislative elections were held ever since 1951. Universal suffrage was given since 1951 per LIED. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent.

03/01/1967 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date associated statehood for St. Lucia was brought by with the West Indies Act, according to which, each state possessed complete authority over its constitution, granting them internal self-government. However, the United Kingdom maintained responsibility for external affairs and defense.⁶¹³

02/22/1979 Continuation (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as independent country]: After initially calling for a referendum, the opposition St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP), led by Allan Louisy, participated in a constitutional conference held in London in July 1978. Following approval of the proposed constitution by the St. Lucia House of Assembly on 10/24 and a draft termination order by both houses of Parliament in December, independence within the Commonwealth was proclaimed on 02/22/1979, with Premier Compton assuming the office of prime minister and the British Crown remaining ceremonial head of state.⁶¹⁴ FH classifies Saint Lucia as free since 1979. V-Dem does not list the country. Following a sweeping triumph by the leftist-oriented SLP on 07/02/1979, Compton was succeeded by Louisy (Lansford 2021: 1404). His party secured twelve out of the seventeen seats.⁶¹⁵ The last general elections in St. Lucia were held on 07/26/2021. During the elections, voters chose all 17 members of the House

⁶¹² <https://www.govt.lc/news/saint-lucia-observes-universal-adult-suffrage>

⁶¹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/West_Indies_Associated_States

⁶¹⁴ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Lucia_1978?lang=en

⁶¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Saint_Lucian_general_election

of Assembly. The outcome marked a victory for the opposition Saint Lucia Labour Party, which secured 13 out of the 17 seats in the House. In contrast, the ruling United Workers Party experienced a significant setback, losing nine out of its eleven seats.⁶¹⁶ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since its independence Saint Lucia held constantly competitive elections according to LIED. According to FH, in 1979, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. As per FH's classification from 1980 onward, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Moreover, constant political liberties are achieved since 1980 (LIED). Issues such as corruption remain an issue, the Corruption Perceptions Index giving it a 55/100.⁶¹⁷ St. Lucia operates as a parliamentary democracy with competitive elections and a history of peaceful transitions of power between opposing parties. However, ongoing issues include instances of government corruption and a lack of transparency, reports of police brutality with a perception of impunity, and instances of discrimination against the LGBT+ community.⁶¹⁸ V-Dem does not provide data for St. Lucia.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Hillebrands/Nohlen 2005)

Saint Martin

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [France, Defective Democracy as part of Guadeloupe] [Start: 23/03/1648]: Saint Martin, initially a Spanish territory, piqued the interests of European powers, mainly France and the United Provinces, resulting in a decline in the native Amerindian population due to introduced diseases. In 1631, the Dutch established Fort Amsterdam on the island for salt mining, but Spanish control was regained in 1633. Despite Dutch attempts in 1644, they couldn't retake the island. The end of the Eighty Years' War in 1648 rendered the island less valuable to Spain, leading to its abandonment, with the Dutch and French dividing it by the Treaty of Concordia on 03/23/1648.⁶¹⁹ French Saint Martin, led by Governor Robert de Longvilliers, saw border adjustments over time, settling by 1817. Slavery was abolished by

⁶¹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Saint_Lucian_general_election

⁶¹⁷ <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023/index/lca>

⁶¹⁸ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/st-lucia/freedom-world/2023>

⁶¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Concordia

the French in 1848 and the Dutch in 1863, but enforcement became challenging as slaves could move freely between the Dutch and French sides. In 1763, Saint Martin merged with France's Guadeloupe colony.⁶²⁰ Saint Martin's colonial era does not appear in LIED's dataset.

03/19/1946 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy as part of Guadeloupe]/Start Part of Other Country [France, Liberal Democracy (as Part of Guadeloupe)]: On this date, Saint Martin (together with Saint Barthélemy) was officially incorporated into the Guadeloupe département as an arrondissement.⁶²¹

07/15/2007 End Part of Other Country Country [France, Liberal Democracy (as Part of Guadeloupe)]/Start Defective Democracy [as protectorate-type of France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, Saint Martin was separated from Guadeloupe and transformed into a territorial collectivity, complete with its Prefect and Territorial Council.⁶²² Saint Martin gained the right to vote for both legislative and executive powers and is represented in the French Senat and Assembly. However, a representative of the French state oversees these institutions and has the authority to postpone legislative decisions, dissolve the parliament or the executive, and establish an interim government. Important policy areas, such as foreign affairs and security policy, are determined by France. Saint Martin is part of the European Union; the region is not represented independently but rather through France. The membership in the European Union distinguishes Saint Martin from other Overseas Collectivities. Severe political instability marked the year 2024 in Sint Maarten, necessitating two separate general elections due to extreme parliamentary fragmentation. The first election, held on 01/11/2024, produced a complex four-party coalition government led by Prime Minister Luc Mercelina of the Unified Resilient St. Maarten Movement (URSM). However, this government was short-lived, collapsing just 18 days after being sworn in when a coalition member of parliament defected, triggering snap elections. The subsequent August election took place amid political turmoil, including the high-profile arrests of several politicians for alleged vote buying related to the January election.⁶²³ The second election again produced a fragmented result, with the National Alliance (NA), URSM, and the Democratic Party (DP) emerging as the largest parties. A new four-party coalition was ultimately negotiated, allowing Mercelina to return as prime minister. His second cabinet was sworn in by late November 2024.⁶²⁴ The autonomy rights, representation in the French Parliament, limited sovereignty and the representation in the EU

⁶²⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collectivity_of_Saint_Martin#History

⁶²¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collectivity_of_Saint_Martin#20th%E2%80%9321st_centuries

⁶²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collectivity_of_Saint_Martin#20th%E2%80%9321st_centuries

⁶²³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/January_2024_Sint_Maarten_general_election

⁶²⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_2024_Sint_Maarten_general_election

make it difficult to categorize the regime. Saint Martin, as well as the other overseas collectivities, represents a special case. Due to its higher degree of autonomy compared to other French administrative zones, such as the départements et régions d'outre-mer, the region cannot be classified as an Indirect Rule Colonial Regime. Instead, it can be categorized as a Defective Democracy with the additional designation of a protectorate-type. It is considered defective because, due to France's position, these territories do not possess full sovereignty.

V-Dem, LIED and FH do not provide data for Saint Martin.

Defective Democracy [as protectorate-type of France, Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Saint Pierre and Miquelon

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 05/30/1814]: Starting in the late 17th century, Saint Pierre and Miquelon faced English attacks, causing the French settlers to leave the islands. The British held control from 1713 to 1763, after which France regained ownership. However, when France joined the American Revolutionary War against Britain, the British launched an attack, leading to the deportation of the French settlers. Over the next 38 years, Saint Pierre and Miquelon changed hands several times between France and Great Britain. The islands endured ongoing invasions, the voluntary or forced removal of residents, and upheaval connected to the French Revolution. On 05/30/1814, the islands were finally ceded to France by the Treaty of Paris. During the War of the Seventh Coalition, the islands were occupied by the British temporarily, but in 1815, following Napoleon's second abdication, France ultimately regained permanent control of the islands.⁶²⁵ LIED does not treat Saint Pierre and Miquelon in its data.

10/27/1946 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Part of Other Country [France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the colony attained the status of a French Overseas Territory.⁶²⁶ On 07/19/1976 the territory once again changed its status to that of an overseas department.⁶²⁷

03/28/2003 End Part of Other Country [France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy [as protectorate-type of France, Liberal Democracy]: Saint Pierre and Miquelon acquired a unique status as an overseas collectivity (COM) in March 2003. Saint Pierre and

⁶²⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Saint_Pierre_and_Miquelon

⁶²⁶ https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Saint-Pierre_and_Miquelon

⁶²⁷ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon>

Miquelon gained the right to vote for both legislative and executive powers and is represented in the French Senate and Assembly. However, a representative of the French state oversees these institutions and has the authority to postpone legislative decisions, dissolve the parliament or the executive, and establish an interim government. Important policy areas, such as foreign affairs and security policy, are determined by France.⁶²⁸ The autonomy rights, representation in the French Parliament, and limited sovereignty make it difficult to categorize the regime. Saint Pierre and Miquelon, as well as the other overseas collectivities, represents a special case. Due to its higher degree of autonomy compared to other French administrative zones, such as the départements et régions d'outre-mer, the region cannot be classified as an Indirect Rule Colonial Regime. Instead, it can be categorized as a Defective Democracy with the additional designation of a protectorate-type. It is considered defective because, due to France's position, these territories do not possess full sovereignty.

FH, LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Saint Pierre and Miquelon.

Defective Democracy [as protectorate-type of France, Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy as part of the Windward Islands] [Start: 02/10/1763]: From 02/10/1763, Saint Vincent passed through various stages of colonial status under the British administration. A representative assembly was authorized in 1776, the Crown Colony government was installed in 1877, and a legislative council created in 1925, but franchise was limited, and most descendants of slaves were disenfranchised. For this period LIED does not treat Saint Vincent's colonial time.

01/01/1951 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: The 1951 constitutional reform introduced universal adult suffrage and direct election of the majority of the legislative council members.⁶²⁹ (Lansford 2021: 1408). Therefore, in line with the typical constitutional evolution of the British West Indies after World War II, Great Britain permitted the gradual formation of an autonomous local government in the colony (Hillebrands/Trefs 2005:595). LIED confirms that legislative and multiparty

⁶²⁸ https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/section_lc/LEGITEXT000006070633/LEGISCTA000006135519/2007-02-22/#LEGISCTA000006135519

⁶²⁹ <https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/saintvincentandgrenadines/11730.htm>

elections were held since 1951, and that universal suffrage was present. LIED identifies political liberties as absent in this timeframe.

01/03/1958 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as part of the Windward Islands]/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as associated state of United Kingdom]: On this date, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines joined the West Indies Federation, founded by ten British insular colonies, to form a territorial union that was economically and politically independent from Great Britain. The federation was dissolved in 1962. On 10/27/1969, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines were granted associated statehood status as an internally self-governing territory as part of the collective West Indies Associated States (Lansford 2021: 1408). From 1974 onwards, elections have been held regularly.

10/27/1979 Continuation (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as independent country]: On this date, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines gained full independence following a referendum.⁶³⁰ After gaining special membership in the Commonwealth in 1979, Sir Sydney Gun-Munro, the former governor, assumed the honorary position of governor-general while the British Crown remained ceremonial head of state. Concurrently, Premier Robert Milton Cato became the prime minister. Cato retained his position following the 05/12/1979 election, where his St. Vincent Labour Party (SVLP) won 11 out of 13 elective parliamentary seats (Lansford 2021: 1408). During Cato's tenure, the government faced growing opposition from the population due to perceived ineffective social and economic policies. The repression of trade unions and opposition groups led to the formation of the National Committee in Defense of Democracy in 1981. Following the 1984 parliamentary elections, the New Democratic Party (NDP) led by James F. Mitchell came to power, ending the ten-year rule of the Saint Vincent Labor Party (SNLP) under Milton Cato. The SVLP's electoral defeat was attributed to corruption scandals and a deteriorating national economy (Hillebrands/Trefs 2005). St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a parliamentary democracy with unicameral system. The constitution mandates the direct election of 15 representatives to the unicameral House of Assembly, while the governor general appoints six senators to the chamber. Regular elections occur, facilitating numerous transitions of power between various parties. Although civil liberties are typically respected, journalists may encounter the threat of criminal defamation charges, and same-sex relationships are prohibited by law. According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. In addition to that LIED scores the constant presence of political liberties since 1969. Violent crime

⁶³⁰ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Vincent_and_the_Grenadines_1979?lang=en

remains a significant concern within the country.⁶³¹ The Unity Labor Party won the elections and Ralph Gonsalves remained prime minister. The 2020 elections were deemed free and fair.⁶³² St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a parliamentary democracy with unicameral system. The constitution mandates the direct election of 15 representatives to the unicameral House of Assembly, while the governor general appoints six senators to the chamber. Regular elections occur, facilitating numerous transitions of power between various parties. Although civil liberties are typically respected, journalists may encounter the threat of criminal defamation charges, and same-sex relationships are prohibited by law. Violent crime remains a significant concern within the country.⁶³³ The Unity Labor Party won the elections and Ralph Gonsalves remained prime minister. The 2020 elections were deemed free and fair.⁶³⁴ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED, the elections were constantly competitive since 1979. Since 1979, FH has constantly classified the country as free, V-Dem does not list it.

(Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Samoa

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 12/02/1899]: Samoa became the final German colonial acquisition in the Pacific basin when it was received through the Tripartite Convention. This agreement was signed on 12/02/1899 and the ratifications were exchanged on 02/16/1900 in Washington. The German colonial period lasted for 14 years. Wilhelm Solf became the first governor.⁶³⁵ According to LIED no legislative and multiparty elections were present. Universal suffrage was absent (LIED). Political liberties were absent according to LIED. LIED's data start to list Samoa only since 1902.

08/29/1914 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by New Zealand, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date, during the early stages of World War I, the New Zealand Expeditionary Force successfully landed on Upolu without facing any opposition. They took control from the German authorities in response to a request from Great Britain, who sought New Zealand's assistance in carrying

⁶³¹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/st-vincent-and-grenadines/freedom-world/2023>

⁶³² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/st-vincent-and-grenadines/freedom-world/2023>

⁶³³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/st-vincent-and-grenadines/freedom-world/2023>

⁶³⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/st-vincent-and-grenadines/freedom-world/2023>

⁶³⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Samoa

out this significant and time-sensitive imperial duty.⁶³⁶ No elections were held during this period (LIED). For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent.

12/17/1920 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by New Zealand, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate of New Zealand, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the League of Nations officially granted New Zealand a Class C Mandate over Samoa, which was formerly a German colony. This mandate was established through the Samoa Constitution Order of 1920, replacing the military occupation with a civil administration starting from 05/01/1920. Between 1920 and 1962, Samoa was administered by the Department of External Affairs, a government department which had been specially created to oversee New Zealand's Island Territories and Samoa.⁶³⁷ The Samoa Act of 1921, effective from 04/01/1922, solidified the governance structure. According to the Samoa Act, the New Zealand Governor-General appointed an administrator stationed in Apia to exercise executive power and report to the New Zealand Minister of External Affairs in Wellington. The administrator and a local legislative council held the authority to create laws, although ultimate decision-making power rested with Wellington.⁶³⁸ After 1945, the mandate's classification was altered to that of a United Trust Territory.⁶³⁹ According to LIED legislative and multiparty elections were held since 1924 but universal suffrage was absent. A Fono of Taimua was the former Lower House of the legislature. In 1939, the system of appointment was abolished but voting rights were only granted to the Matai.⁶⁴⁰ Political liberties were absent according to LIED.

11/15/1957 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate of New Zealand, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate of New Zealand, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this day General elections were held for the new 48-member Legislative Assembly with 41 members elected by the Samoan people and five European members elected by universal suffrage from the inhabitants with a European status. In 1957's election the Samoan representatives were elected for the first time by the Samoan. However, the votes for the Samoan members were restricted to the Matai.⁶⁴¹ LIED considers that multiparty legislative elections were present but universal suffrage remained absent until 1990. Political liberties were absent according to LIED.

⁶³⁶ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samoa>

⁶³⁷ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samoa>

⁶³⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Samoa_Trust_Territory

⁶³⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Samoa_Trust_Territory

⁶⁴⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fono_of_Faipule

⁶⁴¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1957_Western_Samoan_general_election

01/01/1962 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate of New Zealand, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Oligarchy: On this date, Samoa gained independence from New Zealand and adopted the name „Western Samoa.“ Upon gaining independence, Western Samoa implemented the 1960 Constitution, which took effect and became the governing framework. This constitution draws inspiration from the British Westminster model of parliamentary democracy, while also incorporating elements of Samoan traditions and customs. The constitution framed Samoa as a parliamentary representative democracy that used a single member district plurality electoral system. However, only „Matai“ were entitled to vote or stand as candidates in elections in Samoa.⁶⁴² This restriction is reflected in the percentage of the population that participates in elections. According to Vanhanen it ranges between 4.1 (1964) and 10.5 (1988) (Vanhanen 2019). In Samoa, the term „Matai“ refers to the heads of families and extended families, and they play a central role in Samoan society. The Matai system is a traditional system of governance and social organization in Samoa, where each family group, or 'aiga, has its own Matai. The Matai are responsible for the welfare of their family group and play significant roles in village governance and decision-making processes. They are chosen based on their leadership skills, wisdom, and ability to serve and care for the family and the wider community. The selection process is usually based on consensus among family members, and a Matai can be either male or female. Due to this circumstance, Samoa is for example classified as oligarchy in other datasets (LIED). During the first ten years after independence the system resembled consensus politics. Most members of parliament were elected unopposed in their constituencies. In 1970 a period of ‘parliamentary factional politics’ started. For the first time more than one candidate contested the office of Prime Minister. Furthermore, political parties emerged. As parliamentarians increasingly vied for ministerial roles and influence, the competition for constituency seats became more intense. This trend reached its zenith with the establishment of political parties and heightened competition among candidates for parliamentary seats, ultimately culminating in the adoption of universal suffrage in 1990 (So'o 2001: 781). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1962 LIED scores the elections with a constant competitiveness. Per FH, from 1972 to 1988, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. As per FH's classification in 1989, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. However, political

⁶⁴² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Samoa;
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Samoa_2017?lang=en

liberties were absent until 1970. Since 1971, the country guarantees political liberties (LIED). As the constitution was adopted, it was anticipated that future heads of state would be chosen from among the four matai paramount chiefs in line with customary protocol. This is not a constitutional requirement, so Samoa can be considered a parliamentary republic, rather than a constitutional monarchy.⁶⁴³ At the time of independence, two out of the four highest-ranking paramount chiefs, known as Tama a 'Aiga, were appointed as joint heads of state, serving lifetime terms. Additionally, Fiamē Mata'afa Faumuina Mulinu'u II, another paramount chief, was elected to parliament and assumed the role of the country's first Prime Minister. Following the passing of his colleague Tupua Tamasese Mea'ole in 1963, Malietoa Tanumafili II held the position of Head of State alone.⁶⁴⁴

11/12/1990 End Electoral Oligarchy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date a constitutional referendum took place. The voting system was changed by the Electoral Amendment Act which introduced universal suffrage. However, the right to stand for elections remained with matai title holders. Of the approximately 220.000 inhabitants of Samoa, only 25.000 are matai, of whom only 5% are women. Due to the deficits in the right to stand for elections, Samoa cannot be classified as a full democracy according to our criteria.⁶⁴⁵ Western Samoa was renamed in State of Samoa on 07/04/1997. FH lists Samoa as partly free until 1988 and from then on as free. V-Dem does not list the country. On 06/16/2007 Tui Ātua Tupua Tamasese Efi was elected by the legislature to succeed Tanumafili after his death in May 2007. Tanumafili served a five-year term starting from June 2007.⁶⁴⁶ In 2021, an extraordinary political crisis unfolded in Samoa following controversial election results in April. The opposition party seemed poised to overthrow the ruling party, marking the potential end of their three-decade-long reign. Fiamē Naomi Mataafa, the daughter of Fiamē Faumuina Mataafa, was on the verge of becoming Samoa's first female prime minister. However, the ruling party contested that the composition of the newly elected legislature did not meet constitutional requirements, a claim dismissed by the judiciary. On 05/24, when the newly elected members arrived at the parliament building to assume their seats, they were denied entry. Despite this, Mataafa took her oath of office outside the building. Meanwhile, Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi, who had been the prime minister since 1998, declared his intention to continue as a caretaker until the dispute was resolved. In late June, the Supreme Court ordered the convening of parliament within seven days. However, when the head of state attempted to postpone the proceedings, the Court of Appeal ruled in July

⁶⁴³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O_ʻle_Ao_ʻo_ʻle_Malo

⁶⁴⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Samoa

⁶⁴⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Samoa

⁶⁴⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Samoa

that Mataafa's oath of office had been valid and legitimate.⁶⁴⁷ In the 2021 elections, the opposition party Fa'atuatua i le Atua Samoa ua Tasi (FAST) overtook the longstanding HRPP. When HRPP lawmakers did not accept the election results, the incoming government declined to swear them in. The supreme court intervened to address the crisis, showcasing its capability and autonomy. Overall, civil liberties and political rights are upheld and honored.⁶⁴⁸ LIED affirms that political liberties are constantly achieved since 1991. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Besides, LIED classifies the elections as competitive since 1990. According to FH, from 1990 to 1997, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. As per FH's classification in 1998, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. Per FH, for the rest of this regime period, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. V-Dem does not list Samoa in its data.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Samoa, American

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 12/02/1899]: In 1872, the chief of the eastern Samoan islands granted permission to the United States to establish a naval base in exchange for military protection. Subsequently, in 1878, the U.S. Navy constructed a coaling station in Pago Pago Bay for its Pacific Squadron and appointed a local Secretary. The origins of American Samoa can be traced back to the Second Samoan Civil War and the Tripartite Convention of 1899, where Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom reached an agreement. The Convention was signed on 12/02/1899 and resolved international rivalries by dividing the Samoan archipelago between Germany and the U.S.⁶⁴⁹ The eastern Samoan islands became U.S. territories, ultimately forming American Samoa, and the U.S. formally took control the following year, particularly focusing on the strategic harbor of Pago Pago.⁶⁵⁰ In the Treaty of Cession of Tutuila in 1900, several chiefs from the island of Tutuila pledged allegiance to the United States and formally transferred the island to American control. The final ruler of Manu'a, Tui Manu'a Elisara, endorsed the Treaty of Cession of

⁶⁴⁷ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Samoa-island-nation-Pacific-Ocean/History#ref224603>

⁶⁴⁸ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/samoa/freedom-world/2022>

⁶⁴⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tripartite_Convention

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_American_Samoa#European_and_American_Colonial_Division_of_the_Samoan_archipelago

Manu'a in 1904. These agreements were subsequently confirmed by the United States through the Ratification Act of 1929.⁶⁵¹ After World War II, the U.S. Department of Interior sponsored Organic Act 4500, aiming to incorporate American Samoa. However, the attempt was thwarted in Congress, largely due to the efforts of American Samoan chiefs. Their resistance led to the establishment of a local legislature, the American Samoa Fono, situated in the capital village of Fagatogo. Over time, the Navy-appointed governor was replaced by a locally elected one.⁶⁵² 01/01/1952 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]: The American Samoa Fono was reformed this year and the number of members for the House of Representatives was reduced to 18 which were all elected by secret ballot for the first time.⁶⁵³ LIED does not treat American Samoa during its colonial time. On 07/01/1967 a constitution was enacted, which granted American Samoa a higher degree of self-government. Notably, the U.S. Territory of American Samoa is listed as a non-self-governing territory by the United Nations. A listing which is disputed by the territorial government officials, who do consider themselves to be self-governing.⁶⁵⁴ The governance system follows a structure of a presidential representative democratic dependency, where the Governor of American Samoa serves as the head of government. Legislative authority is vested in the American Samoa Fono, while the judiciary operates independently of the executive and legislative branches.⁶⁵⁵ The head of government in American Samoa is the Governor, who, along with the Lieutenant Governor of American Samoa, is elected together on a single ticket through popular vote for a four-year term.⁶⁵⁶ American Samoa operates as a parliamentary democracy, maintaining the preservation of political rights and civil liberties. However, corruption poses a significant challenge, and although investigative journalists are active, the fear of substantial fines for defamation may lead to self-censorship. Additionally, there is a notable underrepresentation of women in politics within the country.⁶⁵⁷ In March 2022 the parliament and judicial council adopted reforms aimed at combatting corruption.⁶⁵⁸ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative

⁶⁵¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_American_Samoa#Colonization_by_the_United_States
⁶⁵²

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_American_Samoa#Current_status_of_the_territory_and_attempts_of_incorporation_in_the_United_States

⁶⁵³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Samoa_Fono

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_American_Samoa#Current_status_of_the_territory_and_attempts_of_incorporation_in_the_United_States

⁶⁵⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_American_Samoa

⁶⁵⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Samoa#Government_and_politics

⁶⁵⁷ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/san-marino/freedom-world/2023>

⁶⁵⁸ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/san-marino/freedom-world/2023>

elections were held during this period. V-Dem, LIED and FH do not register American Samoa. In comparative perspective, American Samoa is a borderline case, however, should still be classified as an indirect rule colonial regime because it lacks international sovereignty and remains an unincorporated territory under United States authority. While it possesses a locally elected legislature and governor, these institutions operate under delegated authority, and ultimate sovereignty rests with Washington. This arrangement mirrors the logic of indirect rule: traditional and local elites are granted limited autonomy in administering internal affairs, yet the overarching legal, political, and foreign policy powers are controlled by the colonial metropole. Thus, despite elements of self-government, American Samoa's dependent status and absence of full independence justify its continued classification as an indirect rule colonial regime.

Indirect Rule Colonial Regime as of 07/01/2025 [of USA, Liberal Democracy] continued.

San Marino

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchy [Start: 10/08/1600]: Around 1200, San Marino was governed by the Council of the Heads of State, the Arengo. Two Captain Regents ruled the city-state, selected for six months and representing the state equally. However, the Arengo gradually transferred its powers to the Grand and General Council, formed in the 14th century. This council comprised 20 nobles, 20 burghers, and 20 land-owning peasants. The Grand Council eventually evolved into an oligarchy dominated by a few influential families. On 10/08/1600, a new constitution was introduced, which formalized the existing institutional system (Baukhage 2010). When Napoleon invaded Italy in 1797, he respected San Marino's independence, further confirmed by the 1815 Congress of Vienna. After political upheavals in Italy ended in 1862, the newly formed Kingdom of Italy officially recognized San Marino.⁶⁵⁹ Until 1906, the 60 members of parliament were appointed for life.⁶⁶⁰ Overall, until 1906 the political regime of San Marino was more an oligarchy than a democracy (Baukhage 2010: 1669). On 03/25/1906, the Arengo was reconstituted through a referendum, which ended the non-electoral oligarchical system and restored its power to elect the Grand Council. Since then, the Grand Council has been elected in direct, equal, and secret elections. However, voting rights were restricted to male heads of households and academics, excluding women, clergy, the mentally disabled, and felons (Baukhage 2010). Based on our observations, multiparty

⁶⁵⁹ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sao-Tome-and-Principe/Government-and-society>

⁶⁶⁰ https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/San_Marino#Die_Zeit_bis_zum_Ende_des_Zweiten_Weltkriegs

executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED the elections were not competitive until 1906. Since 1907, competitiveness is achieved. Moreover, political liberties were absent for the entire period (LIED).

06/19/1909 End Electoral Oligarchy/Start (Male) Defective Democracy: On this date, general elections for the Grand and General Council were held.⁶⁶¹ Suffrage was expanded to male citizens aged 24 or older in 1909.⁶⁶² However, women gained the right to vote only in 1957. In this period San Marino experienced an unstable and restricted democratic phase. San Marino remained neutral during the First World War. Between 1918 and 1923, a period characterized by relatively unstable governments ensued (Veenendaal 2020, Baukhage 2010). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. While LIED affirms the presence of competitive elections for the entire time, it scores political liberties as absent. AF classifies San Marino between 1906 and 1925 as a parliamentary democracy, LIED as a male democracy between 1909 and 1920 and as a multiparty autocracy until 1922. We classify the regime this period as a defective democracy, however, it was a borderline case between this category and an electoral hybrid regime.

03/03/1923 End (Male) Defective Democracy/Start Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy: On this date, a fascist government was elected, but the country remained neutral during the Second World War. Under the fascist administration, suffrage was again restricted to the heads of households, academics, militia members, and citizens who paid income tax of at least 150 Lira per year (Baukhage 2010, Edwards/Michaelides 1996). According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. For the given timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent.

09/13/1944 End Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy, afterwards by Allied forces]: On this date, Germany invaded San Marino. From 09/17-20/1944, the German and Allied forces engaged in battle on San Marino's soil during the Battle of San Marino. Afterward, Allied troops occupied San Marino, but they only stayed for two months before returning the Republic's sovereignty.⁶⁶³ No legislative elections were held (LIED). In 1944, LIED still identifies political liberties as absent.

⁶⁶¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1909_San_Marino_general_election

⁶⁶² https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elezioni_politiche_a_San_Marino_del_1909

⁶⁶³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_San_Marino#19th_century

03/25/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Allied Forces]/Start (Male) Defective Democracy: On this date, San Marino held general elections mandated by the British Army to remove all fascist-friendly politicians. From this date, San Marino had the world's first democratically elected communist-socialist government, a coalition between the Sammarinese Communist Party and the Sammarinese Socialist Party. Male citizens of San Marino, aged at least 24, were eligible to vote.⁶⁶⁴ For the elections on 09/13/1959, absentee voting was introduced, benefitting the Sammarinese Christian Democratic Party (PDCS) as many of its voters lived in the United States of America. However, absentee voting was abolished in 1966 due to pressure from leftist parties. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections are considered as competitive ever since according to LIED. Besides, political liberties were still not present until 1952 according to LIED.

09/13/1964 End (Male) Defective Democracy/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date, the first elections with female suffrage, introduced in 1957, were held. Formal equality between men and women was achieved in 1974 with the Declaration on the Civic Rights and Fundamental Principles of the Order of San Marino, which lowered the voting age to 18 (Baukhage 2010). San Marino is a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral system. Free and fair elections are held regularly and civil liberties as well as political rights are safeguarded. However, corruption remains a problem.⁶⁶⁵ On 04/01/2022, Paolo Rondelli was elected as one of the two captain regents, becoming the first openly gay head of state.⁶⁶⁶ While the captains have a ceremonial role, the secretary of state for foreign and political affairs is the head of government. Luca Beccari of the Sammarinese Christian Democratic Party (PDCS) was elected to this post in the elections on 12/08/2019.⁶⁶⁷ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which we consider competitive. This aligns with the observations of LIED. Moreover, the country guaranteed constant political liberties since 1964 per LIED. V-Dem does not list the country. As per FH's classification from 1972 onward, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Marxer/Pállinger 2009)

⁶⁶⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945_San_Marino_general_election

⁶⁶⁵ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/san-marino/freedom-world/2023>

⁶⁶⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_San_Marino

⁶⁶⁷ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/san-marino/freedom-world/2022>

Sao Tome and Principe

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Portugal, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: xx/xx/1753]: São Tomé and Príncipe were uninhabited before being colonized by the Portuguese in 1486.⁶⁶⁸ The islands became a Portuguese crown colony in 1753. On 06/11/1951⁶⁶⁹, Portugal official started to refer to its colonies as Oversea Provinces, in order „to retain the remaining colonies and to appease anticolonial demands from the United Nations”⁶⁷⁰. From 1900 to 1972, V-Dem's JCE is classified as robust, indicating strong and regular judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In 1973, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In 1974, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. During its colonial time no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held and universal suffrage was absent (LIED). According to LIED political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as absent from 1900 to 1910, not really present from 1911 to 1925 and again absent from 1926 onward.

07/12/1975 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Portugal, Liberal Democracy]/Start One-Party Autocracy: The country gained its independence as Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe. In 1960, the Committee for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe was formed and later became the Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe (MLSTP), which advocated for independence. In 1973, the Organization of African Unity recognized the MLSTP, and Portugal granted the islands local autonomy. After negotiations, independence was proclaimed on 07/12/1975, and a transitional government was formed under MLSTP leadership. Universal suffrage was introduced in 1975.⁶⁷¹ According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. The MLSTP was the only party in the country and the institutional setup exhibits all hallmarks of one-party

⁶⁶⁸ <https://www.worldhistory.org/article/1763/the-portuguese-colonization-of-sao-tome-and-princi/>

⁶⁶⁹ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/portuguese-mozambique-1951-1975/>

⁶⁷⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overseas_province

⁶⁷¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

autocracy: centralized party control over candidate selection, restricted political liberties, and highly limited checks on executive power.⁶⁷² All electoral contests lacked genuine competition. These elections served primarily as mechanisms of confirmation for the ruling party's dominance rather than as arenas of political choice. After the non-competitive election of 1975 Pinto da Costa became the president, and Miguel Trovoada the prime minister (Lansford 2021: 1421).⁶⁷³ On 08/22/1990, a constitution introduced by the Central Committee of the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (ML-STP), was overwhelmingly approved in a referendum on 08/22/1990, which aimed to establish an electoral multi-party regime, while also imposing a two-term limit on the President.⁶⁷⁴ In October 1990, Manuel Pinto da Costa was succeeded as Secretary General of the party (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 56). For the relevant regime period, from 1975 to 1990 V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. As classified by FH 1975 and 1976, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH, from 1977 to 1989, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. According to FH, in 1990, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. For the given period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present until 1989 and are ambiguous afterwards.

01/20/1991 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, multiparty legislative elections were held, which were won by the Democratic Convergence Party-Reflection Group, defeating the ML-STP (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 56).⁶⁷⁵ São Tomé and Príncipe held from then on regular, competitive national elections and has undergone multiple transfers of power between rival parties. Civil liberties are generally respected, but poverty and corruption have weakened some institutions and contributed to dysfunction in the justice system. According to FH, in 1991 and 1992, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. As per FH's classification from 1993 onward, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Furthermore, LIED considers that political liberties are present since 2011. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI scores them as present already since the country's democratic

⁶⁷² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%A3o_Tom%C3%A9_and_Pr%C3%ADncipe

⁶⁷³ See e.g. also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1985_S%C3%A3o_Tom%C3%A9an_legislative_election

⁶⁷⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1990_S%C3%A3o_Tom%C3%A9an_constitutional_referendum;
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sao_Tome_and_Principe_2003?lang=en

⁶⁷⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_S%C3%A3o_Tom%C3%A9an_legislative_election

transition in 1991. Threats to judicial independence have been a growing concern in recent years.⁶⁷⁶ Overnight on 11/24&25/2022 an unsuccessful coup led by Delfim Neves took place. Universal suffrage is granted and a new constitution, promulgated in 1990, secures civil liberties. Sao Tome is a semi-presidential democracy, the president being the head of state and the prime minister the head of government.⁶⁷⁷ The oppositional party ADI won elections in 11/2022, however the process was tainted by irregularities and incompetence of the electoral commission during the voting procedure. Anyhow, based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as competitive since the country's democratic transition. From 1991 to 2001 V-Dem's CEI indicates somewhat cleanliness scores. Since 2002 constant clean elections were held. The overall election conditions were somewhat free and fair until 2000. For the following nine years free and fair conditions were achieved. From 2010 to 2013 the overall conditions were somewhat free and fair again. Since 2014 electoral freedom and fairness are provided (V-Dem EF&FI). In 1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1992 to 2004, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. From 2005 onward, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Saudi Arabia

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 09/15/1818]: The First Saudi State was established in February 1727 and gained control of most of present-day Saudi Arabia through conquests, including Mecca and Medina, until it was defeated by the Ottomans in the „Wahhabi War” on 09/15/1818.⁶⁷⁸ The Al Saud regained power in 1824 but only controlled the Najd region, leading to a long struggle for control with the Al Rashid. The Al Saud were eventually defeated in 1891 and forced into exile in Kuwait. The Ottoman Empire maintained nominal control over the Arabian Peninsula in the early 1900s, with a collection of

⁶⁷⁶ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/sao-tome-and-principe/freedom-world/2022>;
<https://freedomhouse.org/country/sao-tome-and-principe/freedom-world/2023>

⁶⁷⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_S%C3%A3o_Tom%C3%A9_and_Pr%C3%ADncipe

⁶⁷⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahhabi_War

tribal leaders, including the Al Saud, ruling under the Sharif of Mecca's authority.⁶⁷⁹ For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent.

02/16/1902 End Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Autocratic Monarchy]/Start Autocratic Monarchy: The Emirate of Riyadh was the initial version of the Third Saudi State from 1902 to 1913, headed by the House of Saud. This state was established when the Saudi forces conquered Riyadh from the Emirate of Ha'il during the Battle of Riyadh.⁶⁸⁰ It was succeeded by the Emirate of Nejd and Hasa and was considered the earliest legal predecessor of modern-day Saudi Arabia.⁶⁸¹ The second form of the Third Saudi State was the Emirate of Nejd and Hasa, which lasted from 1913 to 1921. It was a monarchy under the leadership of the House of Saud. The state was created after the Ottoman garrison lost control of Al-Ahsa to Saudi forces during the Conquest of al-Hasa.⁶⁸² The Sultanate of Nejd, which lasted from 1921 to 1926, was the third manifestation of the Third Saudi State and served as a forerunner to present-day Saudi Arabia. It was governed by the House of Saud as a monarchy, and emerged when Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, the Emir of Riyadh, became sultan over Nejd and its surrounding areas.⁶⁸³ For the relevant period, from 1902 to 1925 V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

01/08/1926 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd]: After the Kingdom of **Hejaz** fell to Abdul Aziz's forces in December 1925, he declared himself king of Hejaz in January 1926 and combined his territories with the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd.⁶⁸⁴ On 05/20/1927, the Treaty of Jeddah was signed, in which Great Britain recognized the independence of the Kingdoms of Hijaz and Najd, both ruled by the monarchy established through conquest by Adb al Aziz al Saud over the previous 25 years (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 91). In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held

⁶⁷⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Saudi_Arabia#

⁶⁸⁰ <https://www.thenationalnews.com/gulf-news/saudi-arabia/2022/01/13/the-capture-of-riyadh-1902-how-a-daring-raid-shaped-arabia/>

⁶⁸¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emirate_of_Riyadh

⁶⁸² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emirate_of_Nejd_and_Hasa#

⁶⁸³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultanate_of_Nejd

⁶⁸⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultanate_of_Nejd

unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1926-1932, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

09/23/1932 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as unified Saudi Arabia]: The Kingdoms of Hijaz and Najd were unified under the name Saudi Arabia. The king serves traditionally as both the head of state and government. He is selected by his predecessor from among the male descendants of the nation's founder Ibn Saud. However, this selection must be approved by the Allegiance Council, consisting of senior princes.⁶⁸⁵ On 09/27/2022 Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, the son of King Salman, was appointed prime minister making him the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia. In general, the political system is dominated by the royal family. The extensive size of the Al Saud family enables it to occupy most crucial positions within the kingdom and maintain a presence across all levels of government. Traditionally, key ministries and all thirteen regional governorships have been reserved for members of the royal family. Decisions are reached through consultations between the King, the Council of Ministers, Islamic scholars (at least until the mid-2010s) and tribal leaders. Saudi Arabia does not have a conventional constitution. Instead, the Qur'an and the Sunnah are declared as the state constitution. Without national elections or political parties, Saudi Arabian politics operates within two distinct realms, internally between the royal family and externally between the royal family and the broader Saudi society. Factional divisions within the Al Saud family are based on clan loyalties, personal ambitions, and ideological disparities. The dominant clan faction, referred to as the 'Sudairi Seven', consists of the late King Fahd, his full brothers, and their descendants. The Consultative Assembly is the formal advisory body of Saudi Arabia. It is a deliberative assembly that advises the king on important issues for the country. With the power to propose laws to the king and his cabinet for approval and enactment, it consists of 150 members appointed by the king. They are selected from scholars, individuals with expertise, and specialists. Since 2013, the Assembly has included 30 female members out of the total 150, meeting a 20 percent minimum quota for women's representation.⁶⁸⁶ Male suffrage was introduced in 2005 while female suffrage was introduced in 2015. Men and women have the right to vote for half the seats in „virtually powerless“ municipal councils.⁶⁸⁷ Political participation in Saudi Arabia is largely restricted, with the monarchy limiting public

⁶⁸⁵ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2023>

⁶⁸⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Saudi_Arabia#cite_note-7

⁶⁸⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

involvement in meaningful ways. Municipal elections, characterized by a lack of political parties, see voters heavily influenced by tribal and religious leaders, many of whom maintain close ties to the ruling establishment.⁶⁸⁸ In Saudi Arabia are almost all political rights and civil liberties restricted. Women and members of religious minority groups often face significant discrimination, both in law and in practice. The working conditions are often exploitative.⁶⁸⁹ In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Since 1902, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1933 onward, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Per FH, from 1972 onward, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Autocratic Monarchy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Bank/Richter/Sunik 2014, Metz 1992, Champion 2003, Ibrahim 2001)

Senegal

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 10/27/1895]: Senegal has been under French influence since the 17th century. Senegal became part of French West Africa in 1895 and a French colony in 1920 (Lansford 2021: 1434).⁶⁹⁰ The French colonial administration governed Senegal through appointed officials. Universal suffrage was introduced in 1945.⁶⁹¹ LIED confirms that universal suffrage was introduced in 1945. Since 1871 France allowed a seat for Senegal in the National Assembly. In 1914 the Blaise Diagne first African deputy was elected. This privilege lasted until Senegal gained independence. Despite the fact that elections were held and LIED classifies legislative and multiparty elections as present since 1946 we should consider the colonial time as direct rule colonial regime as no local legislative elections were held.⁶⁹² Territorial assembly elections were held in Senegal on 03/31/1957. The result was a landslide victory for the Senegalese

⁶⁸⁸ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2023>

⁶⁸⁹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2023>

⁶⁹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_West_Africa

⁶⁹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

⁶⁹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Senegal

Popular Bloc (BPS). For the colonial time, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present until 1945 and are ambiguous afterwards. LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Senegal before 1904. From 1904 to 1958, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

11/25/1958 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy [as Protectorate of France, Liberal Democracy]: After the 1958 referendum, Senegal became an autonomous republic within the French Community on this date.⁶⁹³ During this period, the country was governed by its Territorial Assembly, which had been in place since 1957 and was tasked with making key legislative decisions. Some party pluralism existed, with parties such as the African Regroupment Party (PRA) and the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS) allowed to form and operate. Full independence was not granted until 1960 (Alalade 1981: 43).⁶⁹⁴ However, political liberties were absent (LIED) but V-Dem's PCLI scored an ambiguous presence. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. Léopold Sédar Senghor, a leading figure in Senegalese politics, was a dominant presence during this time.

01/17/1959 End Electoral Autocracy [as Protectorate of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Part of Other Country [Mali, Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional Regime]: In January 1959, it merged with the neighboring French Sudan (currently known as Mali) to establish the Federation of Mali. The federation gained full independence within the French Community on 06/20/1960 (Lansford 2021: 1434). For 1959, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. In 1959, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified as ambiguous regarding the state of political liberties, indicating an intermediate state between present and absent.

08/20/1960 End Part of Other Country [Mali, Electoral Autocracy]/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: Following independence from the Mali Federation, the BDS (later known as BPS, UPS, PS) dominated the political landscape and secured victory in pre-independence elections,

⁶⁹³ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senegal>

while it absorbed most other parties into its fold. During this regime period, no competitive elections were held, according to LIED. V-Dem's CEI scores ambiguous cleanliness. Following V-Dem's EF&FI somewhat free and fair conditions were given. The harassment of remaining opposition factions commenced shortly after independence, leading to the outlawing of one opposition party in 1960 and the arrest of several opposition leaders. Special tribunals were established in October 1960 to adjudicate political offenses. A power struggle between Senghor and his prime minister from December 1962 to January 1963 culminated in the arrest and subsequent lengthy imprisonment of Prime Minister Dia, consolidating Senghor's personal control over the ruling party (Foltz 1964: 16-63, Klein 1987: 326, LeVine 2004: 204, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 91). On 12/19/1962, the parliament approved President Léopold Senghor as the new head of government, merging the positions of president and prime minister.⁶⁹⁵ Following the dispute Senghor established an authoritarian presidential regime where all rival political parties were suppressed.⁶⁹⁶ For this time, political liberties remained absent according to LIED and ambiguous following V-Dem's PCLI. In 1961, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. In this period the regime was a borderline case between an electoral hybrid regime and an electoral autocracy. For 1960-1962, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/03/1963 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start One-Party Autocracy: A new draft constitution, which eliminated the position of prime minister and established a presidential system, was approved by 99 percent of the voters in a national referendum held on 03/03/1963. Legislative elections were held on 12/01/1963, the Senegalese Progressive Union won all of the seats in the National Assembly. President Senghor was re-elected on December 12/01/1963.⁶⁹⁷ The 1963 constitution that created a majoritarian electoral system ensured de facto one-party rule. The Senegalese Progressive Union was the de facto only legally permitted party from 1963 until 1975.⁶⁹⁸ In accordance with LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For

⁶⁹⁵ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/senegal-1960-present/>

⁶⁹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A9opold_S%C3%A9dar_Senghor

⁶⁹⁷ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/senegal-1960-present/>

⁶⁹⁸ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senegal>

1963-1969, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1970-1975, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. Per FH, from 1972 to 1974, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH in 1975, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous until 1968 and as somewhat present afterwards regarding the state of political liberties.

03/19/1976 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: Following the experience of a one-party system, Senegal restored political pluralism but limited the number of authorized political parties to three, each representing a specific political current. However, this initial shift towards a competitive landscape was criticized as ineffective, and most significantly as „a departure of form, but not of substance from the earlier authoritarian regime“ (Fatton 1986: 283). Nonetheless, democratization continued, president Léopold Sédar Sengho resigning and allowing for a peaceful transfer of power (yet without a popular mandate) in 1981 to Abdou Diouf, followed by the introduction of a multi-party system without restrictions in 05/06/1981 (Fatton 1986). This piece of legislation amended the third article of the Constitution which limited the number of political parties. With the introduction of an unrestricted multi-party system, every Senegalese citizen is free to create his or her own political party.⁶⁹⁹ The governments of Senegal and Gambia signed an agreement to form a confederation on December 12/12/1981, and the Confederation of Senegal and Gambia was formally established on February 2/1/1982. Legislative elections were held on 2/27/1983, and the PSS (Parti Socialiste du Senegal - former Senegalese Progressive Union) won 111 out of 120 seats in the National Assembly. The PDS (Parti Democratique Senegalais) won eight seats in the National Assembly. President Diouf was re-elected with 83.5 percent of the vote on 2/27/1983.⁷⁰⁰ The election was marred by irregularities and the opposition suffered chronically from a lack of resources and organization; the elections therefore cannot be considered to have been held on an even competitive landscape (Fatton 1986: 288). LIED affirms that no competitive elections were held during this time. From 1976 to 1977 not really cleanliness is scored. Between 1978 to 1992 the cleanliness is considered as ambiguous. Since 1993 V-Dem's CEI indicates somewhat

⁶⁹⁹ <https://tsep.africa.ufl.edu/the-party-system-and-conditions-of-candidacy/senegal/>

⁷⁰⁰ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/senegal-1960-present/>

cleanliness. V-Dem's EF&FI indicates somewhat free and fair elections until 1977. For the following five years ambiguous electoral conditions are scored. Between 1983 and 1987 the elections were somewhat free and fair. Ambiguous outcomes were scored again until 1992. Since 1993 V-Dem's EF&FI underlines freedom and fairness for the country's election. According to LIED no political liberties were present during this time. V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were somewhat present until 1989 and present since 1990. As classified by FH in 1976, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. According to FH, in 1977, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH, in 1978, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. Per FH's scoring from 1979 to 1983, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 from 1984 to 1992 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Per FH's evaluation from 1993 to 1995, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. As per FH, from 1996 to 1999, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1976-2000, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. The confederation was dissolved by Senegal on 09/30/1989 after the Gambia refused to move closer toward union.⁷⁰¹

02/27/2000 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, Abdoulaye Wade defeated incumbent Abdou Diouf in a regularly scheduled election. This was the first time that elections in Senegal resulted in the defeat of the incumbent Socialist Party (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 56). On 03/19/2000, the opposition prevailed in the second round of a just presidential election, resulting in the displacement of the dominant-party regime (Vengroff 2001: 129-62).⁷⁰² The period between 2000 and 2019 in Senegal was characterized by a mix of political evolution and challenges. Following Abdoulaye Wade's historic electoral victory in 2000, Senegal entered a phase of political change, seeking to strengthen democratic institutions and expand political freedoms. Under President Wade's leadership, reforms were initiated to enhance civil liberties and diversify the political landscape. This included promoting press freedom and bolstering civil society. Per FH, in 2000 and 2001, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. According to FH,

⁷⁰¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senegambia_Confederation

⁷⁰² <http://africanelections.tripod.com/sn.html>

from 2002 to 2007, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. As classified by FH from 2008 to 2011, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. As per FH's classification in 2012, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. Per FH, from 2013 to 2017, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. As per FH's classification in 2018, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. According to FH, a score of 5 to 7 from 2019 to 2024 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Moreover, regarding the political liberties, are present until 2016 according to LIED. Since 2017 they changed back to absent outcomes. However, V-Dem's PCLI declares them as fully present for the entire time. Between 2000 and 2006, based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. Since 2007, according to the Polity5 indicator, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For 2000, 2001 and for 2020-2023, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 2002-2019, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. Additionally, efforts were made to diversify the economy and curb corruption. However, Senegal also faced challenges during this time, including economic inequality, social unrest, and political instability. Despite strides towards democracy, some institutions remained vulnerable to political influence and corruption. Moreover, ethnic and regional tensions persisted in certain parts of the country, leading to occasional unrest. Despite these challenges, Senegal continued its path towards democracy and solidified its position as one of the most stable and democratic nations in West Africa. The period between 2000 and 2019 was characterized by a steady pursuit of political reform and institutional strengthening, coupled with efforts to drive economic growth and social development. International observers declared the election on 09/24/2019 as credible, despite the exclusion of two prominent opposition politicians, Khalifa Sall and Karim Wade, who could have posed serious challenges to President Sall. In January 2019, just weeks before the election, the Constitutional Council ruled that both were ineligible to run in the presidential election due to their previous convictions in separate, politically contentious corruption cases.⁷⁰³ In 2022 multiple challenges to democracy occurred. Opposition

⁷⁰³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/senegal/freedom-world/2022>

parties were restricted and partly banned, a measure that resulted in mass protests on 06/03, resulting in around 200 arrests and three individuals killed. Freedom of speech and press were under fire by the government as well, with certain oppositional news networks briefly banned and multiple journalists arrested.⁷⁰⁴ Therefore, Senegal is classified as a defective democracy. Senegal is a presidential democracy with a unicameral legislature, where the president is elected through direct universal suffrage.⁷⁰⁵ The three branches of government are generally independent; however, corruption remains an ongoing challenge.⁷⁰⁶ In 02/2024 the acting president of Senegal, Macky Sall, cancelled an upcoming election shortly before voting was scheduled, claiming that disputes between the legislative and judicial branches had to be settled first.⁷⁰⁷ This cancellation was deemed unlawful and overturned by the supreme court of Senegal after weeks of deadly protests. The presidential election took place on 03/24/2024, leading to a victory of opposition politician Bassirou Diomaye Faye. The transfer of power happened peacefully.⁷⁰⁸ Since 2000 LIED classifies the elections as competitive. V-Dem's CEI indicates somewhat clean elections since 2002. The overall election conditions were free and fair until 2006, before they changed to somewhat freedom and fairness for five years. Since 2012 the elections are free and fair again (V-Dem EF&FI).

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Bendel 1999b)

Serbia

[Serbia and Yugoslavia, along with its short-lived successor, the Union of Serbia and Montenegro (02/04/2003 – 06/05/2006), are treated as separate countries in this dataset. We adopted this approach due to significant concerns about the assumption, used in other datasets, that they represent the same country.]

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as Serbia] [Start: 04/23/1815]: The house of Obrenović came to power under the leadership of Miloš I in the Serbian Uprising between 04/23/1815–07/26/1817⁷⁰⁹ against the Ottoman Empire. This led to the formation of the Principality of Serbia in 1817.⁷¹⁰ In 1882 the Principality of Serbia elevated to the status of Kingdom of Serbia.

⁷⁰⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/senegal/freedom-world/2023>

⁷⁰⁵ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Senegal/Government-and-society>

⁷⁰⁶ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/senegal/freedom-world/2023>

⁷⁰⁷ <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/03/world/africa/senegal-president-cancels-election.html>

⁷⁰⁸ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68636327>

⁷⁰⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Serbian_Uprising

⁷¹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obrenovi%C4%87_dynasty

The independence of Serbia was internationally recognized in 1878.⁷¹¹ For male voters who paid taxes suffrage was granted in the Constitution of 1869, and in the Constitution of 1888 the right to vote was given to all males of age 21. For 1900-1902, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

06/15/1903 End Autocratic Monarchy [as Serbia]/Start Constitutional Monarchy [as Serbia]: During the May Coup 1903 (06/10–11; May refers to the Old Style dating system) Alexander I and his wife were assassinated⁷¹² which meant the end of the Obrenović dynasty.⁷¹³ Peter I became the king of Serbia.⁷¹⁴ He adopted a revised version of the 1888 constitution and allegedly gained popularity for his commitment to parliamentary democracy.⁷¹⁵ For 1903-1915, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Until 1914, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

01/01/1916 End Constitutional Monarchy [as Serbia]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Austria, Constitutional Monarchy and Bulgaria, Constitutional Monarchy]: After three failed invasion attempts by the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, a combined invasion of Austrian-Hungarian, German and Bulgarian forces attacked Serbia in October of 1915 and took the country by 11/24^h. Parts of the army and the government fled to Corfu.⁷¹⁶ Serbia was divided into one zone occupied by Austria-Hungary and one zone occupied by Bulgaria⁷¹⁷. On 01/01/1916, Austria-Hungary established the Military General Governorate of Serbia (MGG/S), which is why we code this date as the start of the regime. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present.

11/01/1918 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Austria, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start (Monarchical) Transition Regime: Following the victories of the remaining parts of the Serbian

⁷¹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principality_of_Serbia

⁷¹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_I_of_Serbia

⁷¹³ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_Coup_\(Serbia\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_Coup_(Serbia))

⁷¹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_I_of_Serbia

⁷¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_I_of_Serbia#Politics

⁷¹⁶ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbian_campaign_\(1915\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbian_campaign_(1915))

⁷¹⁷ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarian_occupation_of_Serbia_\(World_War_I\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarian_occupation_of_Serbia_(World_War_I))

Army alongside other Entente-forces, Bulgaria signed an armistice and the armies of Austria-Hungary and Germany retreated.⁷¹⁸ Belgrad was liberated by the Royal Serbian Army on 10/30/1918. In respect of the short period of time, we code this as a transition period.

12/01/1918 End (Monarchical) Transition Regime/Start Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Constitutional Monarchy]: Serbia became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, later renamed Yugoslavia. This constitutional monarchy introduced male suffrage in 1920, and multiparty elections began at the national level. Serbia, as a constituent region, operated under the centralized authority of Yugoslavia. Political liberties were limited (see **Yugoslavia**).

01/06/1929 Continuation Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Autocratic Monarchy]: King Aleksandar Karadjordjevic declared a royal dictatorship, dissolving parliament and suspending constitutional governance. Serbia remained a component of Yugoslavia, governed under the same repressive framework. Political liberties were absent (see **Yugoslavia**).

03/27/1941 Continuation Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Military Autocracy]: Following a coup, Serbia continued to be part of Yugoslavia, now under military rule. The new government lacked democratic legitimacy, and Serbia's political and administrative affairs were directed by the central authority of the Yugoslav regime (see **Yugoslavia**).

04/06/1941 End Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Military Autocracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: The German invasion fragmented Yugoslavia. Serbia was directly occupied and administered by German forces through collaborationist puppet governments. Though technically still within the Yugoslav framework, Serbia's governance was entirely controlled by external forces, with no political liberties or meaningful elections (see **Yugoslavia**).

10/20/1944 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date, Belgrade was liberated from German occupation by Soviet and Bulgarian troops, as well as Yugoslav partisans. This marked the end of the occupation for the Serbian territories within Yugoslavia. On 03/07/1945, and during the retreat of the German forces, a government dominated by Tito and the communists was established (Petrovich 1947: 508-9, Van Dyke 1947: 375). Serbia became a republic within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was officially proclaimed on 11/29/1945, governed by a centralized communist regime led by Tito. Political liberties were absent, and elections were not competitive. Serbia's status was that of a fully integrated part of the federal Yugoslav state (see **Yugoslavia**).

⁷¹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austro-Hungarian_occupation_of_Serbia#Liberation_of_Serbia

01/20/1990 End Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Communist Ideocracy]/Start No Central Authority: With the disintegration of the League of Yugoslav Communists, centralized control over Yugoslavia faded. Serbia remained within the Yugoslav framework, but governance structures were breaking down. While opposition parties formed, Serbia was still considered part of Yugoslavia during this transitional phase (see **Yugoslavia**).

04/27/1992 End No Central Authority/Start Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Electoral Autocracy]: Under the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (composed of Serbia and Montenegro), Serbia continued as part of a unified state. Elections were neither free nor fair, and political liberties remained restricted. Serbia's political system was subordinate to the broader federal structure of Yugoslavia (see **Yugoslavia**).

02/04/2003 Continuation Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Defective Democracy]: Serbia became part of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, a looser federation. Although competitive elections were held, political liberties were not fully secured. Serbia's governance operated within the framework of this broader union until its dissolution (see **Yugoslavia**).

06/05/2006 End Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Defective Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy [as independent country]: On this date, Serbia acknowledged the end of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro.⁷¹⁹ During this period regular free and fair elections were held. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections are classified as competitive (LIED). Until 2013 the election remained somewhat clean. For the time since 2014 V-Dem's CEI indicates ambiguous cleanliness of the elections. Moreover, V-Dem's EF&FI underlines somewhat freedom and fairness until 2015. Since 2016 the overall conditions are considered as ambiguous. From 2003 to 2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. In 2013, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 2014-2016, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. According to FH, from 2006 to 2008 the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. As per FH's classification from 2009 to 2015, the country is considered free with a score ranging

⁷¹⁹ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17907947>; <https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Serbia.html>

from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Per FH's scoring in 2016, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. While civil liberties were overwhelmingly upheld, an increasingly hostile environment towards independent media perpetuated. Moreover, the judiciary remained plagued by issues of corruption (Puddington 2016: 598). Furthermore, LIED still classified political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI outcomes remain the same until 2012, as they changed to somewhat presence since 2013.

04/02/2017 End Defective Democracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: In the April 2017 presidential elections, Vučić won the election with 55 percent of the vote in a field of eleven candidates. The campaign was characterized by media bias and allegations of misuse of public resources and vote buying. The SNS was previously accused in the 2016 snap elections rigging the polls and tampering with ballot boxes. OSCE election observers noted pressure on public-sector workers to vote for the ruling party. Private television outlets also largely favored the SNS in their coverage.⁷²⁰ On 04/03/2022 general elections were held in Serbia to elect both the president and members of the National Assembly, although initially scheduled for 2024. The OSCE criticized irregularities such as an unbalanced access to the media, undue pressure on public sector employees to support the incumbents, significant campaign finance disparities and misuse of state resources resulted in unequal conditions for contestants.⁷²¹ For 2017-2019, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2020, 2021 and 2023, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In 2022, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED the elections remained competitive until 2019. Since 2020 no competitiveness is achieved. Furthermore, V-Dem's CEI indicates not really cleanliness scores. The overall election conditions are classified as ambiguous by V-Dem's EF&FI. According to FH, in 2017, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. Per FH, from 2018 onward, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free.

⁷²⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/freedom-world/2019>;

<https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/freedom-world/2022>

⁷²¹ <https://www.oscepa.org/en/news-a-media/press-releases/2022/serbia-s-elections-offered-diverse-political-options-but-shortcomings-led-to-an-uneven-playing-field-international-observers-say>

Besides, LIED scores no political liberties. According to V-Dem's PCLI the scores remained at a somewhat presence, except in 2018 an ambiguous outcome is given.

Electoral Hybrid Regime: as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Kasapović 2010b, Ristić 2010)

Seychelles

01/01/1900 (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 05/30/1814]: Britain took control of Mauritius during the Napoleonic Wars in 1810, but the formal transfer of Mauritius and the Seychelles to the British did not occur until the Treaty of Paris on 05/30/1814. As part of the capitulation agreements, the British agreed to respect French settlers, language, and customs in the Seychelles. Although the British did not want to govern either Mauritius or the Seychelles, the Seychelles were indirectly ruled by the British until 1903, when they were granted the status of a British crown colony. The Seychelles, therefore, were rather indirectly and reluctantly ruled by the British until 1903, being technically a dependency of Mauritius, which was in turn a full-fledged British colony. Seychellois citizens gradually gained political power.

08/31/1903 Continuation as Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]: On this date, the territory was administratively separated from Mauritius in 1903 (Franda 1982). According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were absent during this time as well as universal suffrage. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI. Both LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for the Seychelles before 1903. For 1903-1948, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

10/01/1948 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: In 1948 the first parliamentary elections took place. Four of the twelve seats were elected but suffrage was limited to citizens over 21 who paid a certain amount of taxes. Thus, only 10% of the population could register for the elections. The 1967 election was the first election held under universal suffrage. The Seychelles Democratic Party won half of the seats. LIED confirms that legislative and multiparty elections took place since 1948 and that universal

suffrage was introduced in 1967.⁷²² In 1970 Seychelles obtained a new constitution, universal adult suffrage, and a governing council with an elected majority.⁷²³ For 1949-1970, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1971-1975, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and in an ambiguous state according to V-Dem's PCLI.

10/01/1975 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Non-Electoral Liberal Transitional (Multiparty) Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date internal self-government was granted (Turner 1998). A coalition government was formed with James Mancham as president and France-Albert René as prime minister. For 1976 and 1977, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. According to LIED, multiparty legislative elections were held in 1975. The following year, multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted. As per FH's classification in 1976, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework.

06/05/1977 End Non-Electoral Liberal Transitional (Multiparty) Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start One-Party Autocracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date, while Mancham was abroad, René became president in a bloodless coup d'état led by the Seychelles People's United Party and their militants.⁷²⁴ The new regime was recognized by the United Kingdom on 06/13 (Houbert 1978: 294). According to LIED, from 1977 onward, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held. As classified by FH in 1977, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free.

06/29/1978 Continuation One-Party Autocracy [as independent country]: On this date independence was gained (Turner 1998). For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is classified as moderate, indicating occasional judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the given period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as an ambiguous state regarding political liberties until 1976 and indicating

⁷²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Seychellois_parliamentary_election;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967_Seychellois_parliamentary_election

⁷²³ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Seychelles/History>

⁷²⁴ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Seychelles/History>

that they were not really present afterwards. Following a successful referendum on 03/26/1979, a new constitution went into effect. This constitution institutionalized Seychelles as a one-party state with the sole candidate for president nominated by the ruling party. All political activity took place under the rule of the Seychelles People's Progressive Front, and the President was voted for on a yes-no basis by any Seychelles citizen 17 or older. The president enjoyed almost unchecked executive power and appointed his own cabinet as well as his own chair of the Assembly. The legislature itself was unable to rule independently, and instead only enacted the bills proposed by the executive.⁷²⁵ For 1979-1989, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1990-1993, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. On 12/27/1991 a process started to initiate a multiparty democracy.⁷²⁶ Discussions and public debates between the major political parties began to take place in 01/1993.⁷²⁷ Per FH, from 1978 to 1991, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH in 1992, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present.

07/20[-23]/1993 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: In these days the first multiparty elections were held. René continued to win, and in 1998 and in 2001, when he defeated the opposition leader Wavel Ramkalawan, the candidate of Seychelles National Party. In addition to presidency, he held several cabinet posts simultaneously including Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Finance.⁷²⁸ The elections were evaluated as free and fair by international observer groups (Thibaut 1999). General elections were held from 10/22 to 10/24. The presidential elections were won by Ramkalawan, who received 54.9 percent of the vote. The election marked the first opposition victory in a presidential contest in Seychellois history. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In addition, ever since the transition the elections were viewed by LIED as competitive. According to V-Dem's CEI ambiguous cleanliness is scored until 2006. Since 2007, the elections are considered as somewhat clean.

⁷²⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_party_rule_in_Seychelles

⁷²⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_party_rule_in_Seychelles

⁷²⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Seychelles

⁷²⁸ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/seychelles/freedom-world/2022>

V-Dem's EF&FI underlines somewhat free and fair election conditions until 2019. On 08/09/2016 the opposition alliance Linyon Demokratik Seselwa secured a victory, winning 19 out of the 33 seats. This marked the first time since the 1979 elections that the People's Party failed to secure a majority of seats.⁷²⁹ Since 2020 the country provides fully free and fair elections. Per FH, from 1993 to 2019, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. According to FH, in 2020, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. As per FH's classification, the country is considered free since 2021 with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. For 1994-2002, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 2003, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2004-2012, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 2013-2015 and from 2022 onward, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2016-2021, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. LIED declares the political liberties as absent for the whole time. V-Dem's PCLI considers them as being in an ambiguous state until 2002. From 2003 to 2018 political liberties were somewhat present per PCLI and present since 2019. Government corruption remained a problem.⁷³⁰ Until 2006 the Seychelles were a borderline case between an electoral hybrid regime and a defective democracy.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Mazepus et al. 2016)

Sierra Leone

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 01/01/1808]: The coastal area of Sierra Leone became a British colony on 01/01/1808.⁷³¹ The Hinterland became a British Protectorate in 1896. Between 1900 and 1956, the effective

⁷²⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Seychellois_parliamentary_election

⁷³⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/seychelles/freedom-world/2022>

⁷³¹ https://oneworldlink.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/SL_POLITICAL_HISTORY

governing authority in Sierra Leone rested firmly with representatives of the British colonial administration, under the authority of the Crown and the British Colonial Office in London. The Governor, appointed by the British monarch on advice from the Colonial Office, held supreme executive power throughout this period, supported by a small Executive Council composed mainly of colonial officials rather than locally elected representatives. From 1900 to 1923, the coastal Colony of Freetown was administered directly by the British Governor of Sierra Leone, who acted as the effective executive leader. The office was successively held by several governors, among them Sir Charles Anthony King-Harman (1898–1900) and Sir George Chardin Denton (1901–1911), followed by Sir Edward Marsh Merewether (1911–1916) and Sir Richard James Wilkinson (1916–1919). These officials exercised nearly unchecked authority under British law, supported by advisory councils dominated by expatriate officials. The inland Protectorate, established in 1896, was governed indirectly through local paramount chiefs, who exercised limited administrative powers under the supervision of British district commissioners. From 1924 to 1950, through the introduction of a new constitution, the United Kingdom government separated Sierra Leone's administration into two distinct regions: the coastal Colony of Freetown and the inland Protectorate, each with its own political structure. The latter was primarily under local chieftain control. Tensions between these two regions peaked in 1947 due to proposals to unify their political systems, mainly advocated by the more populous Protectorate's leaders. The Krios, under Isaac Wallace-Johnson, resisted these changes, fearing a loss of their political influence in the colony. The Governor of Sierra Leone, such as Sir Ransford Slater (1922–1927) and later Sir George Beresford-Stooke (1948–1956), remained the dominant figure in both regions, though the Protectorate's local governance relied on traditional rulers within the framework of indirect rule. The Legislative Council, introduced in 1924, had only a few elected African members from the Colony and served largely in an advisory capacity, without real power to constrain the Governor. No multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1950. From 1951 onward, multiparty legislative elections were held. In 1953, Sierra Leone obtained local ministerial authority, and Margai secured the position of prime minister through elections. There were no executive elections held during this period and universal suffrage was absent (LIED). From 1900 to 1923, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1924 to 1950, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1951 to 1956, V-

Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED, political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present until 1950 and as ambiguous from 1951 onward. 05/01/1957 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: The introduction of a new constitution established Sierra Leone as a parliamentary system within the Commonwealth of Nations. Subsequently, in May 1957, the inaugural parliamentary election took place. The SLPP, then the leading political entity in the colony of Sierra Leone and backed by influential paramount chiefs in the provinces, secured the majority of parliamentary seats. Margai was overwhelmingly re-elected as Chief Minister during this time.⁷³² In May 1957, general elections took place in Sierra Leone Colony and Protectorate, with a total of 39 seats contested, along with the indirect election of 12 paramount chiefs. The Sierra Leone People's Party, under the leadership of Milton Margai, secured a majority of the elected seats and earned the backing of all 12 chiefs, as well as eight out of ten independent candidates. Margai subsequently guided the nation to independence in 1961.⁷³³ For 1957 to 1960, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. LIED confirms the presence of multiparty and legislative elections. Universal suffrage was achieved in 1958 according to LIED. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI.

04/27/1961 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime [as independent country]: On this date, Margai led the country to independence (Lansford 2021: 1468).⁷³⁴ Sierra Leone was from then on an independent sovereign state with its own parliament and its own prime minister.⁷³⁵ On 01/05/1962, general elections were conducted for the first time under universal suffrage. The ruling Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) emerged victorious in these elections. Despite receiving fewer votes compared to independent candidates, SLPP leader Milton Margai retained his position as prime minister.⁷³⁶ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

⁷³² [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sierra_Leone#Colonial_era_\(1800%E2%80%931961\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sierra_Leone#Colonial_era_(1800%E2%80%931961))

⁷³³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1957_Sierra_Leonean_general_election

⁷³⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1957_Sierra_Leonean_general_election

⁷³⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sierra_Leone_Colony_and_Protectorate

⁷³⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1962_Sierra_Leonean_general_election

Additionally, the elections were considered competitive until 1966 by LIED, while V-Dem's CEI scores them as not really clean during this period. Interestingly, V-Dem's EF&FI suggests that the overall election conditions were somewhat free and fair. Furthermore, LIED indicates that political liberties were absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI describes them as ambiguous in 1961 and somewhat present from 1962 onward. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 1961 to 1967, political control was solely in the hands of the SLPP, primarily composed of Mende members and led consecutively by Margai and his half-brother, Albert M. Margai. Efforts to establish a one-party system under the SLPP were thwarted by the opposition All People's Congress (APC), led by Siaka P. Stevens, a formidable trade-union leader from the smaller Limba tribe and predominantly consisting of Temne members (Lansford 2021: 1468). Due to the fact that there were attempts to establish a one-party autocracy by the SLPP and that as soon as a candidate from the APC won the parliamentary elections a coup backed by the SLPP took place-. However, while RoW classifies the country as an electoral autocracy, BR, BMR, GWF, LIED, MCM and PRC all classify Sierra Leone in this period as democratic. According to our classification the regime is an electoral hybrid regime that has mixed democratic and autocratic elements. For the relevant regime period, from 1961 to 1966, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In the general elections 1967, the FAPC won most seats in parliament and Siaka Stevens was sworn in as prime minister.

03/21/1967 End (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start (Monarchical) Military Autocracy: On this date David Lansana seized power from the civilian government. However, this regime lasted only two days and does therefore not appear in the data set.⁷³⁷ Lansana was allied with the dominant faction of the incumbent party and collaborated with incumbent elites in carrying out the coup (Bebler 1973: 68-70, Foray 1988: 27, Fisher 1969).

03/23/1967 End (Monarchical) Military Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Military Autocracy: a coup orchestrated by Major Blake resulted in the removal of Force Commander Brigadier David Lansana. The officers involved in Lansana's ousting were in opposition to the existing administration. They formed a seven-member military junta known as the National Reformation Council, which suspended the constitution, disbanded all political parties, and shut down parliament (Bebler 1973: 68-70, Foray 1988: 27, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 92). Per

⁷³⁷ <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/elections-and-coups-in-sierra-leone-1967/F7F447FA2BE820E80298249E540C2DC4>

LIED no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the year 1967, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In 1967, LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the state of political liberties.

04/18/1968 End (Monarchical) Military Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Autocracy: The officers successfully ousted the military government, facilitating the installation of elected members of parliament who had previously been denied the opportunity to assume office after the March 1967 elections. As the leader of the largest party, Stevens assumed the role of prime minister, marking the completion of the transition to civilian rule (Fisher 1969: 611, Bebler 1973: 79-80, Foray 1988: 31-32, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 92). On 06/30/1968, the SLPP leaders were arrested to prevent them from campaigning in by-elections, as the APC government began steps towards single-party rule. The government annulled most of the constituency elections won by SLPP in 1967 and used resources to ensure they won subsequent by-elections. The first SLPP leaders were arrested in June 1968, tipping the regime towards dictatorship. In November 1968, the government declared a state of emergency and sent troops to SLPP strongholds, killing supporters during the ensuing repression. The SLPP was prevented from holding political meetings and repression increased over time (Africa Confidential 1968: 7, Cartwright 1968: 29-30, Clapham 1972: 83-85, Cox 1976: 208, Allen 1978: 192, Hayward 1984: 25-26, 30, Zack-Williams 1999: 144, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 92-93). Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. For the relevant period, 1968-1970, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

04/19/1971 Continuation Electoral Autocracy (as a republic): On this date the parliamentary system was replaced with a presidential system, signifying a shift in governance structure. This constitutional change elevated Siaka Stevens to the position of Sierra Leone's first executive President.⁷³⁸ Sierra Leone became a republic within the Commonwealth.⁷³⁹ In 1973, general elections were held, but the SLPP boycotted these, due to alleged intimidations. In 1974, an

⁷³⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_Sierra_Leone

⁷³⁹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sierra_Leone_\(1961%E2%80%931971\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sierra_Leone_(1961%E2%80%931971))

alleged coup against President Steve failed and all its leaders were executed. One year later, government officials were executed for an alleged coup attempt. In the election in March 1976, Stevens was reelected as President. In May 1977 national parliamentary elections were held, which had the APC victorious. They won 74 seats, whereas the SLPP won 15 seats.⁷⁴⁰ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In addition, elections were not competitive according to LIED. V-Dem's CEI scores no cleanliness for the entire time. Furthermore, according to V-Dem's EF&FI no elections were held until 1972. Since 1973 the election are not really free and fair. As classified by FH in 1972, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH, from 1973 to 1976, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Per FH's evaluation in 1977, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI declares them as ambiguous until 1971. Since 1972, they are not really present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. In our classification the regime period is a clear case of an electoral autocracy. For 1971-1977, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

06/12/1978 End Electoral Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: In 1978, the parliament, led by the APC, approved a new constitution making the country a one-party state. Stevens argued that the one-party rule was more African than Western-style democracy. The APC became the only legal political party, which led to widespread demonstrations. These were met with government oppression and violence.⁷⁴¹ Stevens remained president for 14 years, until 1985.⁷⁴² He was succeeded by Joseph Saidu Momoh, who was elected as the only candidate and instated 11/28/1985.⁷⁴³ In 1990, the government gave into growing pressure and set up a commission to assess the one-party constitution, leading to the re-establishment of a multi-party system on 10/01/1991. The first elections under the new constitution were not held until 1996, due to the

⁷⁴⁰ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Sierra_Leone_\(1961%E2%80%931978\);](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Sierra_Leone_(1961%E2%80%931978);)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978_Sierra_Leonean_constitutional_referendum

⁷⁴¹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Sierra_Leone_\(1961%E2%80%931978\);](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Sierra_Leone_(1961%E2%80%931978);)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978_Sierra_Leonean_constitutional_referendum

⁷⁴² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sierra_Leone

⁷⁴³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Saidu_Momoh

coup in 1992.⁷⁴⁴ In accordance with LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held during the specified period, but they were not categorized as multiparty. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1978-1990, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1991, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. As classified by FH from 1978 to 1988, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH, from 1989 to 1991, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties were not really present.

04/29/1992 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup of junior officers led by the 25-year-old Captain Valentine Strasser ousted Momoh and the dominant party regime. The officers formed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), consisting of 18 military officers and four civilians (Zack-Williams 1999: 149-50, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 93) and Strasser became head of state.⁷⁴⁵ The constitution was abolished, as well as press freedom and freedom of speech. The rule of the government became increasingly authoritarian, which led to several coups attempts which in turn led to executions. Moreover, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels gained more power and land, which led to the government response of violently driving them back. In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1992, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1993-1995, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime

⁷⁴⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Sierra_Leonean_constitutional_referendum;
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sierra_Leone_2013?lang=en

⁷⁴⁵ <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Valentine-E-M-Strasser>; <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.html>

period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category.

01/17/1996 End Military Autocracy/ Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On 01/17/1996 Julius Maada Bio and other officers ousted Strasser. Bio and other members of the military were reportedly unhappy with Strasser's handling of the peace process with the RUF. Bio stated his goals as ending the civil war and bringing democracy back to Sierra Leone. He assumed the junta chairman position.⁷⁴⁶ This event is not coded as a coup and a regime change since it was bloodless and a seeming majority in the junta changed their leader. For the given timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present until 1993 and in an ambiguous state from 1994 onwards.

03/15/1996 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date elections were held under an electoral commission and around 15 parties were allowed to compete. Due to the raging civil war, less than 50% of the registered voters actually voted and in many rural areas voting was not accessible (Kandeh 1998). The SLPP won the election and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah became president. He immediately started a dialogue with the RUF rebels and signed a peace agreement with them (Kandeh 1998: 95-106, Reno 1998: 135-36, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 93).⁷⁴⁷ We classify this regime change event as a voluntary exit, given that the junta relinquished political power. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED considers the election as not competitive. V-Dem's CEI points in the direction that the elections were not really clean. However, V-Dem's EF&FI considers the overall election conditions as somewhat free and fair. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. LIED still scores absent political liberties, while according to V-Dem's PCLI they were somewhat present. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For 1996, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. While GWF codes the regime as democratic, most other datasets are more skeptical. However, for instance, the coding as a closed autocracy by RoW is a clearly false classification since elections

⁷⁴⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sierra_Leone

⁷⁴⁷ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.html>; <https://africanelections.tripod.com/za.html>

took place. Most datasets like AF, HTW, LIED, and MCM classify the regime as a multiparty/electoral autocracy.

05/25/1997 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Sierra Leone Army (SLA) officers freed and armed 600 prisoners in Freetown, one of them was Major Johnny Paul Korma. Ethnic tensions, the failure of the civil war and the lack of supplies for the armed forces were cited by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, led by Johnny Paul Koroma, as reasons for the coup against Kabbah. Koroma was appointed chairman after the coup and Kabbah was sent into exile (Kandeh 1998: 107, Zack-Williams 1999: 143, 152-53, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 93, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 57-58). For 1997, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In 1997, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were somewhat present.

02/12/1998 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: Koroma invited the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces to help end the civil war with the RUF. Despite the signing of a peace agreement with the rebels, fighting continued. Because of that, ECOMOG ousted Koroma on this date from power and reinstalled the civilian leader Kabbah (Kandeh 1998: 107).⁷⁴⁸ Kabbah returned to Freetown on 03/10/1998 (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 93).⁷⁴⁹ In 1999 the Lomé Peace Agreement between Kabbah and the RUF was signed, which gave the leader of the rebels, Sankoh, the position of vice-president. Moreover, him and his followers were given amnesty. The agreement was nationally and internationally highly criticized and did not lead to an end of the war.⁷⁵⁰ After the deployment of UN peacekeepers, as well as British troops, the war was declared over in January 2002.⁷⁵¹ According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. According to Polity5 the period is characterized by a complete collapse of central authority. For 1998 and 1999, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 2000 and 2001, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate.

⁷⁴⁸ <http://tinyurl.com/3js3qzc>

⁷⁴⁹ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/80603.stm>

⁷⁵⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lom%C3%A9_Peace_Agreement

⁷⁵¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sierra_Leone

Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to FH, in 1998 and 1999, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. As classified by FH in 2000 and 2001 the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were somewhat present.

05/14/2002 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Defective Democracy: Following a decade marked by one of Africa's most brutal armed insurgencies, Sierra Leoneans turned out in significant numbers to participate in the electoral process on 05/14/2002, to choose a new president and parliament. These elections were hailed as the most unrestricted, transparent, and peaceful in the nation's history (Kandeh 1998). The next election was held in August 2007 and in September of that year, the opposition candidate of the APC, Ernest Bai Koroma, became president. He was reelected in November 2012.⁷⁵² All elections on the national and local level were described as free and fair by international observers, including the latest general election on 03/07/2018. In the 2018 election, former military junta leader Julius Maada Bio (SLPP) defeated Samura Kamara of the ruling APC in a highly contested presidential election. However, in Sierra Leone parties tend to mobilize support based on ethno-regional difference rather than providing party programs. Moreover, protesters in Sierra Leone face extensive police repression during demonstrations.⁷⁵³ Furthermore, multiparty election was held over the years, but the opposition often faced police violence and restrictions. On top of that, government corruption is a big issue in the country.⁷⁵⁴ Despite elections being classified as mostly free, authoritarian structures still exist in Sierra Leone, which makes it impossible to code it as an electoral democracy according to our coding rules. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In addition, LIED points out that elections were not competitive until 2000. Since 2001, electoral competitiveness is acknowledged. V-Dem's CEI indicates no cleanliness until 2001. In 2002, not real cleanliness was scored. Since 2003, the electoral cleanliness is classified as ambiguous. Moreover, V-Dem's EF&FI declares that no elections took place until 2001. Since 2002, the overall election conditions are somewhat free and fair. FH rates Sierra Leone in this period as a partly free. In June 2023, incumbent President Julius Maada Bio secured a second term in office following a first-round electoral victory.

⁷⁵² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Bai_Koroma

⁷⁵³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Sierra_Leonean_general_election; <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SLE#pos4>

⁷⁵⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/sierra-leone/freedom-world/2021>

Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the election results was challenged by opposition groups, and international monitors expressed apprehensions regarding numerous irregularities and the general credibility of the process. Subsequently, until October 2023, the opposition party, the All People's Congress (APC), abstained from occupying its designated seats in congress as a form of protest against the electoral outcomes.⁷⁵⁵ According to FH, in 2002, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH, from 2003 to 2011, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. According to FH, in 2012, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 from 2013 onward designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Furthermore, according to LIED political liberties were absent for the entire time, while according to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were somewhat present until 2001 and present from 2002 onward. From 2002 to 2006, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks. Since 2007, based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. For 2002-2004, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2005-2015, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. In 2016, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2017-2019, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2020 onward, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. Sierra Leone is in this period a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Cartwright 1970, Hayward 1989, Reynolds 1999, Zack-Williams/Riley 1993)

Sikkim

⁷⁵⁵ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/sierra-leone/freedom-world/2024>

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: xx/xx/1642]: The Bhutia people started migrating to the region from Tibet in the 14th century. In 1642, when the kingdom of Sikkim was founded, the inaugural chogyal (a combined temporal and spiritual king), Phuntsog Namgyal, hailed from the Bhutia community. The Namgyal dynasty governed Sikkim until 1975.⁷⁵⁶ Sikkim came under British protection through the Treaty of Tumlong in 1861.⁷⁵⁷ Beside „British Sikkim,“ a residual entity known as „Independent Sikkim“ persisted, centered around the capital, Gangtok, governing approximately 2,500 square miles of territory. The former Chogyal was compelled to relinquish the throne in favor of his son, Sidkeong Namgyal, in 1863.⁷⁵⁸ LIED does not provide data for Sikkim.

12/05/1950 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of India, Defective Democracy]: The Indo-Sikkimese Treaty of 1950⁷⁵⁹ transformed Sikkim into an Indian protectorate, where India took on the responsibilities for the external relations, defense, and strategic communications of Sikkim. The treaty also stipulated enhanced public involvement in governance, leading to five general elections conducted on the basis of adult suffrage between 1952 and 1974.⁷⁶⁰ There is very few information on the political norms and procedures in this regime period. Neither LIED, Polity5 nor V-Dem provide data for Sikkim. From what we know, distrust along ethnic lines was a defining feature of society and discrimination against the ethnic majority of the Nepalese persisted in the political system. A „parity-rule“ prescribed a parity of seats on the council between two ethnic groups, although the Nepalese comprised 75 percent of the population and the Bhutia-Lepcha only 25 percent (Sinha 2005, Thapa 2002).(Thapa 2002)

04/14/1975 End Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of India, Defective Democracy]/Start Part of Other Country [India, Defective Democracy]: In 1975, discrimination against Nepali Hindus in Sikkim led to resentment against the Chogyal, prompting the Indian Army's intervention in Gangtok. The army eliminated palace guards and surrounded the palace in April

⁷⁵⁶ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sikkim#ref46212>

⁷⁵⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Tumlong

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Sikkim#:~:text=The%20history%20of%20Sikkim%20begins,as%20a%20state%20of%20India.

⁷⁵⁹ [https://ir.nbu.ac.in/server/api/core/bitstreams/5a2b34c9-9a87-420f-a8a7-de3ac3c9d768/content#:~:text=APPENDIX%20%2D%20I,-Indo%2DSikkim%20Treaty&text=\(1\)%20The%20Government%20of%20India,whether%20within%20or%20outside%20Sikkim.](https://ir.nbu.ac.in/server/api/core/bitstreams/5a2b34c9-9a87-420f-a8a7-de3ac3c9d768/content#:~:text=APPENDIX%20%2D%20I,-Indo%2DSikkim%20Treaty&text=(1)%20The%20Government%20of%20India,whether%20within%20or%20outside%20Sikkim.)

⁷⁶⁰ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sikkim#ref46212>

1975. After disarming the palace, a referendum was held, with the majority favoring the abolition of the monarchy. Considering that the abolition of the monarchy was enabled by the Indian intervention, and assuming that the referendum reflected the will of the population (a claim contested by the Chogyal himself), we code this regime change event as a foreign-imposed regime change. From this point on the Chogyal is no longer part of the Sikkimese elite. Sikkim's new parliament, led by Kazi Lhendup Dorjee, swiftly proposed a bill for Sikkim to become an Indian state, a move promptly accepted by the Indian government.⁷⁶¹

05/16/1975 End Sikkim [Autocratic Monarchy]: after that day Sikkim became a federal state of India and ceased to exist as a distinct political entity. FH, LIED and V-Dem do not treat Sikkim in their datasets.

For time after 05/16/1975, see **India**.

Singapore

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 04/01/1867]: Straits Settlements (amongst them Singapore) become crown colonies (subordinated to British India) on 04/01/1867 (LePoer 1991a). In December 1941, Japanese troops landed in southern Thailand and northern Malaya, quickly established a foothold on the peninsula, and captured the British air base at Kota Baharu. They began bombing Singapore and faced little resistance. During this time multiparty executive and legislative elections were absent as well as universal suffrage and political liberties were absent according to LIED and in an ambiguous state according to our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI until 1941. For 1942, our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were not really present. For this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

02/15/1942 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]: On 02/15/1942, General Yamashita Tomoyuki accepted the unconditional surrender of British Lieutenant General Arthur Percival. The Japanese occupied Singapore until 1945, designating it the capital of Japan's southern region and renaming it Shōnan. The formal surrender was announced a week later (LePoer 1991a). For 1942-1945, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as

⁷⁶¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Sikkim#Accession_to_India

indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to LIED, no elections were held during this period. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present.

09/12/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: Japanese surrender to the British (de facto: 08/15/1945; announced takeover by the BMA 09/12/1945). On 04/01/1946 the British Military Administration ended with the formation of the Malayan Union, at which time Singapore became a separate crown colony with a civil administration. For 1946 and 1947, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI.

03/20/1948 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this day the first general elections for the Legislative Council took place. Six of the 22 seats were directly elected. However, voting was limited to British citizens. In 1951 the number of direct elected representatives increased to nine and to 25 in 1955. In 1957 Singapore gained internal self-government. The legislative Assembly increased to 51 members, all of them directly elected.⁷⁶² For 1948-1955, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1956-1959, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. LIED confirms the presence of multiparty and legislative elections since 1949. However universal suffrage remained absent until 1959 (LIED). Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI.

05/30/1959 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: State of Singapore and internal self-government: In April 1958, Lim Yew

⁷⁶² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Singaporean_general_election;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Singapore

Hock led the Singapore delegation to the third round of constitutional talks, resulting in an agreement for a State of Singapore with full powers of internal government. In August 1958, the British Parliament changed Singapore's status from a colony to a state, and general elections were scheduled for May 1959, with a record 13 parties contending. After a recommendation by the Commission of Inquiry in 1958, compulsory voting was introduced, raising participation rates to 89.4%. The parties with highest prominence were the Singapore People's Alliance (SPA), the People's Action Party (PAP), the Liberal Socialist Party (LS), and the United Malays' Organization/Malayan Chinese Association (UMNO/MCA)(Chung 1975: 63). Based on our observations, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period, which contradicts the observations of LIED. LIED considers the elections as not competitive. Moreover, ambiguous cleanliness is scored (V-Dem CEI) and the overall election conditions were ambiguous as well (V-Dem EF&FI). The PAP, under Lee Kuan Yew, won a landslide victory by campaigning on a platform of honest efficient government, social and economic reform, and union with the Federation of Malaya, winning 43 of the 51 seats. The Singapore People's Alliance won four seats, while the remaining seats were won by three UMNOMCA Alliance candidates and one independent (LePoer 1991a). In a high-profile scandal in 1959, the Minister of Education was reported accepting significant sums of money from foreign sources. Furthermore, while Singapore was granted full self-government under the new constitution of 1959, it still was not granted independence in matters of foreign affairs, internal security and defense until 1965 (Bellows 1967). Furthermore, no political liberties were achieved (LIED). Whereas V-Dem's PCLI classifies their presence as ambiguous. Singapore is a prototypical case of an electoral hybrid regime. For 1960-1963, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

09/16/1963 End Electoral Hybrid Regime [a Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Part of Other Country [Malaysia, Electoral Autocracy]: The leaders of Singapore, Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak signed the Malaysia Agreement on 07/09/1963, under which the Federation of Malaysia was scheduled to come into being on 08/31 Tengku Abdul Rahman changed the date to 09/16, however, to allow the UN time to complete its survey (LePoer 1991a). For the given period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

08/09/1965 End Part of Other Country [Malaysia, Electoral Autocracy]/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On 08/09/1965, with the Singapore delegates not attending, the Malaysian parliament passed a bill favoring separation 126 to 0. That afternoon, in a televised press conference, Lee

declared Singapore a sovereign, democratic and independent state (LePoer 1991a). We code this regime change event as a negotiated transition due to the preceding agreement between Malaysia and Singapore.⁷⁶³ Before independence, the PAP led by Lee Kuan Yew won the 1959 and 1963 assembly elections. The elections were competitive, but individuals with records of „subversive activity,” that is, pro-Communists, a large group including well-known political actors, were not allowed to compete. Throughout the pre-independence period, British actions to limit the influence of the large communist movement aided Lee's dominance over rivals in the PAP and the PAP's dominance over other potential mass-based parties by removing some of the most popular potential political leaders from competition. Thus, we do not treat the pre-independence elections as democratic. Before independence, the PAP government arrested 111 „agitators,” most from a leftist faction of the party, who had opposed Lee and split from the party prior to the 1963 election, further reducing democraticness. At independence in 1965, Lee Kuan Yew and PAP were fully in control (LePoer 1991b, Means 1996: 105). The administration is regarded as authoritarian, despite the presence of competitive elections prior to independence, due to the exclusion of parties and individuals who were anticipated to garner significant support. Following independence, suppression of leftist factions and electoral manipulation persisted (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 93-94). On 08/11/1965 The Lee Kuan Yew government announced two days after separation that Singapore would be a republic, with Malay as its national language and Malay, Chinese, English, and Tamil retained as official languages. The Legislative Assembly was renamed the Parliament, and the prominent Malay leader, Yusof bin Ishak, was made president of the republic. The new nation, immediately recognized by Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, was admitted to the UN in September and the Commonwealth the following month. In the early months following separation, Singapore's leaders continued to talk of eventual reunion with Malaysia (LePoer 1991a). The party system is dominated by the People's Action Party (PAP) led by Lee Kuan Yew. Between 1965 and 1981, the PAP was the only political force represented in parliament. Elections were partially competitive, but some of the most popular potential political leaders were excluded from competition. Singapore operates under a multiparty political system, with 11 parties participating in the 2020 parliamentary elections. Nonetheless, several factors contribute to the dominant position of the PAP, including an electoral structure that favors incumbents, limitations on political content in films and television programs, the risk of defamation lawsuits, the PAP's significantly greater financial resources, and its control over

⁷⁶³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_Singapore_Agreement_1965

mass media and the judiciary.⁷⁶⁴ After Lee Hsien Loong, the acting prime minister, announced his retirement for 05/15/24, he declared former finance minister Lawrence Wong his successor, ending a 20-year reign. Wong had been designated the next PAP leader in an internal election in 2022. Notably, the transition of power is set to occur before the next 2025 general elections.⁷⁶⁵ In 09/23 Singapore held their first contested presidential elections in more than a decade, in which former deputy prime minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam managed to secure the presidency with more than 70% of the votes.⁷⁶⁶ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In addition, LIED points out that competitive elections were absent ever since the country's independence in 1965. According to V-Dem's CEI ambiguous cleanliness is scored until 1980. Since 1981, the country achieved somewhat clean elections. Moreover, the overall election conditions were ambiguous until 2014. Since 2015, somewhat freedom and fairness for the elections is given (V-Dem EF&FI). Since 2021 the government has continued to pass laws limiting freedom of expression such as the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) on 10/04/2021, which multiple organizations claim is intended to limit dissent.⁷⁶⁷ As classified by FH from 1972 to 1988, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. According to FH, from 1989 to 1991, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH's evaluation from 1992 to 2010, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH, from 2011 onward, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Furthermore, LIED underlines a constant absence of political liberties. V-Dem's PCLI scores them as ambiguous since 1965. Since 1966, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. According to our criteria Singapore is a prototypical case for an electoral hybrid regime. From 1964 onward, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Chua 1995, Slater 2010)

⁷⁶⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/singapore/freedom-world/2022>

⁷⁶⁵ <https://bti-project.org/de/reports/country-dashboard/SGP>

⁷⁶⁶ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/singapore/freedom-world/2024>

⁷⁶⁷ <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SGP>

Sint Maarten

For the time before 10/10/2010 see [The] Netherlands Antilles

10/10/2010 Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of Netherlands, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: Originally claimed by Spain, the island attracted the attention of European powers like France, Britain, and the Netherlands. The French aimed to establish colonies between Trinidad and Bermuda, while the Dutch saw it as a strategic location between New Amsterdam (now New York) and New Holland. In 1631, the Dutch constructed Fort Amsterdam on the island, with Jan Claeszen van Campen as its first governor. In 1633, the Spanish took control, but by 1648, they abandoned the island as the Eighty Years' War ended and it lost its strategic value. The Dutch and the French then vied for control. To avoid all-out conflict, they signed the Treaty of Concordia on 03/26/1648, splitting the island into two parts.⁷⁶⁸ The Dutch segment of the island was integrated into the Dutch West Indies in 1828 and, by 1845, had become one of the six Dutch island territories in the West Indies subjected to joint governance.⁷⁶⁹ On 10/10/2010, Sint Maarten became a country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands.⁷⁷⁰ Sint Maarten follows a parliamentary representative democratic system featuring a multi-party framework. Sint Maarten enjoys extensive self-governing authority on most issues, except for those outlined in the „Kingdom affairs“ section of the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands.⁷⁷¹ The Sint Maarten judiciary acts independently and regular elections for the Estates of Sint Maarten (the parliament) are held under universal suffrage.⁷⁷² The most recent fair and free elections were held on 08/19/2024.⁷⁷³ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. LIED, V-Dem and FH do not register Sint Maarten in their data.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Siam see Thailand

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⁷⁶⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sint_Maarten#History

⁷⁶⁹ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Saint-Martin-island-West-Indies>

⁷⁷⁰ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Saint-Martin-island-West-Indies>

⁷⁷¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Sint_Maarten

⁷⁷² <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/suffrage/>,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Sint_Maarten

⁷⁷³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Sint_Maarten_general_election

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